The newly introduced xsm_platform_op hook addresses new sub-ops, while
most ops already have their own XSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The xsm_sysctl hook now covers every sysctl, in addition to the more
fine-grained XSM hooks in most sub-functions.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The xsm_domctl hook now covers every domctl, in addition to the more
fine-grained XSM hooks in most sub-functions. This also removes the
need to special-case XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The rcu_lock_{,remote_}target_domain_by_id functions are wrappers
around an IS_PRIV_FOR check for the current domain. This is now
redundant with XSM hooks, so replace these calls with
rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id or rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id to remove
the duplicate permission checks.
When XSM_ENABLE is not defined or when the dummy XSM module is used,
this patch should not change any functionality. Because the locations
of privilege checks have sometimes moved below argument validation,
error returns of some functions may change from EPERM to EINVAL when
called with invalid arguments and from a domain without permission to
perform the operation.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The Xen hypervisor has two basic access control function calls:
IS_PRIV and the xsm_* functions. Most privileged operations currently
require that both checks succeed, and many times the checks are at
different locations in the code. This patch eliminates the explicit
and implicit IS_PRIV checks that are duplicated in XSM hooks.
When XSM_ENABLE is not defined or when the dummy XSM module is used,
this patch should not change any functionality. Because the locations
of privilege checks have sometimes moved below argument validation,
error returns of some functions may change from EPERM to EINVAL or
ESRCH if called with invalid arguments and from a domain without
permission to perform the operation.
Some checks are removed due to non-obvious duplicates in their
callers:
* acpi_enter_sleep is checked in XENPF_enter_acpi_sleep
* map_domain_pirq has IS_PRIV_FOR checked in its callers:
* physdev_map_pirq checks when acquiring the RCU lock
* ioapic_guest_write is checked in PHYSDEVOP_apic_write
* PHYSDEVOP_{manage_pci_add,manage_pci_add_ext,pci_device_add} are
checked by xsm_resource_plug_pci in pci_add_device
* PHYSDEVOP_manage_pci_remove is checked by xsm_resource_unplug_pci
in pci_remove_device
* PHYSDEVOP_{restore_msi,restore_msi_ext} are checked by
xsm_resource_setup_pci in pci_restore_msi_state
* do_console_io has changed to IS_PRIV from an explicit domid==0
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The xsm_iomem_permission and xsm_ioport_permission hooks are intended
to be called by the domain builder, while the calls in
arch/x86/domctl.c which control mapping are also performed by the
device model. Because these operations require distinct access
control policies, they cannot use the same XSM hooks.
This also adds a missing XSM hook in the unbind IRQ domctl.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Rather than keeping around headers that are autogenerated in order to
avoid adding build dependencies from xen/ to files in tools/, move the
relevant parts of the FLASK policy into the hypervisor tree and
generate the headers as part of the hypervisor's build.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
This patch moves the implementation of the dummy XSM module to a
header file that provides inline functions when XSM_ENABLE is not
defined. This reduces duplication between the dummy module and callers
when the implementation of the dummy return is not just "return 0",
and also provides better compile-time checking for completeness of the
XSM implementations in the dummy module.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
ACPI table passthrough support allowing additional static tables and
SSDTs (AML code) to be loaded. These additional tables are added at
the end of the secondary table list in the RSDT/XSDT tables.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Passthrough support for the SMBIOS structures including three new DMTF
defined types and support for OEM defined tables. Passed in SMBIOS
types override the default internal values. Default values can be
enabled for the new type 22 portable battery using a xenstore
flag. All other new DMTF defined and OEM structures will only be added
to the SMBIOS table if passthrough values are present.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Xen control tools support for loading the firmware passthrough blocks
during domain construction. SMBIOS and ACPI blocks are passed in using
the new xc_hvm_build_args structure. Each block is read and loaded
into the new domain address space behind the HVMLOADER image. The base
address for the two blocks is returned as an out parameter to the
caller via the args structure.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Add public HVM definitions header for xenstore strings used in
HVMLOADER. In addition this header describes the use of the firmware
passthrough values set using xenstore.
