The arm64 EFI boot support added a new 'dtb' value to the configuration file.
Update the documentation to describe this and how the coniguration file is not
used when GRUB loads the modules. Updates 'ucode' description to indicate that
it is x86 only.
Signed-off-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xc_unmap_domain_meminfo uses P2M_FLL_ENTRIES macro instead of P2M_FL_ENTRIES.
Moreover, P2M_FL_ENTRIES macro uses (dinfo->p2m_size) which is always 0 here
as we don't initialize it. The result is that we always unmap just 1 frame.
xc_map_domain_meminfo uses P2M_FLL_ENTRIES macro instead of P2M_FL_ENTRIES
on failure path.
The issue went unnoticed mostly because we use unmap_domain_meminfo and
xc_map_domain_meminfo in one-shot xen-mfndump and xen-hptool (through
xc_exchange_page()) tools. When used is long-running apps (e.g. in xl)
domains become zombies after their death.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
{~0,} only initializes the first cell of the array to ~0. The other cells
are initialized to 0.
Explicitly initialize every cells of the array and, at the same time, do the
same for the mappings.
This is fixing boot after 82985d7 "xen: arm: handle variable p2m levels
in apply_p2m_changes" on platform where the root-level doesn't have
concatenate table (such as the Foundation Model).
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
While the write path change appears to be purely cosmetic (but still
gets done here for consistency), the read side mistake permitted
accesses beyond the virtual APIC page.
Note that while this isn't fully in line with the specification
(digesting MSRs 0x800-0xBFF for the x2APIC), this is the minimal
possible fix addressing the security issue and getting x2APIC related
code into a consistent shape (elsewhere a 256 rather than 1024 wide
window is being used too). This will be dealt with subsequently.
This is CVE-2014-7188 / XSA-108.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The commit 8ab802c "xen/arm: Restricted access to IFSR32_EL2 and FPEXC32_EL2"
introduced the use of the variable current in show_registers.
The variable is not correctly set until Xen has finished to boot.
Therefore any call to show_registers will result to crash Xen.
As the register IFSR32_EL2 is only printed when the registers represent
a guest view, Xen can read the value only for this case.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Currently the hypervisor will hang if it hits a WARN_ON.
The implementation uses an undefined instruction, made ourself because ARM
don't provide one, to implement BUG/ASSERT/WARN_ON, and sets up the
different tables (one for each type) which contain useful information.
This is based on the x86 implementation (include/asm-x86/bug.h). Unfortunately
the structure can't be shared because many ARM{32,64} gcc versions doesn't
correctly support %c. The support for executing a function in an exception handler
is also keep unimplemented on ARM. Therefore, dump_execution_state is
implemented as WARN()
The current opcode used to go in exception mode may not be undefined on ARM64.
Use the instruction "brk" to generate a software debug exception.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This patch adds EFI boot support for ARM based on the previous refactoring of
the x86 EFI boot code. All ARM specific code is in the ARM efi-boot.h header
file, with the main EFI entry point common/efi/boot.c. The PE/COFF header is
open-coded in head.S, which allows us to have a single binary be both an EFI
executable and a normal arm64 IMAGE file. There is currently no PE/COFF
toolchain support for arm64, so it is not possible to create the PE/COFF header
in the same manner as on x86. This also simplifies the build as compared to
x86, as we always build the same executable, whereas x86 builds 2. An ARM
version of efi-bind.h is added, which is based on the x86_64 version with the
x86 specific portions removed. The Makefile in common/efi is different for x86
and ARM, as for ARM we always build in EFI support.
NR_MEM_BANKS is increased, as memory regions are now added from the UEFI memory map,
rather than memory banks from a DTB. The UEFI memory map may be fragmented so a larger
number of regions will be used.
Signed-off-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- applied vga.h movement fixup patch from Roy, plus moved the xen/vga.h
include before the asm/* ones. ]
I started porting QEMU over to use the new ioreq server API and hit a
problem with PCI bus enumeration. Because, with my patches, QEMU only
registers to handle config space accesses for the PCI device it implements
all other attempts by the guest to access 0xcfc go nowhere and this was
causing the vcpu to wedge up because nothing was completing the I/O.
