Commit Graph
30192 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk e254b1900e EFI: support default attributes to map Runtime service areas with none given
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

For example on Dell machines we see:

(XEN)  00000fed18000-00000fed19fff type=11 attr=8000000000000000
(XEN) Unknown cachability for MFNs 0xfed18-0xfed19

Let's allow them to be mapped as UC.

We also alter the 'efi-rs' to be 'efi=rs' or 'efi=no-rs'.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 74cdad5dae
master date: 2015-06-10 12:04:07 +0200
2015-06-18 08:55:54 +02:00
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk cbf41e0514 EFI/early: add /mapbs to map EfiBootServices{Code,Data}
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>

To help on certain platforms to run.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: f36886bdf4
master date: 2015-06-10 12:02:43 +0200
2015-06-18 08:55:26 +02:00
Jan Beulich 37bca10a92 x86/EFI: fix EFI_MEMORY_WP handling
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Backport: Also fix EFI_MEMORY_XP handling (along the lines of what
master commit abcf15fa8f ["x86: switch default mapping attributes
to non-executable"] does): We must not set the NX bit when the CPU
doesn't support it, as the bit being set may trigger Reserved Bit
faults in that case.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: af23e79f46
master date: 2015-06-10 12:01:35 +0200
2015-06-18 08:54:57 +02:00
Ross Lagerwall 6971bb6b22 efi: avoid calling boot services after ExitBootServices()
After the first call to ExitBootServices(), avoid calling any boot
services (except GetMemoryMap() and ExitBootServices()) by setting
setting efi_bs to NULL and halting in blexit(). Only GetMemoryMap() and
ExitBootServices() are explicitly allowed to be called after the first
call to ExitBootServices() and so are are called via
SystemTable->BootServices.

Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: d4300db3a0
master date: 2015-06-10 12:00:10 +0200
2015-06-18 08:54:08 +02:00
Alan Robinson 24fcf17379 x86/VPMU: add lost Intel processor
commit 6d112f2b50 ("x86/vPMU: change Intel model numbers from decimal
to hex") translated 47 to 0x27, now corrected to 0x2f.

Signed-off-by: Alan Robinson <Alan.Robinson@ts.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Dietmar Hahn <Dietmar.Hahn@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 0fcc6f3c2f
master date: 2015-06-08 14:17:06 +0200
2015-06-18 08:52:43 +02:00
Andrew Cooper 131889ce69 x86/crash: don't use set_fixmap() in the crash path
Experimentally, this can result in memory allocation, and in particular a
failed assertion that interrupts are enabled when performing a TLB flush.

  (XEN) Assertion 'local_irq_is_enabled()' failed at smp.c:223
  <snip>
  (XEN) [<ffff82d08018a0d3>] flush_area_mask+0x7/0x134
  (XEN) [<ffff82d08011f7c6>] alloc_domheap_pages+0xa9/0x12a
  (XEN) [<ffff82d08011f8ab>] alloc_xenheap_pages+0x64/0xdb
  (XEN) [<ffff82d080178e08>] alloc_xen_pagetable+0x1c/0xa0
  (XEN) [<ffff82d08017926b>] virt_to_xen_l1e+0x38/0x1be
  (XEN) [<ffff82d080179bff>] map_pages_to_xen+0x80e/0xfd9
  (XEN) [<ffff82d080185a23>] __set_fixmap+0x2c/0x2e
  (XEN) [<ffff82d0801a6fd4>] machine_crash_shutdown+0x186/0x2b2
  (XEN) [<ffff82d0801172bb>] kexec_crash+0x3f/0x5b
  (XEN) [<ffff82d0801479b7>] panic+0x100/0x118
  (XEN) [<ffff82d08019002b>] set_guest_machinecheck_trapbounce+0/0x6d
  (XEN) [<ffff82d080195c15>] do_page_fault+0x40b/0x541
  (XEN) [<ffff82d0802345e0>] handle_exception_saved+0x2e/0x6c

Instead, use the directmap mapping which are writable and involve far less
complexity than set_fixmap()

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 8228055568
master date: 2015-06-03 09:26:13 +0200
2015-06-18 08:51:31 +02:00
Andrew Cooper 8791a307be x86/apic: Disable the LAPIC later in smp_send_stop()
__stop_this_cpu() may reset the LAPIC mode back from x2apic to xapic, but will
leave x2apic_enabled alone.  This may cause disconnect_bsp_APIC() in
disable_IO_APIC() to suffer a #GP fault.

