When a config-file for a pv-domU has a vfb section with a vnc=0
option then a "xl create" for that domU crashes with the message
xl: libxl.c:252: libxl_defbool_val: Assertion `!libxl_defbool_is_default(db)'
failed.
and the domU hangs early in the start.
This patch fixes the cause of the assertion and let the domU start
normally.
This problem exists since xen 4.2.
Signed-off-by: Ronny Hegewald <Ronny.Hegewald@online.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26145:8b93ac0c93f3
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@xxxxxxxxxx>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Short of a solution to the problem described in
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2012-12/msg00648.html,
deal with the bad effect this together with c/s 25751:02b4d5fedb7b has
on the EFI build by filtering out the problematic command line items.
Signed-off-by: Charles Arnold <carnold@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26272:183fcffb6367
xen-unstable date: Tue Dec 11 12:49:39 UTC 2012
I noticed this inconsistency while analyzing the code for XSA-32.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 26260:e80bac7c6598
xen-unstable date: Fri Dec 7 12:40:46 UTC 2012
Should return -EFAULT when copying to guest memory fails.
Once touching this code, also switch to using the more relaxed copy
function (copying from the same guest memory already validated the
virtual address range).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 26196:5faf5b8b702e
xen-unstable date: Wed Nov 28 09:03:51 UTC 2012
When no continuation was established, there must also not be an attempt
to cancel it - hypercall_cancel_continuation(), in the non-HVM, non-
multicall case, adjusts the guest mode return address in a way assuming
that an earlier call hypercall_create_continuation() took place.
Once touching this code, also restructure it slightly to improve
readability and switch to using the more relaxed copy function (copying
from the same guest memory already validated the virtual address
range).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 26195:7670eabcbafc
xen-unstable date: Wed Nov 28 09:02:26 UTC 2012
... also in the non-translated case.
This is XSA-32 / CVE-2012-xxxx.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Allowing unbounded order values here causes almost unbounded loops
and/or partially incomplete requests, particularly in PoD code.
The added range checks in populate_physmap(), decrease_reservation(),
and the "in" one in memory_exchange() architecturally all could use
PADDR_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT, and are being artificially constrained to
MAX_ORDER.
This is XSA-31 / CVE-2012-5515.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
The only user of the "out" label bypasses a necessary unlock, thus
enabling the caller to lock up Xen.
Also, the function was never meant to be called by a guest for itself,
so rather than inspecting the code paths in depth for potential other
problems this might cause, and adjusting e.g. the non-guest printk()
in the above error path, just disallow the guest access to it.
Finally, the printk() (considering its potential of spamming the log,
the more that it's not using XENLOG_GUEST), is being converted to
P2M_DEBUG(), as debugging is what it apparently was added for in the
first place.
This is XSA-30 / CVE-2012-5514.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Ever since its existence (3.0.3 iirc) the handler for this has been
using non address range checking guest memory accessors (i.e.
the ones prefixed with two underscores) without first range
checking the accessed space (via guest_handle_okay()), allowing
a guest to access and overwrite hypervisor memory.
This is XSA-29 / CVE-2012-5513.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Doing large p2m updates for HVMOP_track_dirty_vram without preemption
ties up the physical processor. Integrating preemption into the p2m
updates is hard so simply limit to 1GB which is sufficient for a 15000
* 15000 * 32bpp framebuffer.
For HVMOP_modified_memory and HVMOP_set_mem_type preemptible add the
necessary machinery to handle preemption.
This is CVE-2012-5511 / XSA-27.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
v2: Provide definition of GB to fix x86-32 compile.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() incompletely freed the pages
previously used as status frame in that they did not get removed from
the domain's xenpage_list, thus causing subsequent list corruption
when those pages did get allocated again for the same or another purpose.
Similarly, grant_table_create() and gnttab_grow_table() both improperly
clean up in the event of an error - pages already shared with the guest
can't be freed by just passing them to free_xenheap_page(). Fix this by
sharing the pages only after all allocations succeeded.