This patch introduces an I/O completion handler into the hypervisor for the
case where no ioreq server matches a particular request. Read requests are
completed with 0xf's in the data buffer, writes and all other I/O req types
are ignored.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
* Introduce hvm_dump_emulation_state() to be a common implementation rather
than having the printk() open-coded slightly differently in 3 separate
places.
* Identify the vcpu operating mode to allow for unambiguous decoding of the
instruction bytes.
* A valid instruction can be up to 15 bytes long, but may also be shorter than
the current arbitrary 10 bytes. Print only the fetched bytes, which could
include nothing if the emulation failed due to an inability to fetch the
instruction.
A sample new error message looks like:
(d1) MMIO emulation failed: d1v0 64bit @ 0008:ffff82d0802c4f20 -> 48 8b b8 e8 7f 00 00
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
This behaves in the same way as Linux. The 64 byte limit is arbitrary but
long enough for practical purposes.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Re-structured code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
As a general library routine, it should behave as efficiently as
possible, even if at present no significant contention is known here.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
AMD SVM requires all software events to have their injection emulated if
hardware lacks NextRIP support. In addition, `icebp` (opcode 0xf1) injection
requires emulation in all cases, even with hardware NextRIP support.
Emulating full control transfers is overkill for our needs. All that matters
is that guest userspace can't bypass the descriptor DPL check. Any guest OS
which would incur other faults as part of injection is going to end up with a
double fault instead, and won't be in a position to care that the faulting eip
is wrong.
Reported-by: Andrei LUTAS <vlutas@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Aravind Gopalakrishnan <Aravind.Gopalakrishnan@amd.com>
Injecting emulator software events as hardware exceptions results in a bypass
of DPL checks. As the emulator doesn't perform DPL checks itself, guest
userspace is capable of bypassing DPL checks and injecting arbitrary events.
Propagating software event information from the emulator allows VMX to now
properly inject software events, including DPL and presence checks, as well
correct fault/trap frames.
Reported-by: Andrei LUTAS <vlutas@bitdefender.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrei LUTAS <vlutas@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
This is needed by subsequent patches to support correctly injecting sofware
events for HVM Guests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
If HVM_PARAM_IOREQ_PFN, HVM_PARAM_BUFIOREQ_PFN, or HVM_PARAM_BUFIOREQ_EVTCHN
parameters are read when guest domain is dying it leads to the following
ASSERT:
(XEN) Assertion '_raw_spin_is_locked(lock)' failed at ...workspace/KERNEL/xen/xen/include/asm/spinlock.h:18
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.5-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012b07f>] _spin_unlock+0x27/0x30
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801b6103>] hvm_create_ioreq_server+0x3df/0x49a
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801bcceb>] do_hvm_op+0x12bf/0x27a0
(XEN) [<ffff82d08022b9bb>] syscall_enter+0xeb/0x145
The root cause of this issue is the fact that ioreq_server.lock is being
released twice - first in hvm_ioreq_server_init() and then in hvm_create_ioreq_server().
Drop the lock release from hvm_ioreq_server_init() as we don't take it here, do minor
label cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Move architecture specific sanity checks into its own function
which is called when enabling mem_event.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
A faulty tool stack can brick a debug hypervisor. Unpleasant while dev/test.
Suggested-by: Andres Lagar Cavilla <andres@lagarcavilla.org>
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Relocate p2m_mem_access_resume to common and abstract the new
p2m_mem_event_emulate_check into the p2m layer to.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
We swap the order of the enum of types n ... rwx, as to have rwx at 0, which is
the default setting when mem_access is not in use. This has performance benefits for
non-memaccess paths, as now comparison is to 0 when checking if memaccess is in use,
which is often faster.
We fix one location in nested_hap where the order of the enum made a difference.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Disk replication is enabled by default. This patch adds a cmdline
switch to 'xl remus' command to explicitly disable disk replication.
A new boolean field 'diskbuf' is added to the libxl_domain_remus_info
structure to represent this configuration option inside libxl.
Note: Disabling disk replication requires enabling unsafe mode.