Disabling the LAPIC can safely be deferred to being the last action.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: d639bdd9bb
master date: 2015-06-03 09:25:43 +0200
2015-06-18 08:51:00 +02:00
Ross Lagerwall b0dca512a1 efi: fix allocation problems if ExitBootServices() fails
If calling ExitBootServices() fails, the required memory map size may
have increased. When initially allocating the memory map, allocate a
slightly larger buffer (by an arbitrary 8 entries) to fix this.

The ARM code path was already allocating a larger buffer than required,
so this moves the code to be common for all architectures.

This was seen on the following machine when using the iscsidxe UEFI
driver. The machine would consistently fail the first call to
ExitBootServices().
System Information
        Manufacturer: Supermicro
        Product Name: X10SLE-F/HF
BIOS Information
        Vendor: American Megatrends Inc.
        Version: 2.00
        Release Date: 04/24/2014

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roy Franz <roy.franz@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>

EFI: map allocation size must be set to zero

Commit 8a753b3f1c ("efi: fix allocation problems if ExitBootServices()
fails") replaced the use of a static (and hence zero-initialized)
variable by an automatic (and hence uninitialized) one.

Also drop the variable introduced by that commit in favor of re-using
another available and suitable one.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 8a753b3f1c
master date: 2015-06-02 13:44:24 +0200
master commit: 4c94684bb7
master date: 2015-06-11 14:47:54 +0200
2015-06-18 08:48:59 +02:00
Ross Lagerwall 6fb34833db x86: don't crash when mapping a page using EFI runtime page tables
When an interrupt is received during an EFI runtime service call, Xen
may call map_domain_page() while using the EFI runtime page tables.
This fails because, although the EFI runtime page tables are a
copy of the idle domain's page tables, current points at a different
domain's vCPU.

To fix this, return NULL from mapcache_current_vcpu() when using the EFI
runtime page tables which is treated equivalently to running in an idle
vCPU.

This issue can be reproduced by repeatedly calling GetVariable() from
dom0 while using VT-d, since VT-d frequently maps a page from interrupt
context.

Example call trace:
[<ffff82d0801615dc>] __find_next_zero_bit+0x28/0x60
[<ffff82d08016a10e>] map_domain_page+0x4c6/0x4eb
[<ffff82d080156ae6>] map_vtd_domain_page+0xd/0xf
[<ffff82d08015533a>] msi_msg_read_remap_rte+0xe3/0x1d8
[<ffff82d08014e516>] iommu_read_msi_from_ire+0x31/0x34
[<ffff82d08016ff6c>] set_msi_affinity+0x134/0x17a
[<ffff82d0801737b5>] move_masked_irq+0x5c/0x98
[<ffff82d080173816>] move_native_irq+0x25/0x36
[<ffff82d08016ffcb>] ack_nonmaskable_msi_irq+0x19/0x20
[<ffff82d08016ffdb>] ack_maskable_msi_irq+0x9/0x37
[<ffff82d080173e8b>] do_IRQ+0x251/0x635
[<ffff82d080234502>] common_interrupt+0x62/0x70
[<00000000df7ed2be>] 00000000df7ed2be

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
master commit: 591e1e357c
master date: 2015-06-01 11:59:14 +0200
2015-06-18 08:48:13 +02:00
Roger Pau Monné fbd26f2e9e x86/pvh: disable posted interrupts
Enabling posted interrupts requires the virtual interrupt delivery feature,
which is disabled for PVH guests, so make sure posted interrupts are also
disabled or else vmlaunch will fail.

Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reported-and-Tested-by: Lars Eggert <lars@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: cf6b3ccf28
master date: 2015-05-28 10:56:08 +0200
2015-06-18 08:47:40 +02:00
Andrew Cooper d963f64ba3 tools/libxc: Fix build of 32bit toolstacks on CentOS 5.x following XSA-125
gcc 4.1 of CentOS 5.x era does not like the typecheck in min() between
uint64_t and unsigned long.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 12e817e281)
2015-06-12 13:01:14 +01:00
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk 0d8cbcad03 libxl: In libxl_set_vcpuonline check for maximum number of VCPUs against the cpumap.
There is no sense in trying to online (or offline) CPUs when the size of
cpumap is greater than the maximum number of VCPUs the guest can go to.