This is CVE-2012-5510 / XSA-26.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
When xl is called to create a domU and there is not enough memory available,
then the autoballooning is called to extract memory from dom0. During the
ballooning a loop in libxl_wait_for_free_memory() waits unless enough memory
is available to create the domU.
But because of a variable-underflow the loop can finish too soon and xl
finally aborts with the message:
xc: error: panic: xc_dom_boot.c:161: xc_dom_boot_mem_init: can't allocate low memory for domain: Out of memory
libxl: error: libxl_dom.c:430:libxl__build_pv: xc_dom_boot_mem_init failed: Device or resource busy
libxl: error: libxl_create.c:901:domcreate_rebuild_done: cannot (re-)build domain: -3
The variable-underflow happens when freemem_slack is larger then
info.free_pages*4, because the solution of this operation is converted
implicit to a unsigned int to match the type of memory_kb.
Add a extra check for this condition to solve the problem.
Signed-off-by: Ronny Hegewald <Ronny.Hegewald@online.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26190:678718a2e565
Backport-requested-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
libxl_cpupool_list() enumerates the cpupools by "probing": calling
cpupool_info, starting at 0 and stopping when it gets an error. However,
cpupool_info will print an error when the call to xc_cpupool_getinfo() fails,
resulting in every xl command that uses libxl_list_cpupool (such as
cpupool-list) printing that error message spuriously.
Since at the moment the times we want to print the message correspond
with the use of the existing "exact" parameter, use it to decide
whether to print the message or not.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26185:d66987697fe3
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The way it was coded, it clobbered %rdx without telling the compiler.
This generally didn't cause any problems except when there are two back
to back invocations (as in plt_overflow()), as in that case the
compiler may validly assume that it can re-use for the second instance
the value loaded into %rdx before the first one.
Once at it, also properly relax the second operand of "mul" (there's no
need for it to be in %rdx, or a register at all), and switch away from
using explicit register names in the instruction operands.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 26188:16bf7f3069a7
xen-unstable date: Mon Nov 26 16:20:39 UTC 2012
Using pci_find_next_cap() without prior pci_find_cap_offset() is bogus
(and possibly wrong, given that the latter doesn't check the
PCI_STATUS_CAP_LIST flag, which so far was checked in an open-coded way
only for the non-bridge case).
Once at it, fold the two calls into one, as we need its result in any
case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26179:ae6fb202b233
xen-unstable date: Tue Nov 20 07:58:31 UTC 2012
When deregistering a timeout, the address of application data was
being passed to the timeout_deregister hook instead of the data
itself.
Signed-off-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26155:babb84d9a82e
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The program xen-tmem-list-parse parses the output of xm/xl tmem-list
into human-readable format. A missing NULL terminator sometimes
causes garbage to be spewed where the two-letter pool type
should be output.
Signed-off-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26147:3186c04af582
Backport-requested-by: Dan Magenheimer <dan.magenheimer@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
c/s 20281:95ea2052b41b, which introduces Grant Table version 2
hypercalls introduces a vulnerability whereby the compat hypercall
handler can fall into an infinite loop.
If the watchdog is enabled, Xen will die after the timeout.
This is a security problem, XSA-24 / CVE-2012-4539.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26151:b64a7d868f06
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
If the guest has not fully populated its top-level PAE entries when it calls
HVMOP_pagetable_dying, the shadow code could try to unhook entries from
MFN 0. Add a check to avoid that case.
This issue was introduced by c/s 21239:b9d2db109cf5.
This is a security problem, XSA-23 / CVE-2012-4538.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26150:c7a01b6450e4
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
In certain conditions, such as low memory, set_p2m_entry() can fail.
Currently, the p2m and m2p tables will get out of sync because we still
update the m2p table after the p2m update has failed.
If that happens, subsequent guest-invoked memory operations can cause
BUG()s and ASSERT()s to kill Xen.
This is fixed by only updating the m2p table iff the p2m was
successfully updated.
