find_next_rmrr(base) is used to find the lowest RMRR ending above base
but below 4G. Current method couldn't cover the following situation:
a. two rmrr exist, small gap between them
b. pci_mem_start and mem_resource.base is below the first rmrr.base
c. find_next_rmrr(pci_mem_start) will find the first rmrr
d. After aligning mem_resource.base to bar size,
first_rmrr.end < new_base < second_rmrr.base and
new_base + bar_sz > second_rmrr.base.
So the new bar will overlap with the second rmrr and doesn't overlap
with the first rmrr.
But the next_rmrr point to the first rmrr, then check_overlap() couldn't
find the overlap. Finally assign a wrong address to bar.
This patch using aligned new base to find the next rmrr, could fix the
above case and find all the overlapped rmrr with new base.
Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhang <xiong.y.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: ecc607b185
master date: 2017-08-28 10:51:24 +0200
The implementation on x86 always returns zero, but
other platforms may return error values.
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com> [arm bits]
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> [x86 bits]
Suggested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
master commit: 3eb51dda71
master date: 2016-09-16 11:32:42 -0400
In order for PTE handling to match up with the reference counting done
by common code, presence and writability of grant mapping PTEs must
also be taken into account; validating just the frame number is not
enough. This is in particular relevant if a guest fiddles with grant
PTEs via non-grant hypercalls.
Note that the flags being passed to replace_grant_host_mapping()
already happen to be those of the existing mapping, so no new function
parameter is needed.
This is CVE-2017-14319 / XSA-234.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 16b1414de9
master date: 2017-09-12 14:45:13 +0200
A connection object of a domain with associated stubdom has two
parents: the domain and the stubdom. When cleaning up the list of
active domains in domain_cleanup() make sure not to unlink the
connection twice from the same domain. This could happen when the
domain and its stubdom are being destroyed at the same time leading
to the domain loop being entered twice.
Additionally don't use talloc_free() in this case as it will remove
a random parent link, leading eventually to a memory leak. Use
talloc_unlink() instead specifying the context from which the
connection object should be removed.
This is CVE-2017-14317 / XSA-233.
Reported-by: Eric Chanudet <chanudete@ainfosec.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: 562a1c0f7e
master date: 2017-09-12 14:44:56 +0200
Don't fall over a NULL grant_table pointer when the owner of the domain
is a system domain (DOMID_{XEN,IO} etc).
This is CVE-2017-14318 / XSA-232.
Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: c3d830b244
master date: 2017-09-12 14:44:11 +0200
The output of MEMF_get_node(memflags) can be as large as nodeid_t can
hold (currently 255). This is then used as an index to arrays of size
MAX_NUMNODE, which is 64 on x86 and 1 on ARM, can be passed in by an
untrusted guest (via memory_exchange and increase_reservation) and is
not currently bounds-checked.
Check the value in page_alloc.c before using it, and also check the
value in the hypercall call sites and return -EINVAL if appropriate.
Don't permit domains other than the hardware or control domain to
allocate node-constrained memory.
This is CVE-2017-14316 / XSA-231.
Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 2fece35303
master date: 2017-09-12 14:43:16 +0200
When no memory is available in the hypervisor, rather than immediately
failing the request, try to steal a handle from another vCPU.
Reported-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: d02f1a0b75
master date: 2017-08-17 14:41:01 +0200
On CPUFREQ_GOV_STOP in cpufreq_governor_dbs, shortcut to
return success if the governor is already stopped.
Avoid executing dbs_timer_exit, to prevent tripping an assertion
within a call to kill_timer on a timer that has not been prepared
with init_timer, if the CPUFREQ_GOV_START case has not
run beforehand.
kill_timer validates timer state:
* itself, via BUG_ON(this_cpu(timers).running == timer);
* within active_timer, ASSERTing timer->status is within bounds;
* within list_del, which ASSERTs timer inactive list membership.
