While emulate CR0 and CR4 for nested virtualization, set the CR0/CR4
guest host mask to 0xffffffff in shadow VMCS, then calculate the
corresponding read shadow separately for CR0 and CR4. While getting
the VM exit for CR0/CR4 access, check if L1 VMM owns the bit. If so,
inject the VM exit to L1 VMM. Otherwise, L0 will handle it and sync
the value to L1 virtual VMCS.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
In Linux select() typically supports up to 1024 file descriptors. This can be
a problem when user tries to boot up many guests. Switching to poll() has
minimum impact on existing code and has better scalibility.
pollfd array is dynamically allocated / reallocated. If the array fails to
expand, we just ignore the incoming fd.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Changeset 23861:ec7c81fbe0de alters the SBDF encoding expected by the
DOMCTL_{de,}assign_device hypercalls.
While it updates libxl, libxc and the python bindings, the ocaml
bindings got missed. As a result, any attempt to use PCI Passthrough
with Xen-4.2 and later will fail.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
do_stop() is invoked by "restart" action. We can get multiple QEMUs started up
for Dom0 if we don't kill previous ones.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
in current xen x86_64, the default libexec directory is /usr/lib/xen/bin,
while the private binder is /usr/lib64/xen/bin. but some commands(pygrub,
libxl-save-helper) located in private binder directory is called from
libexec directory which lead to the following error:
1, for pygrub bootloader:
libxl: debug: libxl_bootloader.c:429:bootloader_disk_attached_cb: /usr/lib/xen/bin/pygrub doesn't exist, falling back to config path
2, for libxl-save-helper:
libxl: cannot execute /usr/lib/xen/bin/libxl-save-helper: No such file or directory
libxl: error: libxl_utils.c:363:libxl_read_exactly: file/stream truncated reading ipc msg header from domain 3 save/restore helper stdout pipe
libxl: error: libxl_exec.c:118:libxl_report_child_exitstatus: domain 3 save/restore helper [10222] exited with error status 255
there are two ways to fix above error. the first one is make such command
store in the /usr/lib/xen/bin and /usr/lib64/xen/bin(symbol link to
previous), e.g. qemu-dm. The second way is using private binder dir
instead of libexec dir. e.g. xenconsole.
For these cases, the latter one is suitable.
Signed-off-by: Bamvor Jian Zhang <bjzhang@suse.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
In particular we need to check that adding 512KB of slack and
rounding up to a 4MB boundary do not overflow the guest's memory
allocation. Otherwise we run off the end of the p2m when building the
guest's initial page tables and populate them with garbage.
Wei noticed this when build tiny (2MB) mini-os domains.
Reported-by: Wei Liu <Wei.Liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Other devices set a sensible devid if the caller has not done so.
Do the same for vfb and vkb. While at it, factor out the common code
used to determine a sensible devid, so it can be used by other
libxl__device_*_add functions.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This adds comments to the FLASK access_vectors file describing what
operations each access vector controls and the meanings of the source
and target fields in the permission check. This also makes the
indentation of the file consistent; no functionality changes are made.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Add getscheduler and setscheduler permissions to replace the
monolithic scheduler permission in the scheduler_op domctl and sysctl.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This adds a pair of XSM hooks for tmem operations: xsm_tmem_op which
controls any use of tmem, and xsm_tmem_control which allows use of the
TMEM_CONTROL operations. By default, all domains can use tmem while
only IS_PRIV domains can use control operations.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Include the default XSM hook action as the first argument of the hook
to facilitate quick understanding of how the call site is expected to
be used (dom0-only, arbitrary guest, or device model). This argument
does not solely define how a given hook is interpreted, since any
changes to the hook's default action need to be made identically to
all callers of a hook (if there are multiple callers; most hooks only
have one), and may also require changing the arguments of the hook.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
A number of the platform_hypercall XSM hooks have no parameters or
only pass the operation ID, making them redundant with the
xsm_platform_op hook. Remove these redundant hooks.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
A number of the sysctl XSM hooks have no parameters or only pass the
operation ID, making them redundant with the xsm_sysctl hook. Remove
these redundant hooks.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
A number of the domctl XSM hooks do nothing except pass the domain and
operation ID, making them redundant with the xsm_domctl hook. Remove
these redundant hooks.