This is a security problem, XSA-22 / CVE-2012-4537.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26149:6b6a4007a609
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The timer action for a vcpu periodic timer is to calculate the next
expiry time, and to reinsert itself into the timer queue. If the
deadline ends up in the past, Xen never leaves __do_softirq(). The
affected PCPU will stay in an infinite loop until Xen is killed by the
watchdog (if enabled).
This is a security problem, XSA-20 / CVE-2012-4535.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26148:bf58b94b3cef
Backport-requested-by: security@xen.org
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
xenctl_cpumap_to_cpumask incorrectly uses sizeof when checking whether
bits should be masked off from the input cpumap bitmap or not.
Fix by using the correct cpumask buffer size in place of sizeof.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Compare against copy_bytes instead, and use equality rather than less-
or-equal.
Further, this issue (introduced with c/s 23991:a7ccbc79fc17) is not
security relevant (i.e. the bug could not cause memory corruption):
_xmalloc() never returns chunks of data smaller than the size of a
pointer, i.e. even if sizeof(void*) > guest_bytes > copy_bytes, the
piece of memory erroneously written to would still be inside the
allocation done at the top of the function.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 26139:56400658f096
xen-unstable date: Tue Nov 13 10:28:10 UTC 2012
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
xen-unstable changeset: 26134:279bbf2a0b48
xen-unstable date: Mon Nov 12 10:17:00 UTC 2012
If the client / pool IDs given to tmemc_save_get_next_page are invalid,
the calculation of pagesize will dereference NULL.
Fix this by moving the calculation below the appropriate NULL check.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26132:286ef4ced216
xen-unstable date: Mon Nov 12 08:34:57 UTC 2012
The sysfs parser for /sys/bus/scsi/devices understands only the layout
of kernel version 2.6.16. This looks as follows:
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/block:sda is a symlink to /sys/block/sda/
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/scsi_generic:sg1 is a symlink to /sys/class/scsi_generic/sg1
Both directories contain a 'dev' file with the major:minor information.
This patch updates the used regex strings to match also the colon to
make it more robust against possible future changes.
In kernel version 3.0 the layout changed:
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/ contains now additional symlinks to directories
such as host1 and target1:0:0. This patch ignores these as they do not
point to the desired scsi devices. They just clutter the devices array.
The directory layout in '1:0:0:0' changed as well, the 'type:name'
notation was replaced with 'type/name' directories:
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/block/sda/
/sys/bus/scsi/devices/1:0:0:0/scsi_generic/sg1/
Both directories contain a 'dev' file with the major:minor information.
This patch adds additional code to walk the subdir to find the 'dev'
file to make sure the given subdirectory is really the kernel name.
In addition this patch makes sure devname is not None.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26010:cff10030c6ea
Backport-requested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Currently the callers of vscsi_get_scsidevices() do not pass a mask
string. This will call "lsscsi -g '[]'", which causes a lsscsi syntax
error. As a result the sysfs parser _vscsi_get_scsidevices() is used.
But this parser is broken and the specified names in the config file are
not found.
Using a mask '*' if no mask was given will call lsscsi correctly and the
following config is parsed correctly:
vscsi=[
'/dev/sg3, 0:0:0:0',
'/dev/disk/by-id/wwn-0x600508b4000cf1c30000800000410000, 0:0:0:1'
]
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26009:2dbfa4d2e107
Backport-requested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Currently pvscsi can not pass SCSI devices that have just a scsi_generic node.
In the following example sg3 is a control LUN for the disk sdd.
But vscsi=['4:0:2:0,0:0:0:0'] does not work because the internal 'devname'
variable remains None. Later writing p-devname to xenstore fails because None
is not a valid string variable.
