The current implementation of alloc_domain_struct, dereference the newly
allocated pointer even if the allocation has failed.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The original code is wrong because:
* claim mode wants to know the total number of pages needed while
original code provides the additional number of pages needed.
* if pod is enabled memory will already be allocated by the time we try
to claim memory.
So the fix would be:
* move claim mode before actual memory allocation.
* pass the right number of pages to hypervisor.
The "right number of pages" should be number of pages of target memory
minus VGA_HOLE_SIZE, regardless of whether PoD is enabled.
This fixes bug #32.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Both of these "goto finish;" statements are actually errors, and need to "goto
out;" instead, which will correctly destroy the domain and return an error,
rather than trying to finish the migration (and in at least one scenario,
return success).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
What started out as a simple cleanup patch (eliminating the redundant
check of domctl->cmd before setting "copyback", which as a result
turned the "ext_vcpucontext_out" label useless) revealed a bug in the
handling of XEN_DOMCTL_set_ext_vcpucontext.
Fix this, retaining the cleanup, and at once dropping a stale comment
and an accompanying formatting issue.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Also fix the name of the discard-alignment property, add the missing 'n'.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Acked-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
"ret", being set to -1 early on, gets cleared by the first invocation
of lz4_decompress()/lz4_decompress_unknownoutputsize(), and hence
subsequent failures wouldn't be noticed by the caller without setting
it back to -1 right after those calls.
Linux commit: 2a1d689c9ba42a6066540fb221b6ecbd6298b728
Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
libxl_event.c:eventloop_iteration would pass the allocated pollfds
array size, rather than the used size, to poll (and to
afterpoll_internal).
The effect is that if the number of fds to poll on reduces, libxl will
poll on stale entries. Because of the way the return value from poll
is processed these stale entries are often harmless because any events
coming back from poll ignored by libxl. However, it could cause
malfunctions:
It could result in unwanted SIGTTIN/SIGTTOU/SIGPIPE, for example, if
the fd has been reused to refer to an object which can generate those
signals. Alternatively, it could result in libxl spinning if the
stale entry refers to an fd which happens now to be ready for the
previously-requested operation.
I have tested this with a localhost migration and inspected the strace
output.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Make rdname function work with xl.
The rdname function not support json output of xl commands and this cause
problems using xl, for example the check if domUs are already running (because
they have been restored) on domUs autostart does not succeed and the domain is
created in any case, causing xl create to fail.
Signed-off-by: Fabio Fantoni <fabio.fantoni@m2r.biz>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
"ret", being set to -1 early on, gets cleared by the first invocation
of lz4_decompress()/lz4_decompress_unknownoutputsize(), and hence
subsequent failures wouldn't be noticed by the caller without setting
it back to -1 right after those calls.
Linux commit: 2a1d689c9ba42a6066540fb221b6ecbd6298b728
Reported-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This is a fix for bug 35:
http://bugs.xenproject.org/xen/bug/35
This bug report describes several format string mismatches which prevent
building the stubdom target in Xen 4.3 and Xen 4.4-rc2 on gcc 4.8. This is a
copy of Alex Sharp's original patch with the following modifications:
* Andrew Cooper's recommendation applied to extras/mini-os/xenbus/xenbus.c to
avoid stack corruption
* Samuel Thibault's recommendation to make "fun" an unsigned int rather than an
unsigned long in pcifront_physical_to_virtual and related functions
(extras/mini-os/include/pcifront.h and extras/mini-os/pcifront.c)
Tested on x86_64 gcc Ubuntu/Linaro 4.8.1-10ubuntu9.
Coverity-IDs: 1055807 1055808 1055809 1055810
Signed-off-by: Mike Neilsen <mneilsen@acm.org>
Acked-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This mostly reverts commit e36cd2cdc9.
hvm_get_guest_time() is not a suitable time source for this MSR, as
is resets across migration.