The remaining domctls all use individual hooks because they pass extra
details of the call to the XSM module in order to allow a more
fine-grained access decision to be made - for example, considering the
exact device or memory range being set up for guest access.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
There are three callers of get_pg_owner:
* do_mmuext_op, which does not have XSM hooks on all subfunctions
* do_mmu_update, which has hooks that are inefficient
* do_update_va_mapping_otherdomain, which has a simple XSM hook
In order to preserve return values for the do_mmuext_op hypercall, an
additional XSM hook is required to check the operation even for those
subfunctions that do not use the pg_owner field. This also covers the
MMUEXT_UNPIN_TABLE operation which did previously have an XSM hook.
The XSM hooks in do_mmu_update were capable of replacing the checks in
get_pg_owner; however, the hooks are buried in the inner loop of the
function - not very good for performance when XSM is enabled and these
turn in to indirect function calls. This patch removes the PTE from
the hooks and replaces it with a bitfield describing what accesses are
being requested. The XSM hook can then be called only when additional
bits are set instead of once per iteration of the loop.
This patch results in a change in the FLASK permissions used for
mapping an MMIO page: the target for the permisison check on the
memory mapping is no longer resolved to the device-specific type, and
is instead either the domain's own type or domio_t (depending on if
the domain uses DOMID_SELF or DOMID_IO in the map
command). Device-specific access is still controlled via the "resource
use" permisison checked at domain creation (or device hotplug).
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This patch adds splits up the mem_sharing and mem_event XSM hooks to
better cover what the code is doing. It also changes the utility
function get_mem_event_op_target to rcu_lock_live_remote_domain_by_id
because there is no mm-specific logic in there.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Because the FLASK XSM module no longer checks IS_PRIV for remote
domain accesses covered by XSM permissions, domains now have the
ability to perform memory management and other functions on all
domains that have the same type. While it is possible to prevent this
by only creating one domain per type, this solution significantly
limits the flexibility of the type system.
This patch introduces a domain type transition to represent a domain
that is operating on itself. In the example policy, this is
demonstrated by creating a type with _self appended when declaring a
domain type which will be used for reflexive operations. AVCs for a
domain of type domU_t will look like the following:
scontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t
tcontext=system_u:system_r:domU_t_self
This change also allows policy to distinguish between event channels a
domain creates to itself and event channels created between domains of
the same type.
The IS_PRIV_FOR check used for device model domains is also no longer
checked by FLASK; a similar transition is performed when the target is
set and used when the device model accesses its target domain.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The FLASK module was missing implementations of some hooks and did not
have access vectors defined for 10 domctls; define these now.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The existing domain__set_target check only verifies that the source
and target domains can be associated. We also need to check that the
privileged domain making this association is allowed to do so.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The newly introduced xsm_platform_op hook addresses new sub-ops, while
most ops already have their own XSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The xsm_sysctl hook now covers every sysctl, in addition to the more
fine-grained XSM hooks in most sub-functions.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The xsm_domctl hook now covers every domctl, in addition to the more
fine-grained XSM hooks in most sub-functions. This also removes the
need to special-case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The rcu_lock_{,remote_}target_domain_by_id functions are wrappers
around an IS_PRIV_FOR check for the current domain. This is now
redundant with XSM hooks, so replace these calls with
rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id or rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id to remove
the duplicate permission checks.
When XSM_ENABLE is not defined or when the dummy XSM module is used,
this patch should not change any functionality. Because the locations
of privilege checks have sometimes moved below argument validation,
error returns of some functions may change from EPERM to EINVAL when
called with invalid arguments and from a domain without permission to
perform the operation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The Xen hypervisor has two basic access control function calls:
IS_PRIV and the xsm_* functions. Most privileged operations currently
require that both checks succeed, and many times the checks are at
different locations in the code. This patch eliminates the explicit
and implicit IS_PRIV checks that are duplicated in XSM hooks.