Since devname is used for just informational purpose use sg also as devname.
carron:~ $ lsscsi -g
[0:0:0:0] disk ATA FK0032CAAZP HPF2 /dev/sda /dev/sg0
[4:0:0:0] disk HP P2000G3 FC/iSCSI T100 /dev/sdb /dev/sg1
[4:0:1:0] disk HP P2000G3 FC/iSCSI T100 /dev/sdc /dev/sg2
[4:0:2:0] storage HP HSV400 0950 - /dev/sg3
[4:0:2:1] disk HP HSV400 0950 /dev/sdd /dev/sg4
[4:0:3:0] storage HP HSV400 0950 - /dev/sg5
[4:0:3:1] disk HP HSV400 0950 /dev/sde /dev/sg6
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26008:eecb528583d7
Backport-requested-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
25886:051e2a30e3fb (25894:95a971c8058f in xen-unstable) is wrong
because it assumes that xc_sharing_freed_pages etc. return -errnoval
on error. However, like other libxc calls they return -1 setting
errno.
Correct this, checking for l<0 and then testing errno against ENOSYS,
and also log the correct errno value.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
These fields need to be valid at all times. Hypervisor ensures this
even across 32/64-bit guest transitions.
This fixes a bug where wallclock time is incorrect for booting 32-bit
HVM guests.
This should be backported to Xen 4.1 and 4.2.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Tested-and-Reported-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25908:12fa949b9060
xen-unstable date: Fri Sep 14 18:47:57 UTC 2012
libutil.h is only needed on BSDs, but not in Linux. Debian package
libbsd-dev-0.3.0-1 installed a libutil.h overlay that contains a
Perform the libutil.h check with -Werror, so we don't include this
bogus header.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26005:cdb48f1742f3
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CentOS 5.x forked e2fs ext4 support into a different package called
e4fs, and so headers and library names changed from ext2fs to ext4fs.
Check if ext4fs/ext2fs.h and -lext4fs work, and use that instead of
ext2fs to build libfsimage. This patch assumes that if the ext4fs
library is present it should always be used instead of ext2fs.
This patch includes a rework of the ext2fs check, a new ext4fs check
and a minor modification in libfsimage to use the correct library.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 25895:98e1ba6a672a
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
In commit e8d40584, it intended to check xml file size and when empty will
return, the condition should be "if os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0" rather
then "if not os.path.getsize(xml_path) == 0".
Signed-off-by: Chuang Cao <chuang.cao@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26088:dd64a1bdbe3a
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
There are two egcs in an ao initiator: the one in the AO_CREATE
function, and the one in libxl__ao_inprogress. If synchronous ao
operation generates progress events and completes immediately, the
progress callbacks end up queued in the outer egc. These callbacks
are currently only called after libxl__ao_inprogress has returned, and
keep the ao alive until they happen. This is not good because the
principle is that a synchronous ao is not supposed to survive beyond
libxl__ao_inprogress's return.
The fix is to ensure that the callbacks queued in the outer egc are
called early enough that they don't preserve the ao. This is
straightforward in the AO_INPROGRESS macro because AO_CREATE's egc is
not used inside that macro other than to destroy it. All we have to
do is destroy it a bit sooner.
This involves unlocking and relocking the ctx since EGC_FREE expects
to be called with the lock released but libxl__ao_inprogress needs it
locked. This hole in our lock tenure is fine - libxl__ao_inprogress
has such holes already.
It is still possible to use the CTX_LOCK macros for this unlock/lock
because the gc we are using is destroyed only afterwards by
libxl__ao_inprogress.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26080:25b2f53d2583
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Make xl/libxl accept the long option --wait for -w to be compatible with xm.
The long options are used in the default init and sysconfig scripts.
Signed-off-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26045:ba7198bfc679
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Options for the shutdown command that are supplied behind the domain id are
ignored. In case of the default xendomains init script this means that it will
not wait for the domains to be actually shutdown.
Signed-off-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
xen-unstable changeset: 26044:4845b5ce90e8
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Jan Beulich
Jan Beulich
Ronny Hegewald
Charles Arnold
Keir Fraser
Ian Jackson
Kouya Shimura
Ian Campbell
Tim Deegan
George Dunlap
Jim Fehlig
Dan Magenheimer
Matthew Daley
Olaf Hering
Roger Pau Monne
Joe Jin
Sander Eikelenboom