When an interrupt is received during an EFI runtime service call, Xen
may call map_domain_page() while using the EFI runtime page tables.
This fails because, although the EFI runtime page tables are a
copy of the idle domain's page tables, current points at a different
domain's vCPU.
To fix this, return NULL from mapcache_current_vcpu() when using the EFI
runtime page tables which is treated equivalently to running in an idle
vCPU.
This issue can be reproduced by repeatedly calling GetVariable() from
dom0 while using VT-d, since VT-d frequently maps a page from interrupt
context.
Example call trace:
[<ffff82d0801615dc>] __find_next_zero_bit+0x28/0x60
[<ffff82d08016a10e>] map_domain_page+0x4c6/0x4eb
[<ffff82d080156ae6>] map_vtd_domain_page+0xd/0xf
[<ffff82d08015533a>] msi_msg_read_remap_rte+0xe3/0x1d8
[<ffff82d08014e516>] iommu_read_msi_from_ire+0x31/0x34
[<ffff82d08016ff6c>] set_msi_affinity+0x134/0x17a
[<ffff82d0801737b5>] move_masked_irq+0x5c/0x98
[<ffff82d080173816>] move_native_irq+0x25/0x36
[<ffff82d08016ffcb>] ack_nonmaskable_msi_irq+0x19/0x20
[<ffff82d08016ffdb>] ack_maskable_msi_irq+0x9/0x37
[<ffff82d080173e8b>] do_IRQ+0x251/0x635
[<ffff82d080234502>] common_interrupt+0x62/0x70
[<00000000df7ed2be>] 00000000df7ed2be
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
master commit: 591e1e357c
master date: 2015-06-01 11:59:14 +0200
Enabling posted interrupts requires the virtual interrupt delivery feature,
which is disabled for PVH guests, so make sure posted interrupts are also
disabled or else vmlaunch will fail.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reported-and-Tested-by: Lars Eggert <lars@netapp.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: cf6b3ccf28
master date: 2015-05-28 10:56:08 +0200
There is no sense in trying to online (or offline) CPUs when the size of
cpumap is greater than the maximum number of VCPUs the guest can go to.
As such fail the operation if the count of CPUs to online is greater
than what the guest started with. For the offline case we do not
check (as the bits are unset in the cpumap) and let it go through.
We coalesce some of the underlying libxl_set_vcpuonline code
together which was duplicated in QMP and XenStore codepaths.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit d83bf9d224)
Conflicts:
tools/libxl/libxl.c
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
libxl__ao_inprogress needs to check (like
libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports) that there are no
oustanding progress callbacks.
Otherwise it might happen that we would destroy the ao while another
thread has an outstanding callback its egc report queue. The other
thread would then, in its egc_run_callbacks, touch the destroyed ao.
Instead, when this happens in libxl__ao_inprogress, simply run round
the event loop again. The thread which eventually makes the callback
will spot our poller in the ao, and notify the poller, waking us up.
This fixes an assertion failure race seen with libvirt:
libvirtd: libxl_event.c:1792: libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports: Assertion `ao->in_initiator' failed.
or (after "Add an assert to egc_run_callbacks")
libvirtd: libxl_event.c:1338: egc_run_callbacks: Assertion `aop->ao->magic == 0xA0FACE00ul' failed.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit f1335f0d7b)
Break out the test in libxl__ao_complete_check_progress_reports, into
ao_work_outstanding, which reports false if either (i) the ao is still
ongoing or (ii) there is a progress report (perhaps on a different
thread's callback queue) which has yet to be reported to the
application.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 93699882d9)
... avoiding NULL derefs when the version to use wasn't set yet (via
GNTTABOP_setup_table or GNTTABOP_set_version).