Conflicts:
xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian.c
xen/include/asm-x86/perfc_defn.h
Since 64-bit PV uses separate kernel and user mode page tables, kernel
addresses (as usually provided via VCPUOP_register_runstate_memory_area
and possibly via VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area) aren't
necessarily accessible when the respective updating occurs. Add logic
for toggle_guest_mode() to take care of this (if necessary) the next
time the vCPU switches to kernel mode.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Commit 0dcfb88fb8 ("unmodified_drivers: enable build of usbfront
driver") results in the PV drivers to no longer build against older
(pre-2.6.35) Linux versions. That's because usbfront.h includes
headers from drivers/usb/core/, which is generally unavailable when
building out-of-tree modules.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Sometimes, L0 needs to decode L2's instruction to handle IO access directly.
And L0 may get X86EMUL_RETRY when handling this IO request. At same time, if
there is a virtual vmexit pending (for example, an interrupt pending to inject
to L1) and hypervisor will switch the VCPU context from L2 to L1. Now we
already are in L1's context, but since we got a X86EMUL_RETRY just now and
this means hypervisor will retry to handle the IO request later and
unfortunately, the retry will happen in L1's context. And it will cause the
problem. The fixing is that if there is a pending IO request, no virtual
vmexit/vmentry is allowed.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
struct xen_add_to_physmap_batch's size field being uint16_t causes old
compiler versions to warn about the pointless range check done inside
compat_handle_okay().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
caused by c/s 4be86bb194
In public/memory.h, struct xen_add_to_physmap has 'space' as an unsigned int,
but struct xen_add_to_physmap_batch has 'space' as a uint16_t.
By defining xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() with space defined as uint16_t, the
now-common xenmem_add_to_physmap() implicitly truncates xatp->space from
unsigned int to uint16_t, which changes the space switch()'d upon.
This wouldn't be noticed with any upstream code (of which I am aware), but was
discovered because of the XenServer support for legacy Windows PV drivers,
which make XENMEM_add_to_physmap hypercalls using spaces with the top bit set.
The current Windows PV drivers don't do this any more, but we 'fix' Xen to
support running VMs with out-of-date tools.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-Ack: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
In addition, 'copyback' should be cleared even in the error case.
Also fix the indentation of the arguments to copy_to_guest() to help clarify
that the 'ret = -EFAULT' is not part of the condition.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The LINUX (PV_OPS) section was out-dated and it's better to only have
this information in one place (Tte Linux MAINTAINERS file).
The LINUX (XCP) section was an external project that that hasn't been
maintained for years.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
L2 guest will access the physical device directly(nested VT-d). For such access,
Shadow EPT table should point to device's MMIO. But in current logic, L0 doesn't
distinguish the MMIO whether from qemu or physical device when building shadow EPT table.
This is wrong. This patch will setup the correct shadow EPT table for such MMIO ranges.
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
The function (mctelem_xchg_head()) used to exchange mce telemetry
list heads is racy. It may write to the head twice, with the second
write linking to an element in the wrong state.
If there are two threads, T1 inserting on committed list; and T2
trying to consume it.
1. T1 starts inserting an element (A), sets prev pointer (mcte_prev).
2. T1 is interrupted after the cmpxchg succeeded.
3. T2 gets the list and changes element A and updates the commit list
head.
4. T1 resumes, reads pointer to prev again and compare with result
from the cmpxchg which succeeded but in the meantime prev changed
in memory.
5. T1 thinks the cmpxchg failed and goes around the loop again,
linking head to A again.
To solve the race use temporary variable for prev pointer.
*linkp (which point to a field in the element) must be updated before
the cmpxchg() as after a successful cmpxchg the element might be
immediately removed and reinitialized.
The wmb() prior to the cmpchgptr() call is not necessary since it is
already a full memory barrier. This wmb() is thus removed.
Signed-off-by: Frediano Ziglio <frediano.ziglio@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Using ->rN truncates the 64-bit registers to 32-bits, which on X-gene chops
off the top bit of the entry address for PSCI_UP.
Follow the pattern established in do_trap_hypercall.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
As Ian Campbell writes in http://bugs.xenproject.org/xen/bug/30:
There are two mechanisms by which a suspend can be aborted and the
original domain resumed.