As such fail the operation if the count of CPUs to online is greater
than what the guest started with. For the offline case we do not
check (as the bits are unset in the cpumap) and let it go through.

We coalesce some of the underlying libxl_set_vcpuonline code
together which was duplicated in QMP and XenStore codepaths.

Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit d83bf9d224)

Conflicts:
	tools/libxl/libxl.c
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
2015-06-12 13:00:00 +01:00
Ian Jackson bf06e40002 libxl: event handling: ao_inprogress does waits while reports outstanding
libxl__ao_inprogress needs to check (like
libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports) that there are no
oustanding progress callbacks.

Otherwise it might happen that we would destroy the ao while another
thread has an outstanding callback its egc report queue.  The other
thread would then, in its egc_run_callbacks, touch the destroyed ao.

Instead, when this happens in libxl__ao_inprogress, simply run round
the event loop again.  The thread which eventually makes the callback
will spot our poller in the ao, and notify the poller, waking us up.

This fixes an assertion failure race seen with libvirt:
  libvirtd: libxl_event.c:1792: libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports: Assertion `ao->in_initiator' failed.
or (after "Add an assert to egc_run_callbacks")
  libvirtd: libxl_event.c:1338: egc_run_callbacks: Assertion `aop->ao->magic == 0xA0FACE00ul' failed.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit f1335f0d7b)
2015-06-12 12:45:03 +01:00
Ian Jackson 97051bd952 libxl: event handling: Break out ao_work_outstanding
Break out the test in libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports, into
ao_work_outstanding, which reports false if either (i) the ao is still
ongoing or (ii) there is a progress report (perhaps on a different
thread's callback queue) which has yet to be reported to the
application.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 93699882d9)
2015-06-12 12:44:58 +01:00
Andrew Cooper 0bc9f98b02 x86/traps: loop in the correct direction in compat_iret()
This is CVE-2015-4164 / XSA-136.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 1f07213779
master date: 2015-06-11 14:44:47 +0200
2015-06-11 14:57:38 +02:00
Jan Beulich fcfbdb4333 gnttab: add missing version check to GNTTABOP_swap_grant_ref handling
... avoiding NULL derefs when the version to use wasn't set yet (via
GNTTABOP_setup_table or GNTTABOP_set_version).

This is CVE-2015-4163 / XSA-134.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 5d5c09d853
master date: 2015-06-11 14:44:12 +0200
2015-06-11 14:56:38 +02:00
Ian Jackson 5af278695f QEMU_TAG update 2015-06-09 16:33:00 +01:00
Jan Beulich 0f4362b43f update Xen version to 4.5.1-rc2 4.5.1-rc2 2015-06-03 09:10:15 +02:00
Dario Faggioli 09f76cb8b8 cpupools: avoid crashing if shutting down with free CPUs
in fact, before this change, shutting down or suspending the
system with some CPUs not assigned to any cpupool, would
crash as follows:

  (XEN) Xen call trace:
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d080101757>] disable_nonboot_cpus+0xb5/0x138
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801a8824>] enter_state_helper+0xbd/0x369
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d08010614a>] continue_hypercall_tasklet_handler+0x4a/0xb1
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801320bd>] do_tasklet_work+0x78/0xab
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d0801323f3>] do_tasklet+0x5e/0x8a
  (XEN)    [<ffff82d080163cb6>] idle_loop+0x56/0x6b
  (XEN)
  (XEN)
  (XEN) ****************************************
  (XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
  (XEN) Xen BUG at cpu.c:191
  (XEN) ****************************************

This is because, for free CPUs, -EBUSY were being returned
when trying to tear them down, making cpu_down() unhappy.

It is certainly unpractical to forbid shutting down or
suspenging if there are unassigned CPUs, so this change
fixes the above by just avoiding returning -EBUSY for those
CPUs. If shutting off, that does not matter much anyway. If
suspending, we make sure that the CPUs remain unassigned
when resuming.

While there, take the chance to:
 - fix the doc comment of cpupool_cpu_remove() (it was
   wrong);
 - improve comments in general around and in cpupool_cpu_remove()
   and cpupool_cpu_add();
 - add a couple of ASSERT()-s for checking consistency.

Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
master commit: 7ff6f1fc39
master date: 2015-05-13 15:08:30 +0200
2015-05-28 14:01:48 +02:00
Dario Faggioli f237ee493b cpupool: assigning a CPU to a pool can fail
which means such an event must be handled at the call sites
of cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(), and the error, if occurring,
properly propagated.

Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
master commit: d415a81b22
master date: 2015-05-07 15:15:53 +0200
2015-05-28 14:01:03 +02:00
Ian Campbell b986072c2b xen: common: Use unbounded array for symbols_offset.
Using a singleton array causes gcc5 to report:
symbols.c: In function 'symbols_lookup':
symbols.c:128:359: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]
symbols.c:136:176: error: array subscript is above array bounds [-Werror=array-bounds]

Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 3f82ea6282
master date: 2015-03-20 12:02:03 +0000
2015-05-28 14:00:20 +02:00
Andrew Cooper 5eac1be257 x86/irq: limit the maximum number of domain PIRQs
c/s 7e73a6e "have architectures specify the number of PIRQs a hardware domain
gets" increased the default number of pirqs for dom0, as 256 was found to be
too low in some cases.

However, it didn't account for the upper bound presented by the domains EOI
bitmap, registered with the PHYSDEVOP_pirq_eoi_gmfn_v* hypercall.

On a server with 240 cpus, Xen was observed to be attempting to clear the EOI
bit for dom0's pirq 0xb40f, which hit a pagefault.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 75d28c9170
master date: 2015-05-22 10:13:04 +0200
2015-05-28 12:29:49 +02:00
Andrew Cooper 9c3d34da0c x86: don't unconditionally touch the hvm_domain union during domain construction
It may not be the appropriate half to touch.

Drop the superfluous mem_sharing_enabled assignment, and move the hap_enabled
assignment to a suitable conditional before it is actually needed.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 74d0932448
master date: 2015-05-20 13:25:12 +0200
2015-05-28 12:29:19 +02:00
Jan Beulich 5ca0609a7b x86/EFI: keep EFI runtime services top level page tables up-to-date
Updates to idle_pg_table[] need to be mirrored into the page tables
used for invoking EFI runtime services.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: db83975f0f
master date: 2015-05-19 11:39:09 +0200
2015-05-28 12:27:47 +02:00
Andrew Cooper 9d5b2b0102 tools/xenconsoled: Increase file descriptor limit
XenServer's VM density testing uncovered a regression when moving from
sysvinit to systemd where the file descriptor limit dropped from 4096 to
1024. (XenServer had previously inserted a ulimit statement into its
initscripts.)

One solution is to use LimitNOFILE=4096 in xenconsoled.service to match the
lost ulimit, but that is only a stopgap solution.

As Xenconsoled genuinely needs a large number of file descriptors if a large
number of domains are running, attempt to increase the limit.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 588df84c0d)
2015-05-27 17:04:40 +01:00
Ross Lagerwall a984d860ee tools/hotplug: systemd: Don't ever kill xenstored
Don't kill xenstored as part of the usual service shutdown process to
prevent hangs on shutdown where the kernel tries to unplug a VIF
after xenstored has exited.

In an ideal case with all guests cooperating, xendomains will have shut
down all guests before xenstored is killed.

However in the uncooperative case, malicious or crashed guests may still
be running after xendomains has exited and this should not block the
shutdown/reboot of dom0.

Xenstored has no state to sync to disk, and never used to be killed in
the sysvinit case; observe the warning in xencommons.  Our testing has
shown regressions caused by the change in behaviour between sysvinit and
systemd when it comes to killing xenstored.

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- added systemd to title ]
(cherry picked from commit 96e0ee8386)
2015-05-27 17:04:23 +01:00
Andrew Cooper cfc4c43be1 ocaml/xenctrl: Fix stub_xc_readconsolering()
The Ocaml stub to retrieve the hypervisor console ring had a few problems.

 * A single 32k buffer would truncate a large console ring.
 * The buffer was static and not under the protection of the Ocaml GC lock so
   could be clobbered by concurrent accesses.
 * Embedded NUL characters would cause caml_copy_string() (which is strlen()
   based) to truncate the buffer.

The function is rewritten from scratch, using the same algorithm as the python
stubs, but uses the protection of the Ocaml GC lock to maintain a static
running total of the ring size, to avoid redundant realloc()ing in future
calls.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Dave Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1a010ca99e)
2015-05-27 17:04:15 +01:00
Andrew Cooper 032673c883 ocaml/xenctrl: Make failwith_xc() thread safe
The static error_str[] buffer is not thread-safe, and 1024 bytes is
unreasonably large.  Reduce to 256 bytes (which is still much larger than any
current use), and move it to being a stack variable.