Patch is synonymous to an OpenXT patch produced at Citrix prior to
June 2014.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: e7ec6f5f32
master date: 2017-08-10 12:35:50 +0200
From the context calling pi_desc_init(), we can conclude the current
implementation of VT-d PI depends on CPU-side PI. If we enable VT-d PI
and disable CPU-side PI by disabling APICv explicitly in xen boot
command line, we would get an assertion failure.
This patch clears iommu_intpost once finding CPU-side PI won't be enabled.
It is safe for this is done before this flag starts taking effect. Also
take this chance to remove the useless check of "acknowledge interrupt on
exit", which is a minimal requirement which has been checked earlier.
Signed-off-by: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: e489eb6138
master date: 2017-08-10 12:32:16 +0200
When operating on an Intel graphics device, iommu_enable_translation()
panicked (force_iommu==1) or warned (force_iommu==0) about the BIOS if
is_igd_vt_enabled_quirk() returned 0. That's good if the actual BIOS
problem has been detected. But since commit 1463411, returning 0 could
also happen if the user simply passed "iommu=no-igfx", in which case
bailing out with an info message (instead of a panic/warning) would be
more appropriate.
The panic broke the combination "iommu=force,no-igfx", and also the case
where "iommu=no-igfx" is passed but force_iommu=1 is set automatically
by x2apic_bsp_setup().
Move the iommu_igfx check from is_igd_vt_enabled_quirk() into its only
caller iommu_enable_translation(), and tweak the logic.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Bird <rustybird@openmailbox.org>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: dbf2a76856
master date: 2017-08-03 12:40:25 +0200
If the default compiler silently defaults to to -fPIC/-fPIE building
rombios fails:
ld -melf_i386 -s -r 32bitbios.o tcgbios/tcgbiosext.o util.o pmm.o -o 32bitbios_all.o
There are undefined symbols in the BIOS:
U _GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_
make[10]: *** [Makefile:26: 32bitbios_all.o] Error 11
Prevent the failure by enforcing non-PIC/PIE mode.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 672949d6c6
master date: 2017-06-26 14:32:46 +0100
A symndx of STN_UNDEF is special, and means a symbol value of 0. While
legitimate in the ELF standard, its existance in a livepatch is questionable
at best. Until a plausible usecase presents itself, reject such a relocation
with -EOPNOTSUPP.
Additionally, fix an off-by-one error while range checking symndx, and perform
a safety check on elf->sym[symndx].sym before derefencing it, to avoid
tripping over a NULL pointer when calculating val.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [x86 and arm32]
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
master commit: 2ff229643b
master date: 2017-06-23 15:00:37 +0100
Each of these arrays is sparse. Use zeroed allocations to cause uninitialised
array elements to contain deterministic values, most importantly for the
embedded pointers.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> [x86 and arm32]
Reviewed-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
master commit: bd53b85156
master date: 2017-06-23 15:00:37 +0100
Force insn_off to a single byte, as offset can wrap around or truncate with
respect to sh_ctxt->insn_buf_eip under a number of normal circumstances.
Furthermore, don't use an ASSERT() for bounds checking the write into
hvmemul_ctxt->insn_buf[].
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
x86/hvm: Fix boundary check in hvmemul_insn_fetch()
c/s 0943a03037 added some extra protection for overflowing the emulation
instruction cache, but Coverity points out that boundary condition is off by
one when memcpy()'ing out of the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
x86/HVM: fix boundary check in hvmemul_insn_fetch() (again)
Commit 5a992b670b ("x86/hvm: Fix boundary check in
hvmemul_insn_fetch()") went a little too far in its correction to
commit 0943a03037 ("x86/hvm: Fixes to hvmemul_insn_fetch()"): Keep the
start offset check, but restore the original end offset one.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
master commit: 0943a03037
master date: 2017-07-19 10:25:18 +0100
master commit: 5a992b670b
master date: 2017-07-27 11:39:57 +0100
master commit: 58e8986267
master date: 2017-08-10 12:37:24 +0200
Commit 55021ff9ab ("xen/arm: add_to_physmap_one: Avoid to map mfn 0 if
an error occurs") introduced error paths not releasing the grant table
lock. Replace them by a suitable check after the lock was dropped.