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Using SVT_VERIFY_BUS here doesn't make sense; native Linux also
uses SVT_VERIFY_SID_SQ here instead.
This is XSA-33 / CVE-2012-5634.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When fronts are not enabled, the test application needs to disable the
corresponding tests.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
To allow for more flexibility, this notifies domain shutdown through a
function rather than a wake queue, to let the application use a wake
queue only if it wishes.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Page fault is specially handled not only with exception bitmaps,
but also with consideration of page fault error code mask/match
values. Therefore in nested virtualization case, the two values
need to be synchronized from virtual VMCS to shadow VMCS.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Use the host value to emulate IA32_VMX_MISC MSR for L1 VMM.
For CR3-target value, we don't support this feature currently and
set the number to zero.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Instead of using a hardcoded domain 0 as the endpoint for the event
channels created in hvm_vcpu_initialise, use the domain ID of the
building domain so that a domain builder in a domain other than dom0 has
the expected access to the event channels.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
c/s 22998:e9fab50d7b61 (and immediately following ones) made it
possible that __get_page_type() returns other than -EINVAL, in
particular -EBUSY. Consequently, the assertion in get_page_type()
should check for only the return values we absolutely don't expect to
see there.
This is XSA-37 / CVE-2013-0154.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
At least certain Marvell SATA controllers are known to issue bus master
requests with a non-zero function as origin, despite themselves being
single function devices.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
With ordinary requests allowed to come from phantom functions, the
remapping tables ought to be set up to allow for MSI triggers to come
from other than the "real" device too.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Apart from generating device context entries for the base function,
all phantom functions also need context entries to be generated for
them.
In order to distinguish different use cases, a variant of
pci_get_pdev() is being introduced that, even when passed a phantom
function number, would return the underlying actual device.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Add an "unknown" device types as well as one for PCI-to-PCIe bridges
(the latter of which other IOMMU code with or without this patch
doesn't appear to handle properly).
Make sure we don't mistake a device for which we can't access its
config space as a legacy PCI device (after all we in fact don't know
how to deal with such a device, and hence shouldn't try to).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: "Zhang, Xiantao" <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
This appears to be a copy paste error from c/s 23861:ec7c81fbe0de.
It is safe, functionally speaking, as both the xen_domctl_assign_device
and xen_domctl_get_device_group structure start with a 'uint32_t
machine_sbdf'. We should however use the correct union structure.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
We weren't taking the guest mode (CPSR) into account and would always
access the user version of the registers.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The concept is X86 specific.
AFAICT the generic concept here is the number of static physical IRQs
which the current hardware has, so call this nr_static_irqs.
Also using "defined NR_IRQS" as a standin for x86 might have made
sense at one point but its just cleaner to push the necessary
definitions into asm/irq.h.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Otherwise gcc complains about variables being used when not
initialised when in fact that point is never reached.
There aren't any instances of this in tree right now, I noticed this
while developing another patch.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
- move 32-bit specific files into subarch specific arm32 subdirectory.
- move gic.h to xen/include/asm-arm (it is needed from both subarch
and generic code).
- make the appropriate build and config file changes to support
XEN_TARGET_ARCH=arm32.
This prepares us for an eventual 64-bit subarch.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Primarily this is so that they are ordered in the same way as the
mapping from arm64 x0..x31 registers to the arm32 registers, which is
just less confusing for everyone going forward.
It also makes the implementation of select_user_regs in the next patch
slightly simpler.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Callers are VT-d (so x86 specific) and various bits of page offlining
support, which although it looks generic (and is in xen/common) does
things like diving into page_info->count_info which is not generic.
In any case on this is only reachable via XEN_SYSCTL_page_offline_op,
which clearly shouldn't be called on ARM just yet.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>