... to validate the kernel image (which is required to be in PE
format, as is e.g. the case for the Linux bzImage when built with
CONFIG_EFI_STUB).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Also, add log level indicator to P2M_ERROR(), and drop pointless
underscores from all related macros' parameter names.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
When guest hypervisor tries to read MSR value, we intercept this
behavior and return certain emulated values. Besides that, we also
need to ensure that those emulated values must compatible with host
ability.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
While delivering interrupt into L2 guest, L0 hypervisor need to check
whether L1 hypervisor wants to own the interrupt, if not, directly
inject the interrupt into L2 guest.
Signed-off-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
If the "Virtualize APIC accesses" feature is enabled, we need to sync
the APIC-access address from virtual vvmcs into shadow vmcs when doing
virtual_vmentry.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Some VMMs may check the platform capability to judge whether long
mode guest is supported. Therefore we need to expose this bit to
guest VMM.
Xen on Xen works fine in current solution because Xen doesn't
check this capability but directly set it in VMCS if guest
supports long mode.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
For DR register, we use lazy restore mechanism when access
it. Therefore when receiving such VM exit, L0 should be responsible to
switch to the right DR values, then inject to L1 hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
If L0 is to handle the TSC access, then we need to update guest EIP by
calling update_guest_eip().
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
As stated in SDM, all bits (except for those 1-reserved) in rflags
would be set to 0 in VM exit. Therefore we need to follow this logic
in virtual_vmexit.
Signed-off-by: Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Besides, use literal name instead of hard numbers for this bit 55 in
IA32_VMX_BASIC_MSR.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
For those default 1 settings in VMX MSR, use some literal name
instead of hard numbers in the code.
Besides, fix the default 1 setting for pin based control MSR.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
In nested vmx virtualization for MSR bitmaps, L0 hypervisor will trap
all the VM exit from L2 guest by disable the MSR_BITMAP feature. When
handling this VM exit, L0 hypervisor judges whether L1 hypervisor uses
MSR_BITMAP feature and the corresponding bit is set to 1. If so, L0
will inject such VM exit into L1 hypervisor; otherwise, L0 will be
responsible for handling this VM exit.
Signed-off-by: Dongxiao Xu <dongxiao.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Checking that multi-page allocations are permitted is unnecessary for
PoD population operations. Instead, the (loop invariant) check added
for addressing XSA-31 can be moved here.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
At the sender
xc_domain_save has a key point: 'to query the types of all the pages
with xc_get_pfn_type_batch'
1) if broken page occur before the key point, migration will be fine
since proper pfn_type and pfn number will be transferred to the
target and then take appropriate action;
2) if broken page occur after the key point, whole system will crash
and no need care migration any more;
At the target
Target will populates pages for guest. As for the case of broken page,
we prefer to keep the type of the page for the sake of seamless migration.
Target will set p2m as p2m_ram_broken for broken page. If guest access
the broken page again it will kill itself as expected.
Suggested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
libxl__device_disk_from_xs_be() was failing without error for some
missing xenstore nodes in a backend, while assuming (without checking)
that other nodes were valid, causing a crash when another internal
error wrote these nodes in the wrong place.
Make this function consistent by:
* Checking the existence of all nodes before using
* Choosing a default only when the node is not written in device_disk_add()
* Failing with log msg if any node written by device_disk_add() is not present
* Returning an error on failure
* Disposing of the structure before returning using libxl_device_disk_displose()
Also make the callers of the function pay attention to the error and
behave appropriately. In the case of libxl__append_disk_list_of_type(),
this means only incrementing *ndisks as the disk structures are
successfully initialized.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
At the moment it is possible to reach return_to_hypervisor with
interrupts enabled (it happens all the times when we are actually going
back to hypervisor mode, when we don't take the return_to_guest path).
If that happens we risk loosing the content of ELR_hyp: if we receive an
interrupt right after restoring ELR_hyp, once we come back we'll have a
different value in ELR_hyp and the original is lost.
