x86/HVM: guard against emulator driving ioreq state in weird ways

In the case where hvm_wait_for_io() calls wait_on_xen_event_channel(),
p->state ends up being read twice in succession: once to determine that
state != p->state, and then again at the top of the loop.  This gives a
compromised emulator a chance to change the state back between the two
reads, potentially keeping Xen in a loop indefinitely.

Instead:
* Read p->state once in each of the wait_on_xen_event_channel() tests,
* re-use that value the next time around,
* and insist that the states continue to transition "forward" (with the
  exception of the transition to STATE_IOREQ_NONE).

This is XSA-262.

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jan Beulich authored and Andrew Cooper committed 2018-05-08 18:28:20 +01:00
1 parent c5339c5947
commit c53663a223
1 file changed
+24 -5
+24 -5
View File
@@ -453,14 +453,17 @@ static void hvm_io_assist(struct hvm_ioreq_vcpu *sv, uint64_t data)
static bool_t hvm_wait_for_io(struct hvm_ioreq_vcpu *sv, ioreq_t *p)
{
unsigned int prev_state = STATE_IOREQ_NONE;
while ( sv->pending )
{
unsigned int state = p->state;
rmb();
switch ( state )
smp_rmb();
recheck:
if ( unlikely(state == STATE_IOREQ_NONE) )
{
case STATE_IOREQ_NONE:
/*
* The only reason we should see this case is when an
* emulator is dying and it races with an I/O being
@@ -468,14 +471,30 @@ static bool_t hvm_wait_for_io(struct hvm_ioreq_vcpu *sv, ioreq_t *p)
*/
hvm_io_assist(sv, ~0ul);
break;
}
if ( unlikely(state < prev_state) )
{
gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Weird HVM ioreq state transition %u -> %u\n",
prev_state, state);
sv->pending = 0;
domain_crash(sv->vcpu->domain);
return 0; /* bail */
}
switch ( prev_state = state )
{
case STATE_IORESP_READY: /* IORESP_READY -> NONE */
p->state = STATE_IOREQ_NONE;
hvm_io_assist(sv, p->data);
break;
case STATE_IOREQ_READY: /* IOREQ_{READY,INPROCESS} -> IORESP_READY */
case STATE_IOREQ_INPROCESS:
wait_on_xen_event_channel(sv->ioreq_evtchn, p->state != state);
break;
wait_on_xen_event_channel(sv->ioreq_evtchn,
({ state = p->state;
smp_rmb();
state != prev_state; }));
goto recheck;
default:
gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Weird HVM iorequest state %u\n", state);
sv->pending = 0;
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