This is CVE-2015-4163 / XSA-134.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 5d5c09d853
master date: 2015-06-11 14:44:12 +0200
in fact, before this change, shutting down or suspending the
system with some CPUs not assigned to any cpupool, would
crash as follows:
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d080101757>] disable_nonboot_cpus+0xb5/0x138
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801a8824>] enter_state_helper+0xbd/0x369
(XEN) [<ffff82d08010614a>] continue_hypercall_tasklet_handler+0x4a/0xb1
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801320bd>] do_tasklet_work+0x78/0xab
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801323f3>] do_tasklet+0x5e/0x8a
(XEN) [<ffff82d080163cb6>] idle_loop+0x56/0x6b
(XEN)
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) Xen BUG at cpu.c:191
(XEN) ****************************************
This is because, for free CPUs, -EBUSY were being returned
when trying to tear them down, making cpu_down() unhappy.
It is certainly unpractical to forbid shutting down or
suspenging if there are unassigned CPUs, so this change
fixes the above by just avoiding returning -EBUSY for those
CPUs. If shutting off, that does not matter much anyway. If
suspending, we make sure that the CPUs remain unassigned
when resuming.
While there, take the chance to:
- fix the doc comment of cpupool_cpu_remove() (it was
wrong);
- improve comments in general around and in cpupool_cpu_remove()
and cpupool_cpu_add();
- add a couple of ASSERT()-s for checking consistency.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
master commit: 7ff6f1fc39
master date: 2015-05-13 15:08:30 +0200
which means such an event must be handled at the call sites
of cpupool_assign_cpu_locked(), and the error, if occurring,
properly propagated.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
master commit: d415a81b22
master date: 2015-05-07 15:15:53 +0200
c/s 7e73a6e "have architectures specify the number of PIRQs a hardware domain
gets" increased the default number of pirqs for dom0, as 256 was found to be
too low in some cases.
However, it didn't account for the upper bound presented by the domains EOI
bitmap, registered with the PHYSDEVOP_pirq_eoi_gmfn_v* hypercall.
On a server with 240 cpus, Xen was observed to be attempting to clear the EOI
bit for dom0's pirq 0xb40f, which hit a pagefault.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 75d28c9170
master date: 2015-05-22 10:13:04 +0200
It may not be the appropriate half to touch.
Drop the superfluous mem_sharing_enabled assignment, and move the hap_enabled
assignment to a suitable conditional before it is actually needed.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 74d0932448
master date: 2015-05-20 13:25:12 +0200
Updates to idle_pg_table[] need to be mirrored into the page tables
used for invoking EFI runtime services.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: db83975f0f
master date: 2015-05-19 11:39:09 +0200
XenServer's VM density testing uncovered a regression when moving from
sysvinit to systemd where the file descriptor limit dropped from 4096 to
1024. (XenServer had previously inserted a ulimit statement into its
initscripts.)
One solution is to use LimitNOFILE=4096 in xenconsoled.service to match the
lost ulimit, but that is only a stopgap solution.
As Xenconsoled genuinely needs a large number of file descriptors if a large
number of domains are running, attempt to increase the limit.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 588df84c0d)
Don't kill xenstored as part of the usual service shutdown process to
prevent hangs on shutdown where the kernel tries to unplug a VIF
after xenstored has exited.
In an ideal case with all guests cooperating, xendomains will have shut
down all guests before xenstored is killed.
However in the uncooperative case, malicious or crashed guests may still
be running after xendomains has exited and this should not block the
shutdown/reboot of dom0.
Xenstored has no state to sync to disk, and never used to be killed in
the sysvinit case; observe the warning in xencommons. Our testing has
shown regressions caused by the change in behaviour between sysvinit and
systemd when it comes to killing xenstored.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- added systemd to title ]
(cherry picked from commit 96e0ee8386)
The Ocaml stub to retrieve the hypervisor console ring had a few problems.
* A single 32k buffer would truncate a large console ring.
* The buffer was static and not under the protection of the Ocaml GC lock so
could be clobbered by concurrent accesses.
* Embedded NUL characters would cause caml_copy_string() (which is strlen()
based) to truncate the buffer.
The function is rewritten from scratch, using the same algorithm as the python
stubs, but uses the protection of the Ocaml GC lock to maintain a static
running total of the ring size, to avoid redundant realloc()ing in future
calls.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Dave Scott <dave.scott@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: David Scott <dave.scott@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1a010ca99e)
Call xc_domain_destroy in a subprocess. That allows us to do so
asynchronously, rather than blocking the whole process calling libxl.