The older method is that the toolstack resets a bunch of state (see
tools/python/xen/xend/XendDomainInfo.py resumeDomain) and then
restarts the domain. The domain will see HYPERVISOR_suspend return 0
and will continue without any realisation that it is actually
running in the original domain and not in a new one. This method is
supposed to be implemented by libxl_domain_resume(suspend_cancel=0)
but it is not.
The other method is newer and in this case the toolstack arranges
that HYPERVISOR_suspend returns SUSPEND_CANCEL and restarts it. The
domain will observe this and realise that it has been restarted in
the same domain and will behave accordingly. This method is
implemented, correctly AFAIK, by
libxl_domain_resume(suspend_cancel=1).
Attempting to use the old method without doing all of the work simply
causes the guest to crash. Implementing the work required for old
method, or for checking that domains actually support the new method,
is not feasible at this stage of the 4.4 release.
So, always use the new method, without regard to the declarations of
support by the guest. This is a strict improvement: guests which do
in fact support the new method will work, whereas ones which don't are
no worse off.
There are two call sites of libxl_domain_resume that need fixing, both
in the migration error path.
With this change I observe a correct and successful resumption of a
Debian wheezy guest with a Linux 3.4.70 kernel after a migration
attempt which I arranged to fail by nobbling the block hotplug script.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: konrad.wilk@oracle.com
CC: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
CC: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
This replicates a Xend behavior, see ec78952374 ("xend: Dis-allow
device assignment if PoD is enabled.").
This change is restricted to HVM guest, as only HVM is relevant in the
counterpart in Xend. We're late in release cycle so the change should
only do what's necessary. Probably we can revisit it if we need to do
the same thing for PV guest in the future.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The p2m is shared between VCPUs for each domain. Currently Xen only flush
TLB on the local PCPU. This could result to mismatch between the mapping in the
p2m and TLBs.
Flush TLB entries used by this domain on every PCPU. The flush can also be
moved out of the loop because:
- ALLOCATE: only called for dom0 RAM allocation, so the flush is never called
- INSERT: if valid = 1 that would means with have replaced a
page that already belongs to the domain. A VCPU can write on the wrong page.
This can happen for dom0 with the 1:1 mapping because the mapping is not
removed from the p2m.
- REMOVE: except for grant-table (replace_grant_host_mapping), each
call to guest_physmap_remove_page are protected by the callers via a
get_page -> .... -> guest_physmap_remove_page -> ... -> put_page. So
the page can't be allocated for another domain until the last put_page.
- RELINQUISH : the domain is not running anymore so we don't care...
Also avoid leaking a foreign page if the function is INSERTed a new mapping
on top of foreign mapping.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
On ARM, flush_tlb_mask is used in the common code:
- alloc_heap_pages: the flush is only be called if the new allocated
page was used by a domain before. So we need to flush only TLB non-secure
non-hyp inner-shareable.
- common/grant-table.c: every calls to flush_tlb_mask are used with
the current domain. A flush TLB by current VMID inner-shareable is enough.
The current code only flush hypervisor TLB on the current PCPU. For now,
flush TLBs non-secure non-hyp on every PCPUs.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The various cpuid functions are not available on ARM, so this
makes them raise an OCaml exception. Omitting the functions
completely results in a link failure in oxenstored due to the
missing symbols, so this is preferable to the much bigger patch
that would result from adding conditional compilation into the
OCaml interfaces.
With this patch, oxenstored can successfully start a domain on
Xen/ARM.
Signed-off-by: Anil Madhavapeddy <anil@recoil.org>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Without this gdb does not report an error.
With this patch and using a 1G hvm domU:
(gdb) x/1xh 0x6ae9168b
0x6ae9168b: Cannot access memory at address 0x6ae9168b
Drop output of iop->remain because it most likely will be zero.
This leads to a strange message:
ERROR: failed to read 0 bytes. errno:14 rc:-1
Add address to write error because it may be the only message
displayed.
