Leaf 0x8000000a contains SVM information. The feature choices are borrowed
straight from the libxc policy code.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The entirety of edx is reserved.
Intel only defines the lower 16 bits of eax, although ebx is covered by the
featureset ABI, so left unclobbered.
AMD uses 24 bits in eax, although nothing thus far has ever exposed a non-zero
guest maxphysaddr to HVM guests. Its semantics are not clearly expressed, so
it is explicitly clobbered. ecx contains some reserved bits, and several
pieces of static topology information, which are left as the toolstack
chooses.
A side effect of the common recalculation of maxlinaddr is that 32bit PV
guests see a maximum linear address of 32, which is consistent with the hiding
of other long mode information from them.
Finally, the call to guest_cpuid() in mtrr_var_range_msr_set() (introduced in
c/s fff8160a) can be dropped, now that maxphysaddr can be read straight out of
the cpuid_policy block.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Leaf 0x80000005 contains L1 cache/TLB information, 0x80000006 L2 & L3
cache/TLB information, and 0x80000007 Power management information.
Intel reserves all of this information other than the L2 cache information,
and the ITSC bit from the power management leaf.
AMD passes all of the cache/TLB information through to the guest, while most
of of the power management information is explicitly clobbered by the
toolstack.
0x80000007 edx (containing ITSC) is covered by the featureset logic.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Leaves 0x80000002 through 0x80000004 are plain ASCII text, and are left
exactly as the toolstack chooses.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Intel reserve eax and ebx, while AMD duplicates eax from the low
family/model/stepping leaf. For AMD, ebx contains further brand/package
information which is left as the toolstack chooses (other than bits 27:16
which are reserved).
While moving the dynamic adjustments from the legacy path, simplify the shadow
PSE36 adjustment. PAE paging is a prerequisite for enabling long mode, making
the long mode check redundant; the case where it doesn't get short circuited
is the case where it is architecturally 0. Make the same adjustment to the
leaf 1 legacy path.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Intel now document leaf 2 as a plain leaf, with %al always containing the
value 0x01. Collect this leaf normally in calculate_raw_policy() and expose
it to guests. The leaf is reserved by AMD.
Intel leaves 3 and 9 (PSN and DCA respectively) are not exposed to guests at
all. They are reserved by AMD.
Leaves 8 and 0xc are reserved by both vendors.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
With accurate vendor information available, the shared bits can be sorted out
during recalculation, rather than at query time in the legacy cpuid path.
This means that:
* Duplication can be dropped from the automatically generated cpuid data.
* The toolstack need not worry about setting them appropriately.
* They can be dropped from the system maximum featuresets.
While editing gen-cpuid.py, reflow some comments which exceeded the expected
line length.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The calculations for p->extd.max_leaf are reworked to force a value of at
least 0x80000000, and to take the domains chosen vendor into account when
clamping maximum value.
The high short vendor information is clobbered or duplicated according to the
chosen vendor.
As a side effect of handing out an audited max_leaf value, the 0x8000001e case
can be dropped from pv_cpuid(), as it outside of the visible range.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Self-snoop describes a property of the CPU cache behaviour, which FreeBSD uses
to optimise its cache flushing algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
This is a basic program to call into the unified fuzzing function.
Hook it up into build system so that we can always build test it.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The patch introduces a new performance counter that counts how many times we go
through the load balancing logic in Credit2.
Signed-off-by: Praveen Kumar <kpraveen.lkml@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Since injection works on a remote vCPU, and since there's no
enforcement of the subject vCPU being paused, there's a potential race
between the producing and consuming sides. Fix this by leveraging the
vector field as synchronization variable.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
[re-based]
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
NOTE: This patch also modifies the types of the 'vector', 'type' and
'insn_len' arguments of xc_hvm_inject_trap() from uint32_t to
uint8_t. In practice the values passed were always truncated to
8 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This patch removes the need for handling HVMOP restarts, so that
infrastructure is removed.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' argument of
xc_hvm_set_mem_type() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice the
value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This patch introduces code to handle DMOP continuations.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' argument of
xc_hvm_modified_memory() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice the
value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... HVMOP_set_pci_link_route
These HVMOPs were exposed to guests so their definitions need to be
preserved for compatibility. This patch therefore updates
__XEN_LATEST_INTERFACE_VERSION__ to 0x00040900 and makes the HVMOP
defintions conditional on __XEN_INTERFACE_VERSION__ less than that value.
NOTE: This patch also widens the 'domain' parameter of
xc_hvm_set_pci_intx_level() from a uint8_t to a uint16_t.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The handle type passed to the underlying shadow and hap functions is
changed for compatibility with the new hypercall buffer.
NOTE: This patch also modifies the type of the 'nr' parameter of
xc_hvm_track_dirty_vram() from uint64_t to uint32_t. In practice
the value passed was always truncated to 32 bits.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
...as a set of hypercalls to be used by a device model.