When XSM_ENABLE is not defined or when the dummy XSM module is used,
this patch should not change any functionality. Because the locations
of privilege checks have sometimes moved below argument validation,
error returns of some functions may change from EPERM to EINVAL or
ESRCH if called with invalid arguments and from a domain without
permission to perform the operation.
Some checks are removed due to non-obvious duplicates in their
callers:
* acpi_enter_sleep is checked in XENPF_enter_acpi_sleep
* map_domain_pirq has IS_PRIV_FOR checked in its callers:
* physdev_map_pirq checks when acquiring the RCU lock
* ioapic_guest_write is checked in PHYSDEVOP_apic_write
* PHYSDEVOP_{manage_pci_add,manage_pci_add_ext,pci_device_add} are
checked by xsm_resource_plug_pci in pci_add_device
* PHYSDEVOP_manage_pci_remove is checked by xsm_resource_unplug_pci
in pci_remove_device
* PHYSDEVOP_{restore_msi,restore_msi_ext} are checked by
xsm_resource_setup_pci in pci_restore_msi_state
* do_console_io has changed to IS_PRIV from an explicit domid==0
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The xsm_iomem_permission and xsm_ioport_permission hooks are intended
to be called by the domain builder, while the calls in
arch/x86/domctl.c which control mapping are also performed by the
device model. Because these operations require distinct access
control policies, they cannot use the same XSM hooks.
This also adds a missing XSM hook in the unbind IRQ domctl.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Rather than keeping around headers that are autogenerated in order to
avoid adding build dependencies from xen/ to files in tools/, move the
relevant parts of the FLASK policy into the hypervisor tree and
generate the headers as part of the hypervisor's build.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This patch moves the implementation of the dummy XSM module to a
header file that provides inline functions when XSM_ENABLE is not
defined. This reduces duplication between the dummy module and callers
when the implementation of the dummy return is not just "return 0",
and also provides better compile-time checking for completeness of the
XSM implementations in the dummy module.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
ACPI table passthrough support allowing additional static tables and
SSDTs (AML code) to be loaded. These additional tables are added at
the end of the secondary table list in the RSDT/XSDT tables.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Passthrough support for the SMBIOS structures including three new DMTF
defined types and support for OEM defined tables. Passed in SMBIOS
types override the default internal values. Default values can be
enabled for the new type 22 portable battery using a xenstore
flag. All other new DMTF defined and OEM structures will only be added
to the SMBIOS table if passthrough values are present.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Xen control tools support for loading the firmware passthrough blocks
during domain construction. SMBIOS and ACPI blocks are passed in using
the new xc_hvm_build_args structure. Each block is read and loaded
into the new domain address space behind the HVMLOADER image. The base
address for the two blocks is returned as an out parameter to the
caller via the args structure.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Add public HVM definitions header for xenstore strings used in
HVMLOADER. In addition this header describes the use of the firmware
passthrough values set using xenstore.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Using SVT_VERIFY_BUS here doesn't make sense; native Linux also
uses SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ here instead.
This is XSA-33 / CVE-2012-5634.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When fronts are not enabled, the test application needs to disable the
corresponding tests.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
To allow for more flexibility, this notifies domain shutdown through a
function rather than a wake queue, to let the application use a wake
queue only if it wishes.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Page fault is specially handled not only with exception bitmaps,
but also with consideration of page fault error code mask/match
values. Therefore in nested virtualization case, the two values
need to be synchronized from virtual VMCS to shadow VMCS.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Use the host value to emulate IA32_VMX_MISC MSR for L1 VMM.
For CR3-target value, we don't support this feature currently and
set the number to zero.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Instead of using a hardcoded domain 0 as the endpoint for the event
channels created in hvm_vcpu_initialise, use the domain ID of the
building domain so that a domain builder in a domain other than dom0 has
the expected access to the event channels.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
c/s 22998:e9fab50d7b61 (and immediately following ones) made it
possible that __get_page_type() returns other than -EINVAL, in
particular -EBUSY. Consequently, the assertion in get_page_type()
should check for only the return values we absolutely don't expect to
see there.
This is XSA-37 / CVE-2013-0154.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Keir Fraser