Note: currently XEN_DOMCTL_gdbsx_guestmemio does not change 'iop' on
error and so iop->remain will be zero.
Signed-off-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Acked-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
I had coded this with XGERR, but gdb will try to read memory without
a direct request from the user. So the error message can be confusing.
Signed-off-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Acked-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
This reverts commit a0035ecc0d.
Even with this fix there is a period between the flush and the unmap where
processor may speculate data into the cache. The solution is to map this
region uncached or to use the HCR.DC bit to mark all guest accesses cached.
89eb02c220 "xen: arm: force guest memory accesses to cacheable when MMU is
disabled" has arranged to do the latter.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
On ARM guest OSes are started with MMU and Caches disables (as they are on
native) however caching is enabled in the domain running the builder and
therefore we must ensure cache consistency.
The existing solution to this problem (a0035ecc0d "tools: libxc: flush data
cache after loading images into guest memory") is to flush the caches after
loading the various blobs into guest RAM. However this approach has two short
comings:
- The cache flush primitives available to userspace on arm32 are not
sufficient for our needs.
- There is a race between the cache flush and the unmap of the guest page
where the processor might speculatively dirty the cache line again.
(of these the second is the more fundamental)
This patch makes use of the the hardware functionality to force all accesses
made from guest mode to be cached (the HCR.DC == default cached bit). This
means that we don't need to worry about the domain builder's writes being
cached because the guests "uncached" accesses will actually be cached.
Unfortunately the use of HCR.DC is incompatible with the guest enabling its
MMU (SCTLR.M bit). Therefore we must trap accesses to the SCTLR so that we can
detect when this happens and disable HCR.DC. This is done with the HCR.TVM
(trap virtual memory controls) bit which also causes various other registers
to be trapped, all of which can be passed straight through to the underlying
register. Once the guest has enabled its MMU we no longer need to trap so
there is no ongoing overhead. In my tests Linux makes about half a dozen
accesses to these registers before the MMU is enabled, I would expect other
OSes to behave similarly (the sequence of writes needed to setup the MMU is
pretty obvious).
Apart from this unfortunate need to trap these accesses this approach is
incompatible with guests which attempt to do DMA operations with their MMU
disabled. In practice this means guests with passthrough which we do not yet
support. Since a typical guest (including dom0) does not access devices which
require DMA until after it is fully up and running with paging enabled the
main risk is to in-guest firmware which does DMA i.e. running EFI in a guest,
with a disk passed through and booting from that disk. Since we know that dom0
is not using any such firmware and we do not support device passthrough to
guests yet we can live with this restriction. Once passthrough is implemented
this will need to be revisited.
The patch includes a couple of seemingly unrelated but necessary changes:
- HSR_SYSREG_CRN_MASK was incorrectly defined, which happened to be benign
with the existing set of system register we handled, but broke with the new
ones introduced here.
- The defines used to decode the HSR system register fields were named the
same as the register. This breaks the accessor macros. This had gone
unnoticed because the handling of the existing trapped registers did not
require accessing the underlying hardware register. Rename those constants
with an HSR_SYSREG prefix (in line with HSR_CP32/64 for 32-bit registers).
This patch has survived thousands of boot loops on a Midway system.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Scrub heap pages was disabled because it was slow on the models. Now that Xen
supports real hardware, it's possible to enable by default scrubbing.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This allows the application to pass a token to libxl in the fd/timeout
registration callbacks, which it receives back in modification or
deregistration callbacks.
It turns out that this is essential for timeout handling, in order to
identify which timeout to change on a modify event.
Signed-off-by: Rob Hoes <rob.hoes@citrix.com>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Commit 7113a45451 (kexec/x86: do not map
crash kernel area) causes fatal page faults when loading a crash
image. The attempt to zero the first control page allocated from the
crash region will fault as the VA return by map_domain_page() has no
mapping.
The fault will occur on non-debug builds of Xen when the crash area is
below 5 TiB (which will be most systems).
The assumption that the crash area mapping was not used is incorrect.
map_domain_page() is used when loading an image and building the
image's page tables to temporarily map the crash area, thus the
mapping is required if the crash area is in the direct map area.