As stated in the new docs/designs/dm_op.markdown:
"The aim of DMOP is to prevent a compromised device model from
compromising domains other then the one it is associated with. (And is
therefore likely already compromised)."
See that file for further information.
This patch simply adds the boilerplate for the hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@citrix.com>
Suggested-by: Jennifer Herbert <jennifer.herbert@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
On some platforms firmware fails to specify RMRR regions in ACPI tables and
thus those regions will not be mapped in dom0 or guests and may cause IO
Page Faults and prevent dom0 from booting if "iommu=dom0-strict" option is
specified on the Xen command line.
New Xen command line option rmrr allows to specify such devices and
memory regions. These regions are added to the list of RMRR defined in ACPI
if the device is present in system. As a result, additional RMRRs will be
mapped 1:1 in dom0 with correct permissions.
The above mentioned problems were discovered during the PVH work with
ThinkCentre M and Dell 5600T. No official documentation was found so far
in regards to what devices and why cause this. Experiments show that
ThinkCentre M USB devices with enabled debug port generate DMA read
transactions to the regions of memory marked reserved in host e820 map.
For Dell 5600T the device and faulting addresses are not found yet.
For detailed history of the discussion please check following threads:
http://lists.Xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2015-02/msg01724.htmlhttp://lists.Xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2015-01/msg02513.html
Format for rmrr Xen command line option:
rmrr=start<-end>=[s1]bdf1[,[s1]bdf2[,...]];start<-end>=[s2]bdf1[,[s2]bdf2[,...]]
For example, for Lenovo ThinkCentre M, use:
rmrr=0xd5d45=0:0:1d.0;0xd5d46=0:0:1a.0
If grub2 used and multiple ranges are specified, ';' should be
quoted/escaped, refer to grub2 manual for more information.
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
For sbdf's parsing in RMRR command line, add parse_pci_seg with additional
parameter def_seg. parse_pci_seg will help to identify if segment was
found in string being parsed or default segment was used.
Make a wrapper parse_pci so the rest of the callers are not affected.
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
In preparation for auxiliary RMRR data provided on Xen command line,
make RMRR adding a separate function.
Also free memery for rmrr device scope in error path.
Signed-off-by: Elena Ufimtseva <elena.ufimtseva@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
In fact, when domains are being unpaused:
- it's not necessary to put the vcpu to sleep, as
they are all already paused;
- it is not necessary to call vcpu_migrate(), as
the vcpus are still paused, and therefore won't
wakeup anyway.
Basically, the only important thing is to call
pick_cpu, to let the scheduler run and figure out
what would be the best initial placement (i.e., the
value stored in v->processor), for the vcpus, as
they come back up, one after another.
Note that this is consistent with what was happening
before this change, as vcpu_migrate() calls pick_cpu.
But much simpler and quicker.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
It is ok to use just cpumask_scratch in csched_runq_steal().
In fact, the cpu parameter comes from the cpu local variable
in csched_load_balance(), which in turn comes from cpu in
csched_schedule(), which is smp_processor_id().
While there, also:
- move the comment about cpumask_scratch in the header
where the scratch space is declared;
- spell more clearly (in that same comment) what are the
serialization rules.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
In fact, during shutdown/suspend, we temporarily move all
the vCPUs to the BSP (i.e., pCPU 0, as of now). For Credit2
domains, we call csched2_vcpu_migrate(), expects to find the
target pCPU in the domain's pool
Therefore, if Credit2 is the default scheduler and we have
removed pCPU 0 from cpupool0, shutdown/suspend fails like
this:
RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08012906d>] sched_credit2.c#migrate+0x274/0x2d1
Xen call trace:
[<ffff82d08012906d>] sched_credit2.c#migrate+0x274/0x2d1
[<ffff82d080129138>] sched_credit2.c#csched2_vcpu_migrate+0x6e/0x86
[<ffff82d08012c468>] schedule.c#vcpu_move_locked+0x69/0x6f
[<ffff82d08012ec14>] cpu_disable_scheduler+0x3d7/0x430
[<ffff82d08019669b>] __cpu_disable+0x299/0x2b0
[<ffff82d0801012f8>] cpu.c#take_cpu_down+0x2f/0x38
[<ffff82d0801312d8>] stop_machine.c#stopmachine_action+0x7f/0x8d
[<ffff82d0801330b8>] tasklet.c#do_tasklet_work+0x74/0xab
[<ffff82d0801333ed>] do_tasklet+0x66/0x8b
[<ffff82d080166a73>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x3b/0x5e
****************************************
Panic on CPU 8:
Assertion 'svc->vcpu->processor < nr_cpu_ids' failed at sched_credit2.c:1729
****************************************
On the other hand, if Credit2 is the scheduler of another
pool, when trying (still during shutdown/suspend) to move
the vCPUs of the Credit2 domains to pCPU 0, it figures
out that pCPU 0 is not a Credit2 pCPU, and fails like this:
RIP: e008:[<ffff82d08012916b>] sched_credit2.c#csched2_vcpu_migrate+0xa1/0x107
Xen call trace:
[<ffff82d08012916b>] sched_credit2.c#csched2_vcpu_migrate+0xa1/0x107
[<ffff82d08012c4e9>] schedule.c#vcpu_move_locked+0x69/0x6f
[<ffff82d08012edfc>] cpu_disable_scheduler+0x3d7/0x430
[<ffff82d08019687b>] __cpu_disable+0x299/0x2b0
[<ffff82d0801012f8>] cpu.c#take_cpu_down+0x2f/0x38
[<ffff82d0801314c0>] stop_machine.c#stopmachine_action+0x7f/0x8d
[<ffff82d0801332a0>] tasklet.c#do_tasklet_work+0x74/0xab
[<ffff82d0801335d5>] do_tasklet+0x66/0x8b
[<ffff82d080166c53>] domain.c#idle_loop+0x3b/0x5e
The solution is to recognise the specific situation, inside
csched2_vcpu_migrate() and, considering it is something temporary,
which only happens during shutdown/suspend, quickly deal with it.