This is XSA-235.
Reported-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
master commit: 59546c1897
master date: 2017-08-23 17:45:45 +0200
The compat mode code also needs adjustment to deal with the changed
return value from gnttab_copy().
This is part of XSA-226.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ca61757054
master date: 2017-08-21 15:43:36 +0200
Processing of transitive grants must not use the fast path, or else
reference counting breaks due to the skipped recursive call to
__acquire_grant_for_copy() (its __release_grant_for_copy()
counterpart occurs independent of original pin count). Furthermore
after re-acquiring temporarily dropped locks we need to verify no grant
properties changed if the original pin count was non-zero; checking
just the pin counts is sufficient only for well-behaved guests. As a
result, __release_grant_for_copy() needs to mirror that new behavior.
Furthermore a __release_grant_for_copy() invocation was missing on the
retry path of __acquire_grant_for_copy(), and gnttab_set_version() also
needs to bail out upon encountering a transitive grant.
This is part of XSA-226.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ad48fb963d
master date: 2017-08-17 14:40:31 +0200
There is no guarantee that the compiler would actually translate them
to branches instead of calls, so only ones with a known recursion limit
are okay:
- __release_grant_for_copy() can call itself only once, as
__acquire_grant_for_copy() won't permit use of multi-level transitive
grants,
- __acquire_grant_for_copy() is fine to call itself with the last
argument false, as that prevents further recursion,
- __acquire_grant_for_copy() must not call itself to recover from an
observed change to the active entry's pin count
This is part of XSA-226.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 999d2ccb7f
master date: 2017-08-17 14:39:18 +0200
Regardless of copy operations only setting GNTPIN_hst*, GNTPIN_dev*
also need to be taken into account when deciding whether to clear
_GTF_{read,writ}ing. At least for consistency with code elsewhere the
read part better doesn't use any mask at all.
This is XSA-230.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 6e2a4c7356
master date: 2017-08-15 15:08:03 +0200
The way the lock is currently being used in get_maptrack_handle(), it
protects only the maptrack limit: The function acts on current's list
only, so races on list accesses are impossible even without the lock.
Otoh list access races are possible between __get_maptrack_handle() and
put_maptrack_handle(), due to the invocation of the former for other
than current from steal_maptrack_handle(). Introduce a per-vCPU lock
for list accesses to become race free again. This lock will be
uncontended except when it becomes necessary to take the steal path,
i.e. in the common case there should be no meaningful performance
impact.
When in get_maptrack_handle adds a stolen entry to a fresh, empty,
freelist, we think that there is probably no concurrency. However,
this is not a fast path and adding the locking there makes the code
clearly correct.
Also, while we are here: the stolen maptrack_entry's tail pointer was
not properly set. Set it.
This is CVE-2017-12136 / XSA-228.
Reported-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: 02cbeeb620
master date: 2017-08-15 15:07:25 +0200
Pagetable entries must be aligned to function correctly. Disallow attempts
from the guest to have a grant PTE created at a misaligned address, which
would result in corruption of the L1 table with largely-guest-controlled
values.
This is CVE-2017-12137 / XSA-227.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: ce442926c2
master date: 2017-08-15 15:06:45 +0200
Commit d18627583d ("memory: don't hand MFN info to translated guests")
wrongly added a null-handle check there - just like stated in its
description for memory_exchange(), the array is also an input for
populate_physmap() (and hence can't reasonably be null). I have no idea
how I've managed to overlook this.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: b964e3106d
master date: 2017-06-20 14:51:53 +0200
If we have a large amount of livepatches and want to print them
on the console using 'xl debug-keys x' we eventually hit
the preemption check:
if ( i && !(i % 64) )
{
spin_unlock(&payload_lock);
process_pending_softirqs();
if ( spin_trylock(&payload_lock) )
return
<facepalm> The effect is that we have just effectively
taken the lock and returned without unlocking!