Also, propagate the Noreturn attribute from caml_raise_with_string().

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Dave Scott <Dave.Scott@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit c8945d5161)
2015-05-27 17:04:03 +01:00
Andrew Cooper c91ed889ea ocaml/xenctrl: Check return values from hypercalls
rather than blindly continuing and possibly using negative values.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Dave Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3380f5b627)
2015-05-27 17:03:36 +01:00
Ian Jackson fa62913ea7 libxl: Domain destroy: fork
Call xc_domain_destroy in a subprocess.  That allows us to do so
asynchronously, rather than blocking the whole process calling libxl.

The changes in detail:

 * Provide an libxl__ev_child in libxl__domain_destroy_state, and
   initialise it in libxl__domain_destroy.  There is no possibility
   to `clean up' a libxl__ev_child, but there need to clean it up, as
   the control flow ensures that we only continue after the child has
   exited.

 * Call libxl__ev_child_fork at the right point and put the call to
   xc_domain_destroy and associated logging in the child.  (The child
   opens a new xenctrl handle because we mustn't use the parent's.)

 * Consequently, the success return path from domain_destroy_domid_cb
   no longer calls dis->callback.  Instead it simply returns.

 * We plumb the errorno value through the child's exit status, if it
   fits.  This means we normally do the logging only in the parent.

 * Incidentally, we fix the bug that we were treating the return value
   from xc_domain_destroy as an errno value when in fact it is a
   return value from do_domctl (in this case, 0 or -1 setting errno).

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 188e9c541f)
2015-05-27 17:02:52 +01:00
Ian Jackson c9b13f32dc libxl: Domain destroy: unlock userdata earlier
Unlock the userdata before we actually call xc_domain_destroy.  This
leaves open the possibility that other libxl callers will see the
half-destroyed domain (with no devices, paused), but this is fine.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1c91d6fba2)
2015-05-27 17:02:48 +01:00
Ian Jackson 0b19348f3c libxl: In domain death search, start search at first domid we want
From: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>

When domain_death_xswatch_callback needed a further call to
xc_domain_getinfolist it would restart it with the last domain it
found rather than the first one it wants.

If it only wants one it will also only ask for one domain.  The result
would then be that it gets the previous domain again (ie, the previous
one to the one it wants), which still doesn't reveal the answer to the
question, and it would therefore loop again.

It's completely unclear to me why I thought it was a good idea to
start the xc_domain_getinfolist with the last domain previously found
rather than the first one left un-confirmed.  The code has been that
way since it was introduced.

Instead, start each xc_domain_getinfolist at the next domain whose
status we need to check.

We also need to move the test for !evg into the loop, we now need evg
to compute the arguments to getinfolist.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reported-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4783c99aab)
2015-05-27 17:02:41 +01:00
Ian Jackson 771f857e03 QEMU_TAG update 2015-05-27 16:55:39 +01:00
Jan Beulich ddfe333aef x86: don't change affinity with interrupt unmasked
With ->startup unmasking the IRQ, setting the affinity afterwards
without masking the IRQ again is invalid namely for MSI (address and
data can't be updated atomically and may - at least for MSI-X - be
cached while unmasked).

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

AMD IOMMU: only translate remapped IO-APIC RTEs

1aeb1156fa ("x86 don't change affinity with interrupt unmasked")
introducing RTE reads prior to the respective interrupt having got
enabled for the first time uncovered a bug in 2ca9fbd739 ("AMD IOMMU:
allocate IRTE entries instead of using a static mapping"): We obviously
shouldn't be translating RTEs for which remapping didn't get set up
yet.

Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>

master commit: 1aeb1156fa
master date: 2015-03-26 11:18:28 +0100
master commit: c33c51b81c
master date: 2015-04-24 12:06:26 +0200
2015-05-19 12:00:09 +02:00
Jan Beulich bf30232bf1 x86: don't clear high 32 bits of RAX on sub-word guest I/O port reads
1- or 2-byte operations never alter the high halves of registers.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 1191aa9d19
master date: 2015-05-11 10:37:58 +0200
2015-05-19 11:47:13 +02:00
Eugene Korenevsky a824bf9daf x86_emulate: fix EFLAGS setting of CMPXCHG emulation
CMPXCHG sets CF, PF, AF, SF, and OF flags according to the results of the
comparison the rAX with the operand of the instruction.
rAX must be the first argument of the comparison (a minuend), the operand
must be the second one (a subtrahend).