Then, in the resume path, in restore_vcpu_affinity(), things
are set back to normal, and a new v->processor is chosen, for
each vCPU, from the proper set of pCPUs (i.e., the ones of
the proper cpupool).
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
In fact, relying on the mask of what pCPUs belong to
which Credit2 runqueue is not enough. If we only do that,
when Credit2 is the boot scheduler, we may ASSERT() or
panic when moving a pCPU from Pool-0 to another cpupool.
This is because pCPUs outside of any pool are considered
part of cpupool0. This puts us at risk of crash when those
same pCPUs are added to another pool and something
different than the idle domain is found to be running
on them.
Note that, even if we prevent the above to happen (which
is the purpose of this patch), this is still pretty bad,
in fact, when we remove a pCPU from Pool-0:
- in Credit1, as we do *not* update prv->ncpus and
prv->credit, which means we're considering the wrong
total credits when doing accounting;
- in Credit2, the pCPU remains part of one runqueue,
and is hence at least considered during load balancing,
even if no vCPU should really run there.
In Credit1, this "only" causes skewed accounting and
no crashes because there is a lot of `cpumask_and`ing
going on with the cpumask of the domains' cpupool
(which, BTW, comes at a price).
A quick and not to involved (and easily backportable)
solution for Credit2, is to do exactly the same.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
In fact, there is one scratch mask per each CPU. When
you use the one of a CPU, it must be true that:
- the CPU belongs to your cpupool and scheduler,
- you own the runqueue lock (the one you take via
{v,p}cpu_schedule_lock()) for that CPU.
This was not the case within the following functions:
get_fallback_cpu(), csched2_cpu_pick(): as we can't be
sure we either are on, or hold the lock for, the CPU
that is in the vCPU's 'v->processor'.
migrate(): it's ok, when called from balance_load(),
because that comes from csched2_schedule(), which takes
the runqueue lock of the CPU where it executes. But it is
not ok when we come from csched2_vcpu_migrate(), which
can be called from other places.
The fix is to explicitly use the scratch space of the
CPUs for which we know we hold the runqueue lock.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Invocation of `make' in top-level directory would end up invoking the
install target.
Adjust fuzzing target makefiles a bit so that they are always build in
that situation.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
... as they don't work as intended with -fPIC.
I did prefer them over *_end ones at the time because older gcc would
cause .L* symbols to be public, due to issuing .globl for all
referenced externals. And labels at the end of instructions collide
with the ones at the start of the next instruction, making disassembly
harder to grok. Luckily recent gcc no longer issues those .globl
directives, and hence .L* labels, staying local by default, no longer
get in the way.
Reported-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Commit 6e03363 ("x86: Implement TSC adjust feature for HVM guest")
implemented TSC_ADJUST MSR for hvm guests. Though while booting
an HVM guest the boot CPU would have a value set with delta_tsc -
guest tsc while secondary CPUS would have 0. For example one can
observe:
$ xen-hvmctx 17 | grep tsc_adjust
TSC_ADJUST: tsc_adjust ff9377dfef47fe66
TSC_ADJUST: tsc_adjust 0
TSC_ADJUST: tsc_adjust 0
TSC_ADJUST: tsc_adjust 0
Upcoming Linux 4.10 now validates whether this MSR is correct and
adjusts them accordingly under the following conditions: values of < 0
(our case for CPU 0) or != 0 or values > 7FFFFFFF. In this conditions it
will force set to 0 and for the CPUs that the value doesn't match all
together. If this msr is not correct we would see messages such as:
[Firmware Bug]: TSC ADJUST: CPU0: -30517044286984129 force to 0
And on HVM guests supporting TSC_ADJUST (requiring at least Haswell
Intel) it won't boot.