Reintroduce the mapping, but only the portions of the crash area that
are within the direct map area.
Reported-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
This is really just a band aid - kexec shouldn't rely on the crash area
being always mapped when in the direct mapping range (and it didn't use
to in its previous form). That's primarily because map_domain_page()
(needed when the area is outside the direct mapping range) may be
unusable when wanting to kexec due to a crash, but also because in the
case of PFN compression the kexec range (if specified on the command
line) could fall into a hole between used memory ranges (while we're
currently only ignoring memory at the top of the physical address
space, it's pretty clear that sooner or later we will want that
selection to become more sophisticated in order to maximize the memory
made use of).
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Using a 1G hvm domU (in grub) and gdbsx:
(gdb) set arch i8086
warning: A handler for the OS ABI "GNU/Linux" is not built into this configuration
of GDB. Attempting to continue with the default i8086 settings.
The target architecture is assumed to be i8086
(gdb) target remote localhost:9999
Remote debugging using localhost:9999
Remote debugging from host 127.0.0.1
0x0000d475 in ?? ()
(gdb) x/1xh 0x6ae9168b
Will reproduce this bug.
With a debug=y build you will get:
Assertion '!preempt_count()' failed at preempt.c:37
For a debug=n build you will get a dom0 VCPU hung (at some point) in:
[ffff82c4c0126eec] _write_lock+0x3c/0x50
ffff82c4c01e43a0 __get_gfn_type_access+0x150/0x230
ffff82c4c0158885 dbg_rw_mem+0x115/0x360
ffff82c4c0158fc8 arch_do_domctl+0x4b8/0x22f0
ffff82c4c01709ed get_page+0x2d/0x100
ffff82c4c01031aa do_domctl+0x2ba/0x11e0
ffff82c4c0179662 do_mmuext_op+0x8d2/0x1b20
ffff82c4c0183598 __update_vcpu_system_time+0x288/0x340
ffff82c4c015c719 continue_nonidle_domain+0x9/0x30
ffff82c4c012938b add_entry+0x4b/0xb0
ffff82c4c02223f9 syscall_enter+0xa9/0xae
And gdb output:
(gdb) x/1xh 0x6ae9168b
0x6ae9168b: 0x3024
(gdb) x/1xh 0x6ae9168b
0x6ae9168b: Ignoring packet error, continuing...
Reply contains invalid hex digit 116
The 1st one worked because the p2m.lock is recursive and the PCPU
had not yet changed.
crash reports (for example):
crash> mm_rwlock_t 0xffff83083f913010
struct mm_rwlock_t {
lock = {
raw = {
lock = 2147483647
},
debug = {<No data fields>}
},
unlock_level = 0,
recurse_count = 1,
locker = 1,
locker_function = 0xffff82c4c022c640 <__func__.13514> "__get_gfn_type_access"
}
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Don Slutz <dslutz@verizon.com>
Acked-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@oracle.com>
This will change initiate_domain_create to walk through NIC definitions
and automatically assign devids to those which have not assigned one.
The devids are needed later in domcreate_launch_dm (for HVM domains
using emulated NICs). The command string for starting the device-model
has those ids as part of its arguments.
Assignment of devids in the hotplug case is handled by libxl_device_nic_add
but that would be called too late in the startup case.
I also moved the call to libxl__device_nic_setdefault here as this seems
to be the only path leading there and avoids doing the loop a third time.
The two loops are trying to handle a case where the caller sets some devids
(not sure that should be valid) but leaves some unset.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Julien Grall
Wei Liu
Olaf Hering
Anthony PERARD
Andrew Cooper
Jan Beulich
Ian Jackson
Ian Jackson
Stefano Stabellini
Fabio Fantoni
Pranavkumar Sawargaonkar
Mike Neilsen
Yang Zhang
David Vrabel
Frediano Ziglio
Ian Campbell
Anil Madhavapeddy
Don Slutz
Rob Hoes
Stefan Bader