Reviewed-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
master commit: 75dfe7c566
master date: 2017-06-12 08:59:33 -0400
This reverts commit c41e0266dd.
When determining Access Rights, Protection Keys only take effect when CR4.PKE
it set, and 4-level paging is active. All other circumstances (notibly, 32bit
PAE paging) skip the Protection Key control mechanism.
Therefore, we do not need to clear CR4.PKE behind the back of a guest which is
not using paging, as such a guest is necesserily running with EFER.LMA
disabled.
The {RD,WR}PKRU instructions are specified as being legal for use in any
operating mode, but only if CR4.PKE is set. By clearing CR4.PKE behind the
back of an unpaged guest, these instructions yield #UD despite the guest
correctly seeing PKE set if it reads CR4, and OSPKE being visible in CPUID.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 224acdd04a
master date: 2017-06-01 14:13:57 +0100
The current function vgic_to_sgi does not sanitize the target mask and
may therefore get an invalid vCPU ID. This will result to an out of
bound access of d->vcpu[...] as there is no check whether the vCPU ID is
within the maximum supported by the guest.
This was introduced by commit ea37fd2111 "xen/arm: split vgic driver
into generic and vgic-v2 driver".
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
master commit: 6fb9419673
master date: 2017-06-20 14:47:07 +0200
All failures have to be detected in __gnttab_unmap_common(), the
completion function must not skip part of its processing. In particular
the GNTMAP_device_map related putting of page references and adjustment
of pin count must not occur if __gnttab_unmap_common() signaled an
error. Furthermore the function must not make adjustments to global
state (here: clearing GNTTAB_device_map) before all possibly failing
operations have been performed.
There's one exception for IOMMU related failures: As IOMMU manipulation
occurs after GNTMAP_*_map have been cleared already, the related page
reference and pin count adjustments need to be done nevertheless. A
fundamental requirement for the correctness of this is that
iommu_{,un}map_page() crash any affected DomU in case of failure.
The version check appears to be pointless (or could perhaps be a
BUG_ON() or ASSERT()), but for the moment also move it.
This is part of XSA-224.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 11fc7ccb72
master date: 2017-06-20 14:46:47 +0200
The rules for reference counting are somewhat complicated:
* Each of GNTTAB_host_map and GNTTAB_device_map need their own
reference count
* If the mapping is writeable:
- GNTTAB_host_map needs a type count under only some conditions
- GNTTAB_device_map always needs a type count
If the mapping succeeds, we need to keep all of these; if the mapping
fails, we need to release whatever references we have acquired so far.
Additionally, the code that does a lot of this calculation "inherits"
a reference as part of the process of finding out who the owner is.
Finally, if the grant is mapped as writeable (without the
GNTMAP_readonly flag), but the hypervisor cannot grab a
PGT_writeable_page type, the entire operation should fail.
Unfortunately, the current code has several logic holes:
* If a grant is mapped only GNTTAB_device_map, and with a writeable
mapping, but in conditions where a *host* type count is not
necessary, the code will fail to grab the necessary type count.
* If a grant is mapped both GNTTAB_device_map and GNTTAB_host_map,
with a writeable mapping, in conditions where the host type count is
not necessary, *and* where the page cannot be changed to type
PGT_writeable, the condition will not be detected.
In both cases, this means that on success, the type count will be
erroneously reduced when the grant is unmapped. In the second case,
the type count will be erroneously reduced on the failure path as
well. (In the first case the failure path logic has the same hole
as the reference grabbing logic.)
Additionally, the return value of get_page() is not checked; but this
may fail even if the first get_page() succeeded due to a reference
counting overflow.
First of all, simplify the restoration logic by explicitly counting
the reference and type references acquired.
Consider each mapping type separately, explicitly marking the
'incoming' reference as used so we know when we need to grab a second
one.