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Add two members in libxl_domain_remus_info:
netbuf: whether netbuf is enabled
netbufscript: the path of the script which will be run to setup
and tear down the guest's interface.
Add cmdline switches to 'xl remus' command to enable or disable
network buffering and a domain-specific hotplug script to setup
network buffering.
Add a new config var 'remus.default.netbufscript' to xl.conf, that
allows the user to override the default global script used to
setup network buffering.
Note: Network buffering is enabled by default. Disabling network
buffering requires enabling unsafe mode.
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
By default, network buffering and disk replication are enabled;
checkpoints are replicated to another standby VM.
This patch allows the user to disable any of these features by
explicitly specifying a 'run in unsafe mode' switch when invoking
the 'xl remus' command. While running Remus in an unsafe mode
makes little sense under normal circumstances, it is useful to be
able to disable one or more features mentioned above for
testing/debugging/profiling purposes.
Unless this option is enabled, it will not be possible to
replicate memory checkpoints to /dev/null (blackhole replication),
disable network buffering or disk replication.
As a starter, the use of blackhole replication now requires that
the unsafe mode be enabled. Subsequent patches will add support
for disabling network buffering and disk replication in a similar
manner.
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This patch adds the machinery required for protecting a guest's
disk state, when the guest disk uses a DRBD disk backend.
This patch comprises of two parts:
1. Hotplug scripts: The block-drbd-probe script is responsible for
performing sanity checks on the state of the DRBD disk before the
checkpointing process begins. This script should be invoked by
libxl for each of the guest's disk devices, when starting Remus.
2. Remus drbd disk device: Implements the interfaces required by the
remus abstract device layer. A note about the implementation:
a) setup() is called for each disk attached to the guest.
During setup():
i) The hotplug script is called to perform the sanity check.
ii) Libxl obtains a handle to the DRBD device (/dev/drbd*) and
and subsequently controls disk checkpoint replication using
this handle in the checkpoint callbacks.
c) The preresume() checkpoint callback is executed asynchronously
using libxl__ev_child_fork(), as it may potentially block for more
than few seconds in case of backup failure.
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This patch adds the machinery required for protecting a guest's
network device state. This patch comprises of two parts:
1. Hotplug scripts: The remus-netbuf-setup script is responsible for
setting up and tearing down the necessary infrastructure required for
network output buffering. This script should be invoked by libxl for
each of the guest's network interfaces, when starting or stopping Remus.
Apart from returning success/failure indication via the usual hotplug
entries in xenstore, this script also writes to xenstore, the name of
the REMUS_IFB device to be used to control the vif's network output.
The script relies on libnl3 command line utilities to perform various
setup/teardown functions. The script is confined to Linux platforms only
since NetBSD does not seem to have libnl3.
2. Remus network device: Implements the interfaces required by the
remus abstract device layer. A note about the implementation:
a) init_subkind_nic() & cleanup_subkind_nic() are called once per Remus
invocation. They establish and free netlink related state respectively.
b) setup() and teardown are called for each vif attached to the
guest.
During setup():
i) The hotplug script is called to setup a network buffer on a
given vif. The script chooses an available IFB device from
the system, redirects vif egress traffic to the IFB device
and sets up the plug qdisc (output buffer) on the IFB device.
The name of the IFB device is communicated via xenstore to
libxl.
ii) Libxl obtains a handle to the plug qdisc using the libnl3 API
and subsequently controls output buffering using this handle
in the checkpoint callbacks.
During teardown(), the hotplug scripts are called again to remove
the vif->ifb traffic redirection, release the ifb and the plug
qdisc associated with it.
c) The checkpoint callbacks [postsuspend(), preresume() and commit()]
are implemented as synchronous ops as the netlink calls associated
with the qdisc subsystem are very fast.
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Introduce an abstract device layer that allows the Remus
logic in libxl to control a guest's devices in a device-agnostic
manner. The device layer also exposes a set of internal interfaces
that a device type must implement, if it wishes to support Remus.
The following API are exposed to libxl:
One-time configuration operations:
*libxl__remus_devices_setup
> Enable output buffering for NICs, setup disk replication, etc.