Our current vCPU 0 values are incorrect and according to Intel SDM which on
section "Time-Stamp Counter Adjustment" states that "On RESET, the value
of the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR is 0." hence we should set it 0 and be
consistent across multiple vCPUs. Perhaps this MSR should be only
changed by the guest which already happens through
hvm_set_guest_tsc_adjust(..) routines (see below). After this patch
guests running Linux 4.10 will see a valid IA32_TSC_ADJUST msr of value
0 for all CPUs and are able to boot.
On the same section of the spec ("Time-Stamp Counter Adjustment") it is
also stated:
"If an execution of WRMSR to the IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR
adds (or subtracts) value X from the TSC, the logical processor also
adds (or subtracts) value X from the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR.
Unlike the TSC, the value of the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR changes only in
response to WRMSR (either to the MSR itself, or to the
IA32_TIME_STAMP_COUNTER MSR). Its value does not otherwise change as
time elapses. Software seeking to adjust the TSC can do so by using
WRMSR to write the same value to the IA32_TSC_ADJUST MSR on each logical
processor."
This suggests these MSRs values should only be changed through guest i.e.
throught write intercept msrs. We keep IA32_TSC MSR logic such that writes
accomodate adjustments to TSC_ADJUST, hence no functional change in the
msr_tsc_adjust for IA32_TSC msr. Though, we do that in a separate routine
namely hvm_set_guest_tsc_msr instead of through hvm_set_guest_tsc(...).
Signed-off-by: Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Other than hvm_set_guest_tsc(), neither needs to be exposed. And
hvm_get_guest_tsc_adjust() is pretty pointless as a seperate function
altogether, let alone a non-static one.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Properly inform the compiler about fic's role as both an input (its
insn_bytes field) and output (its exn_raised field).
Take the opportunity and bring emulate_fpu_insn_stub() more in line
with emulate_fpu_insn_stub_eflags().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The current function pointers in struct vmx_domain for managing hvm
posted interrupt can be used also by SVM AVIC. Therefore, this patch
introduces the struct hvm_pi_ops in the struct hvm_domain to hold them.
Signed-off-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
If the hardware supports faulting, and the guest has chosen to use it, leave
faulting active in HVM context.
It is more efficient to have hardware convert CPUID to a #GP fault (which we
don't intercept), than to take a VMExit and have Xen re-inject a #GP fault.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Calculate a domains x86_vendor early in recalculate_cpuid_policy(); subsequent
patches need to make other recalculation decisions based on it.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Include a min() against the appropriate ARRAY_SIZE(), and ASSERT() that
max_subleaf is within ARRAY_SIZE().
This is more robust to unexpected problems in a release build of Xen.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The VT-x/SVM features are hidden from PV dom0 by the pv_featureset[] upper
mask, but nothing thus far has prevented the features being visible in
HVM-based control domains (where there is no toolstack decision to hide the
features).
As a side effect of calling nestedhvm_enabled() earlier during domain
creation, it needs to cope with the params[] array not having been allocated.
Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Travis reports that Clang objects to integer truncation during assignments to
a bitfield:
./x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c:6150:19: error: implicit truncation from 'int'
to bitfield changes value from -1 to 15 [-Werror,-Wbitfield-constant-conversion]
pxop->reg = ~0; /* rAX */
^ ~~
Use 0xf instead.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Null selector loads into SS (possible in 64-bit mode only, and only in
rings other than ring 3) must not alter SS.DPL. (This was found to be
an issue on KVM, and fixed in Linux commit 33ab91103b.)
Further arch_set_info_hvm_guest() didn't make sure that the ASSERT()s
in hvm_set_segment_register() wouldn't trigger: Add further checks, but
tolerate (adjust) clear accessed (CS, SS, DS, ES) and busy (TR) bits.
Finally the setting of the accessed bits for user segments was lost by
commit dd5c85e312 ("x86/hvm: Reposition the modification of raw segment
data from the VMCB/VMCS"), yet VMX requires them to be set for usable
segments. Add respective ASSERT()s (the only path not properly setting
them was arch_set_info_hvm_guest()).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
BT, being encoded as DstBitBase just like BT{C,R,S}, nevertheless does
not write its (register or memory) operand and hence also doesn't allow
a LOCK prefix to be used.
At the same time CLAC/STAC have no need to explicitly check lock_prefix
- this is being taken care of by generic code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
This fixes a regression introduced by commit ff913f68c9 ("x86/PV:
restrict permitted instructions during memory write emulation")
breaking namely 32-bit PV guests (which commonly use CMPXCHG8B for
certain page table updates).
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>