Finally, always check the return value of get_page[_type]() and go to
the failure path if appropriate.
This is part of XSA-224.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 75b384ece6
master date: 2017-06-20 14:46:21 +0200
We shouldn't create a host mapping unless asked to even in the case of
mapping a granted MMIO page. In particular the mapping wouldn't be torn
down when processing the matching unmap request.
This is part of XSA-224.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 56f2ab5b97
master date: 2017-06-20 14:46:01 +0200
If a grant has been mapped with the GNTTAB_device_map flag, calling
grant_unmap_ref() with dev_bus_addr set to zero should cause the
GNTTAB_device_map part of the mapping to be left alone.
Unfortunately, at the moment, op->dev_bus_addr is implicitly checked
before clearing the map and adjusting the pin count, but only the bits
above 12; and it is not checked at all before dropping page
references. This means a guest can repeatedly make such a call to
cause the reference count to drop to zero, causing the page to be
freed and re-used, even though it's still mapped in its pagetables.
To fix this, always check op->dev_bus_addr explicitly for being
non-zero, as well as op->flag & GNTMAP_device_map, before doing
operations on the device_map.
While we're here, make the logic a bit cleaner:
* Always initialize op->frame to zero and set it from act->frame, to reduce the
chance of untrusted input being used
* Explicitly check the full dev_bus_addr against act->frame <<
PAGE_SHIFT, rather than ignoring the lower 12 bits
This is part of XSA-224.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8fdfcb2b6b
master date: 2017-06-20 14:45:33 +0200
gic_raise_inflight_irq will be called if the IRQ is already inflight
(i.e the IRQ is injected to the guest). If the IRQ is already already in
the LRs, then the associated LR will be updated.
To know if the interrupt is already in the LR, the function check if the
interrupt is queued. However, if the interrupt is not enabled then the
interrupt may not be queued nor in the LR. So gic_update_one_lr may be
called (if we inject on the current vCPU) and read the LR.
Because the interrupt is not in the LR, Xen will either read:
* LR 0 if the interrupt was never injected before
* LR 255 (GIC_INVALID_LR) if the interrupt was injected once. This
is because gic_update_one_lr will reset p->lr.
Reading LR 0 will result to potentially update the wrong interrupt and
not keep the LRs in sync with Xen.
Reading LR 255 will result to:
* Crash Xen on GICv3 as the LR index is bigger than supported (see
gicv3_ich_read_lr).
* Read/write always GICH_LR + 255 * 4 that is not part of the memory
mapped.
The problem can be prevented by checking whether the interrupt is
enabled in gic_raise_inflight_irq before calling gic_update_one_lr.
A follow-up of this patch is expected to mitigate the issue in the
future.
This is XSA-223.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
master commit: c84e4b2dd4
master date: 2017-06-20 14:41:55 +0200
Callers, namely such subsequently freeing the page, must not blindly
assume success - the function may namely fail when needing to shatter a
super page, but there not being memory available for the then needed
intermediate page table.
As it happens, guest_remove_page() callers now also all check the
return value.
Furthermore a missed put_gfn() on an error path in gnttab_transfer() is
also being taken care of.
This is part of XSA-222.
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: a0cce6048d
master date: 2017-06-20 14:41:16 +0200
Despite the description in mm.h, guest_remove_page() previously returned 0 for
paging errors.
Switch guest_remove_page() to having regular 0/-error semantics, and propagate
the return values from clear_mmio_p2m_entry() and mem_sharing_unshare_page()
to the callers (although decrease_reservation() is the only caller which
currently cares).
This is part of XSA-222.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: b614f642c3
master date: 2017-06-20 14:39:56 +0200
Commit fbbd5009e6 ("evtchn: refactor low-level event channel port ops")
added a de-reference of the struct evtchn pointer for a port without
first making sure the bucket pointer is non-NULL. This de-reference is
actually entirely unnecessary, as all relevant callers (beyond the
problematic do_poll()) already hold the port number in their hands, and
the actual leaf functions need nothing else.