In order to make the return_to_hypervisor path safe, we disable
interrupts before restoring any registers.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Shutdown variables are meaningless when CONFIG_XENBUS=n since no
shutdown event will ever happen. Better make sure that no code tries
to use it and never get the hoped shutdown event.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
The capabilities register field is a 5-bit value, and the 5 bits all
being zero actually means 32 entries.
Under the assumption that amd_iommu_flush_iotlb() really just tried
to correct for the miscalculation above when adding 32 to the value,
that adjustment is also being removed.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by Xiantao Zhang <xiantao.zhang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Wei Huang <wei.huang2@amd.com>
... also in the non-translated case.
This is XSA-32 / CVE-2012-xxxx.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Allowing unbounded order values here causes almost unbounded loops
and/or partially incomplete requests, particularly in PoD code.
The added range checks in populate_physmap(), decrease_reservation(),
and the "in" one in memory_exchange() architecturally all could use
PADDR_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT, and are being artificially constrained to
MAX_ORDER.
This is XSA-31 / CVE-2012-5515.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
The only user of the "out" label bypasses a necessary unlock, thus
enabling the caller to lock up Xen.
Also, the function was never meant to be called by a guest for itself,
so rather than inspecting the code paths in depth for potential other
problems this might cause, and adjusting e.g. the non-guest printk()
in the above error path, just disallow the guest access to it.
Finally, the printk() (considering its potential of spamming the log,
the more that it's not using XENLOG_GUEST), is being converted to
P2M_DEBUG(), as debugging is what it apparently was added for in the
first place.
This is XSA-30 / CVE-2012-5514.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Ever since its existence (3.0.3 iirc) the handler for this has been
using non address range checking guest memory accessors (i.e.
the ones prefixed with two underscores) without first range
checking the accessed space (via guest_handle_okay()), allowing
a guest to access and overwrite hypervisor memory.
This is XSA-29 / CVE-2012-5513.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
Doing large p2m updates for HVMOP_track_dirty_vram without preemption
ties up the physical processor. Integrating preemption into the p2m
updates is hard so simply limit to 1GB which is sufficient for a 15000
* 15000 * 32bpp framebuffer.
For HVMOP_modified_memory and HVMOP_set_mem_type preemptible add the
necessary machinery to handle preemption.
This is CVE-2012-5511 / XSA-27.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
gnttab_unpopulate_status_frames() incompletely freed the pages
previously used as status frame in that they did not get removed from
the domain's xenpage_list, thus causing subsequent list corruption
when those pages did get allocated again for the same or another purpose.
Similarly, grant_table_create() and gnttab_grow_table() both improperly
clean up in the event of an error - pages already shared with the guest
can't be freed by just passing them to free_xenheap_page(). Fix this by
sharing the pages only after all allocations succeeded.
This is CVE-2012-5510 / XSA-26.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson.citrix.com>
If the user has set a vnc display number both in vnclisten (with
"xxxx:yy"), and with vncdisplay, throw an error.
Update man pages to match.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
The comment in function libxl__try_phy_backend is wrong, 1 is returned
if the backend should be handled as "phy", while 0 is returned if not.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Committed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
This fixes the build of the xenstore stub domain, which should never
be shut down and so does not need this feature.
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
In exactly the same style as app_main() in kernel.c, create a weak
reference console_input() function for applications to override to
quickly gain access to the console.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Add a thread watching the xenbus shutdown control path and notifies a
wait queue.
Add HYPERVISOR_shutdown convenient inline for minios shutdown.
Add proper shutdown to the minios test application.
Signed-off-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Committed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Ian Jackson
Jan Beulich
Dongxiao Xu
Olaf Hering
Liu Jinsong
George Dunlap
Stefano Stabellini
Ian Campbell
Samuel Thibault
David Vrabel
Tim Deegan
Roger Pau Monne
Daniel De Graaf
Wei Liu
Andrew Cooper