Due to improper order of comparison arguments, CF, PF, AF, SF and OF flags were
set incorrectly in the case of inequality. Need to swap them.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>

# Commit 20fd4b70a7
# Date 2015-05-04 12:03:19 +0200
# Author Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
test_x86_emulate: extend EFLAGS check of CMPXCHG test

CMPXCHG: in the case of inequality of the rAX and the operand,
need to check CF, PF, AF, SF and OF flags as well.

This adjustment covers the fix of incorrect comparison during
CMPXCHG emulation.

Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
master commit: 2232628ecb
master date: 2015-05-04 11:55:41 +0200
master commit: 20fd4b70a7
master date: 2015-05-04 12:03:19 +0200
2015-05-19 11:46:31 +02:00
Paul Durrant f653b7fd6a x86/hvm: implicitly disable an ioreq server when it is destroyed
Currently, unless a (non-default) ioreq server is explicitly disabled before
being destroyed, its gmfns will not be placed back into the p2m but still
released back into the ioreq_gmfn mask. This is somewhat counter-intuitive
and easily remedied by this small patch.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ebd41901b9
master date: 2015-04-24 12:14:23 +0200
2015-05-19 11:45:34 +02:00
Paul Durrant 8dbdcc3910 x86/hvm: actually release ioreq server pages
hvm_free_ioreq_gmfn has the sense of the ioreq_gmfn mask inverted; it
needs to set a bit to release the gmfn, not clear it.

Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: cb791b84e7
master date: 2015-04-24 12:13:48 +0200
2015-05-19 11:44:59 +02:00
Ross Lagerwall d0725109f7 x86/efi: reserve SMBIOS table region when EFI booting
Some EFI firmware implementations may place the SMBIOS table in RAM
marked as BootServicesData, which Xen does not consider as reserved.
When dom0 tries to access the SMBIOS, the region is not contained in the
initial P2M and it crashes with a page fault. To fix this, reserve the
SMBIOS region.

Also, fix the memcmp checks for existence of the SMBIOS.

Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: bf68adcada
master date: 2015-04-17 10:44:48 +0200
2015-05-19 11:43:35 +02:00
Jan Beulich 0c4e0ef608 update Xen version to 4.5.1-rc1 4.5.1-rc1 2015-05-18 16:18:42 +02:00
Ian Jackson d41906197d Config.mk: Fix QEMU_TAG and QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION handling
In 2417e243 "QEMU_TAG update" my tag update script mangled the
machinery which sets QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION, by replacing the first
assignment to QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION it found rather than the one
which ought to have been replaced.

The result was that from that commit on, QEMU_TAG was no longer
honoured although QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION still was.

Fix this by restoring the transfer from QEMU_TAG.

This fix is analogous to 5d4c0952 "Config.mk: Fix (and, effectively,
update) QEMU_TAG" from xen.git#staging, but in 4.5 there has not been
a subsequent attempt to update the qemu revision, so both settings of
QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION are the same, and restoring the proper
behaviour will not have the side effect of making a previous qemu tag
update effective.

Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
2015-04-21 14:47:38 +01:00
Liang Li 56fe488893 x86/hvm: fix the unknown nested vmexit reason 80000021 bug
This bug will be trigged when NMI happen in the L2 guest. The current
code handles the NMI incorrectly. According to Intel SDM 31.7.1.2
(Resuming Guest Software after Handling an Exception), If bit 31 of the
IDT-vectoring information fields is set, and the virtual NMIs VM-execution
control is 1, while bits 10:8 in the IDT-vectoring information field is
2, bit 3 in the interruptibility-state field should be cleared to avoid
the next VM entry fail.

Signed-off-by: Liang Li <liang.z.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: f7708796db
master date: 2015-04-10 11:35:46 -0400
2015-04-21 09:16:06 +02:00
Tim Deegan 4a69292bc4 x86_emulate: split the {reg,mem} union in struct operand
In the hopes of making any future errors along the lines of XSA-123
into clean crashes instead of memory corruption bugs.

Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: dd766684e7
master date: 2015-03-27 16:13:07 +0100
2015-04-21 09:15:07 +02:00
Jan Beulich 4a521010b1 VT-d: improve fault info logging
I got repeatedly annoyed by there not getting anything logged by
default on VT-d faults (and hence having to tell people to add extra
command line options), and hence I think it is time to redo this code:
Log basic fault information at guest-warning level (rate limited by
default), and show the page walk in verbose rather than only in debug
mode. Break up multi-line message so that each gets a proper log level
attached, at once splitting out the common part. Also don't log
"unknown" faults as interrupt-remapping ones.

As a minor cleanup fix the type of the involved "fault_type" variables.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
master commit: f0250f4b48
master date: 2015-03-27 15:23:25 +0100
2015-04-21 09:14:34 +02:00
Jan Beulich 5a7c04221c x86/MSI: fix error handling
__setup_msi_irq() needs to undo what it did before calling
write_msi_msg() in case that returned an error.

map_domain_pirq() needs to get rid of the MSI descriptor it
(implicitly) allocated. The case of a setup_msi_irq() failure on a
non-initial multi-vector-MSI interrupt needs special handling: While
the initial IRQ will get freed by the caller (who also passed it to
us), we need to undo the effect setup_msi_irq() had on it. (As a
benefit from the added call to msi_free_irq() we no longer need to
explicitly call destroy_irq() on the non-initial slots.)

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 29c1b7886c
master date: 2015-03-26 11:19:57 +0100
2015-04-21 09:13:51 +02:00
JeHyeon Yeon 51d8325b25 LZ4 : fix the data abort issue
If the part of the compression data are corrupted, or the compression
data is totally fake, the memory access over the limit is possible.

This is the log from my system usning lz4 decompression.
   [6502]data abort, halting
   [6503]r0  0x00000000 r1  0x00000000 r2  0xdcea0ffc r3  0xdcea0ffc
   [6509]r4  0xb9ab0bfd r5  0xdcea0ffc r6  0xdcea0ff8 r7  0xdce80000
   [6515]r8  0x00000000 r9  0x00000000 r10 0x00000000 r11 0xb9a98000
   [6522]r12 0xdcea1000 usp 0x00000000 ulr 0x00000000 pc  0x820149bc
   [6528]spsr 0x400001f3
and the memory addresses of some variables at the moment are
    ref:0xdcea0ffc, op:0xdcea0ffc, oend:0xdcea1000

As you can see, COPYLENGH is 8bytes, so @ref and @op can access the momory
over @oend.

Signed-off-by: JeHyeon Yeon <tom.yeon@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
[Linux commit d5e7cafd69da24e6d6cc988fab6ea313a2577efc]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: fcc17f96c2
master date: 2015-03-26 11:19:10 +0100
2015-04-21 09:13:14 +02:00
Jan Beulich 0327c934e4 hvmloader: don't treat ROM BAR like other BARs
Its low 11 bits have different meaning.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 73aa7fc292
master date: 2015-03-26 11:17:51 +0100
2015-04-21 09:12:50 +02:00
Jan Beulich 63c3eb26b7 QEMU_UPSTREAM_REVISION = master again
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
2015-04-21 09:11:43 +02:00
Andrew Cooper f2e08aa5b1 domctl/sysctl: don't leak hypervisor stack to toolstacks
This is CVE-2015-3340 / XSA-132.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 4ff3449f0e
master date: 2015-04-21 09:03:15 +0200
2015-04-21 09:10:16 +02:00
denys drozdov 0b754fb3ed xen/arm: Call context_saved() with interrupts enabled during context switch
This is a requirement of the scheduler interface, violating this
causes for example with the RT scheduler:

(XEN) Assertion 'local_irq_is_enabled()' failed at spinlock.c:137
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.5.0  arm32  debug=y  Not tainted ]----
(XEN) CPU:    0
(XEN) PC:     0022a074 _spin_lock_irq+0x18/0x94

(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN)    [<0022a074>] _spin_lock_irq+0x18/0x94 (PC)
(XEN)    [<002256b8>] rt_context_saved+0x3c/0x144 (LR)
(XEN)    [<002256b8>] rt_context_saved+0x3c/0x144
(XEN)    [<00228ed8>] context_saved+0x4c/0x80
(XEN)    [<002524b4>] schedule_tail+0x148/0x2f0
(XEN)    [<00252668>] continue_new_vcpu+0xc/0x70
(XEN)    [<00252a18>] context_switch+0x74/0x7c

Signed-off-by: denys drozdov <denys.drozdov@globallogic.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit e8bb583bec)
2015-04-02 15:30:06 +01:00