For FIFO event channels there's a second problem in that the ordering
of reads and updates to ->num_evtchns and ->event_array[] was so far
undefined (the read side isn't always holding the domain's event lock).
Add respective barriers.
This is XSA-221.
Reported-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: e7719a0dfa
master date: 2017-06-20 14:37:47 +0200
PKRU is explicitly "XSAVE-managed but not XSAVE-enabled", so guests
might access the register (via {RD,WR}PKRU) without setting XCR0.PKRU.
Force context switching as well as migrating the register as soon as
CR4.PKE is being set the first time.
For MPX (BND<n>, BNDCFGU, and BNDSTATUS) the situation is less clear,
and the SDM has not entirely consistent information for that case.
While experimentally the instructions don't change register state as
long as the two XCR0 bits aren't both 1, be on the safe side and enable
both if BNDCFGS.EN is being set the first time.
This is XSA-220.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: de20bb6c4f
master date: 2017-06-20 14:36:51 +0200
The (misnamed) emulate_gva_to_mfn() function translates a linear address to an
mfn, but releases its page reference before returning the mfn to its caller.
sh_emulate_map_dest() uses the results of one or two translations to construct
a virtual mapping to the underlying frames, completes an emulated
write/cmpxchg, then unmaps the virtual mappings.
The page references need holding until the mappings are unmapped, or the
frames can change ownership before the writes occurs.
This is XSA-219.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: 26217aff67
master date: 2017-06-20 14:36:11 +0200
In order to observe a consistent (limit,pointer-table) pair, the reader
needs to either hold the maptrack lock (in line with documentation) or
both sides need to order their accesses suitably (the writer side
barrier was removed by commit dff515dfea ["gnttab: use per-VCPU
maptrack free lists"], and a read side barrier has never been there).
Make the writer publish a new table page before limit (for bounds
checks to work), and new list head last (for racing maptrack_entry()
invocations to work). At the same time add read barriers to lockless
readers.
Additionally get_maptrack_handle() must not assume ->maptrack_head to
not change behind its back: Another handle may be put (updating only
->maptrack_tail) and then got or stolen (updating ->maptrack_head).
This is part of XSA-218.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 4b78efa91c
master date: 2017-06-20 14:34:34 +0200
Each grant mapping for a particular domain is tracked by an in-Xen
"maptrack" entry. This entry is is referenced by a "handle", which is
given to the guest when it calls gnttab_map_grant_ref().
There are two types of mapping a particular handle can refer to:
GNTMAP_host_map and GNTMAP_device_map. A given
gnttab_unmap_grant_ref() call can remove either only one or both of
these entries. When a particular handle has no entries left, it must
be freed.
gnttab_unmap_grant_ref() loops through its grant unmap request list
twice. It first removes entries from any host pagetables and (if
appropraite) iommus; then it does a single domain TLB flush; then it
does the clean-up, including telling the granter that entries are no
longer being used (if appropriate).
At the moment, it's during the first pass that the maptrack flags are
cleared, but the second pass that the maptrack entry is freed.
Unfortunately this allows the following race, which results in a
double-free:
A: (pass 1) clear host_map
B: (pass 1) clear device_map
A: (pass 2) See that maptrack entry has no mappings, free it
B: (pass 2) See that maptrack entry has no mappings, free it #
Unfortunately, unlike the active entry pinning update, we can't simply
move the maptrack flag changes to the second half, because the
maptrack flags are used to determine if iommu entries need to be
added: a domain's iommu must never have fewer permissions than the
maptrack flags indicate, or a subsequent map_grant_ref() might fail to
add the necessary iommu entries.
Instead, free the maptrack entry in the first pass if there are no
further mappings.
This is part of XSA-218.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: b7f6cbb9d4
master date: 2017-06-20 14:33:13 +0200
Once all {writable} mappings of a grant entry have been unmapped, the
hypervisor informs the guest that the grant entry has been released by
clearing the _GTF_{reading,writing} usage flags in the guest's grant
table as appropriate.