*libxl__remus_devices_teardown
> Disable network output buffering and disk replication;
teardown any associated external setups like qdiscs for NICs.
Operations executed every checkpoint (in order of invocation):
*libxl__remus_devices_postsuspend
*libxl__remus_devices_preresume
*libxl__remus_devices_commit
Each device type needs to implement the interfaces specified in
the libxl__remus_device_instance_ops if it wishes to support Remus.
The high-level control flow through the Remus device layer is shown below:
xl remus
|-> libxl_domain_remus_start
|-> libxl__remus_devices_setup
|-> Per-checkpoint libxl__remus_devices_[postsuspend,preresume,commit]
...
|-> On backup failure/network error/other errors
libxl__remus_devices_teardown
callback processing
* Only call the per-device libxl__multidev_one_callback
when the iteration has succeded or failed.
* The final callback (called by multidev) is a trivial
shim to shuffle the pointers and notify our own caller.
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Libnl3 is required for controlling Remus network buffering.
This patch adds dependency on libnl3 (>= 3.2.8) to autoconf scripts.
It also provides the ability to configure tools without libnl3 support
i.e., without network buffering support.
When there is no network buffering support, libxl__netbuffer_enabled()
returns 0, otherwise returns 1. The callers of this api will be
introduced in the rest of the series.
NOTE: This patch changes tools/configure.ac, please rerun
autogen.sh while applying the patch.
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Wen Congyang <wency@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
This can be used to fork children to allow the asynchronous execution
of system calls which only come in a synchronous variant. This will
be useful for Remus, in the following patches.
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
libxl__multidev_prepare_with_aodev is similar to libxl__multidev_prepare,
but takes a libxl__ao_device as an extra argument.
libxl__multidev_prepare is now a wrapper around
libxl__multidev_prepare_with_aodev.
This new internal API will be used by the Remus device abstract layer
for handling various Remus devices.
Signed-off-by: Yang Hongyang <yanghy@cn.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Now a caller who wants to be able to do other work when the aodev
completes can put their own callback into the aodev, and make the
multidev machinery aware that the particular aodev is complete (from
the point of view that multidev should have) whenever it likes.
No functional change in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Nested page fault exception code definitions can be reused on ARM as well.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
In preparation to add support for ARM LPAE mem_event, relocate mem_access,
mem_event and auxiliary functions into common Xen code.
This patch makes no functional changes to the X86 side, for ARM mem_event
and mem_access functions are just defined as placeholder stubs, and are
actually enabled later in the series.
Edits that are only header path adjustments:
xen/arch/x86/domctl.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/nested_ept.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/hap/nested_hap.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_paging.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_sharing.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/compat/mm.c
xen/arch/x86/x86_64/mm.c
Makefile adjustments for new/removed code:
xen/common/Makefile
xen/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
Relocated prepare_ring_for_helper and destroy_ring_for_helper functions:
xen/include/xen/mm.h
xen/common/memory.c
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
Code movement of mem_event and mem_access:
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_access.c -> xen/common/mem_access.c
xen/arch/x86/mm/mem_event.c -> xen/common/mem_event.c
xen/include/asm-x86/mem_access.h -> xen/include/xen/mem_access.h
xen/include/asm-x86/mem_event.h -> xen/include/xen/mem_event.h
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tklengyel@sec.in.tum.de>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
The x86 EFI build of Xen always uses a configuration file to load modules, but
the ARM version can either use a config file to specify the modules, or be
loaded by GRUB in which case GRUB loads the modules and adds them to the DTB
that is passed to Xen. Add the efi_arch_use_config_file() to indicate if a
configuration file is required. For x86, this will always be true. ARM will
examine the DTB passed via EFI configuration table (if any), and if it contains
module information will use that that not use the configuration file at all.
Add Emacs footer to efi-boot.h and boot.c
Signed-off-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Roy Franz
Vitaly Kuznetsov
Julien Grall
Jan Beulich
Roger Pau Monne
Andrew Cooper
Olaf Hering
Tamas K Lengyel
Paul Durrant
Wei Liu
Yang Hongyang
Ian Jackson