Unfortunately, at the moment, the code that updates the accounting
happens in a different critical section than the one which updates the
usage flags; this means that under the right circumstances, there may be
a window in time after the hypervisor reported the grant as being free
during which the grant referee still had access to the page.
Move the grant accounting code into the same critical section as the
reporting code to make sure this kind of race can't happen.
This is part of XSA-218.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 9a0bd460cf
master date: 2017-06-20 14:32:03 +0200
Treat IOMMU mapping and unmapping failures as a fatal to the DomU
If IOMMU mapping and unmapping failed, crash the DomU and propagate
the error up to the call trees.
No spamming of the log can occur. For DomU, we avoid logging any
message for already dying domains. For Dom0, that'll still be more
verbose than we'd really like, but it at least wouldn't outright
flood the console.
Signed-off-by: Quan Xu <quan.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 834c97baeb
master date: 2016-06-14 15:10:57 +0200
The operation's success can't be controlled by the guest, as the device
model may have an active mapping of the page. If we nevertheless
permitted this operation, we'd have to add further TLB flushing to
prevent scenarios like
"Domains A (HVM), B (PV), C (PV); B->target==A
Steps:
1. B maps page X from A as writable
2. B unmaps page X without a TLB flush
3. A sends page X to C via GNTTABOP_transfer
4. C maps page X as pagetable (potentially causing a TLB flush in C,
but not in B)
At this point, X would be mapped as a pagetable in C while being
writable through a stale TLB entry in B."
A similar scenario could be constructed for A using XENMEM_exchange and
some arbitrary PV domain C then having this page allocated.
This is XSA-217.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
master commit: fae7d5be8b
master date: 2017-06-20 14:29:51 +0200
When an irq migration is already in progress, but not yet completed
(GIC_IRQ_GUEST_MIGRATING is set), refuse any other irq migration
requests for the same irq.
This patch implements this approach by returning success or failure from
vgic_migrate_irq, and avoiding irq target changes on failure. It prints
a warning in case the irq migration fails.
It also moves the clear_bit of GIC_IRQ_GUEST_MIGRATING to after the
physical irq affinity has been changed so that all operations regarding
irq migration are completed.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
master-commit-id: 91ef736493
This patch fixes a potential race that could happen when
gic_update_one_lr and vgic_vcpu_inject_irq run simultaneously.
When GIC_IRQ_GUEST_MIGRATING is set, we must make sure that the irq has
been removed from inflight before changing physical affinity, to avoid
concurrent accesses to p->inflight, as vgic_vcpu_inject_irq will take a
different vcpu lock.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
master-commit-id: 31bc6a93a0
Currently we crash Xen if we see an ESR_EL2.EC value we don't recognise.
As configurable disables/enables are added to the architecture
(controlled by RES1/RESO bits respectively), with associated synchronous
exceptions, it may be possible for a guest to trigger exceptions with
classes that we don't recognise.
While we can't service these exceptions in a manner useful to the guest,
we can avoid bringing down the host. Per ARM DDI 0487A.k_iss10775, page
D7-1937, EC values within the range 0x00 - 0x2c are reserved for future
use with synchronous exceptions, and EC within the range 0x2d - 0x3f may
be used for either synchronous or asynchronous exceptions.
The patch makes Xen handle any unknown EC by injecting an UNDEFINED
exception into the guest, with a corresponding (ratelimited) warning in
the log.
This patch is based on Linux commit f050fe7a9164 "arm: KVM: Survive unknown
traps from the guest".
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
master-commit-id: baf2950213
Xiong Zhang
Jan Beulich
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Juergen Gross
Andrew Cooper
George Dunlap
Christopher Clark
Chao Gao
Rusty Bird
Olaf Hering
Wei Liu
Julien Grall
Quan Xu
Stefano Stabellini