The changes in detail:
* Provide an libxl__ev_child in libxl__domain_destroy_state, and
initialise it in libxl__domain_destroy. There is no possibility
to `clean up' a libxl__ev_child, but there need to clean it up, as
the control flow ensures that we only continue after the child has
exited.
* Call libxl__ev_child_fork at the right point and put the call to
xc_domain_destroy and associated logging in the child. (The child
opens a new xenctrl handle because we mustn't use the parent's.)
* Consequently, the success return path from domain_destroy_domid_cb
no longer calls dis->callback. Instead it simply returns.
* We plumb the errorno value through the child's exit status, if it
fits. This means we normally do the logging only in the parent.
* Incidentally, we fix the bug that we were treating the return value
from xc_domain_destroy as an errno value when in fact it is a
return value from do_domctl (in this case, 0 or -1 setting errno).
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 188e9c541f)
From: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
When domain_death_xswatch_callback needed a further call to
xc_domain_getinfolist it would restart it with the last domain it
found rather than the first one it wants.
If it only wants one it will also only ask for one domain. The result
would then be that it gets the previous domain again (ie, the previous
one to the one it wants), which still doesn't reveal the answer to the
question, and it would therefore loop again.
It's completely unclear to me why I thought it was a good idea to
start the xc_domain_getinfolist with the last domain previously found
rather than the first one left un-confirmed. The code has been that
way since it was introduced.
Instead, start each xc_domain_getinfolist at the next domain whose
status we need to check.
We also need to move the test for !evg into the loop, we now need evg
to compute the arguments to getinfolist.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reported-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Tested-by: Jim Fehlig <jfehlig@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4783c99aab)
With ->startup unmasking the IRQ, setting the affinity afterwards
without masking the IRQ again is invalid namely for MSI (address and
data can't be updated atomically and may - at least for MSI-X - be
cached while unmasked).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
AMD IOMMU: only translate remapped IO-APIC RTEs
1aeb1156fa ("x86 don't change affinity with interrupt unmasked")
introducing RTE reads prior to the respective interrupt having got
enabled for the first time uncovered a bug in 2ca9fbd739 ("AMD IOMMU:
allocate IRTE entries instead of using a static mapping"): We obviously
shouldn't be translating RTEs for which remapping didn't get set up
yet.
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <Suravee.Suthikulpanit@amd.com>
master commit: 1aeb1156fa
master date: 2015-03-26 11:18:28 +0100
master commit: c33c51b81c
master date: 2015-04-24 12:06:26 +0200
1- or 2-byte operations never alter the high halves of registers.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 1191aa9d19
master date: 2015-05-11 10:37:58 +0200
CMPXCHG sets CF, PF, AF, SF, and OF flags according to the results of the
comparison the rAX with the operand of the instruction.
rAX must be the first argument of the comparison (a minuend), the operand
must be the second one (a subtrahend).
Due to improper order of comparison arguments, CF, PF, AF, SF and OF flags were
set incorrectly in the case of inequality. Need to swap them.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
# Commit 20fd4b70a7
# Date 2015-05-04 12:03:19 +0200
# Author Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
# Committer Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
test_x86_emulate: extend EFLAGS check of CMPXCHG test
CMPXCHG: in the case of inequality of the rAX and the operand,
need to check CF, PF, AF, SF and OF flags as well.
This adjustment covers the fix of incorrect comparison during
CMPXCHG emulation.
Signed-off-by: Eugene Korenevsky <ekorenevsky@gmail.com>
master commit: 2232628ecb
master date: 2015-05-04 11:55:41 +0200
master commit: 20fd4b70a7
master date: 2015-05-04 12:03:19 +0200
Currently, unless a (non-default) ioreq server is explicitly disabled before
being destroyed, its gmfns will not be placed back into the p2m but still
released back into the ioreq_gmfn mask. This is somewhat counter-intuitive
and easily remedied by this small patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ebd41901b9
master date: 2015-04-24 12:14:23 +0200
hvm_free_ioreq_gmfn has the sense of the ioreq_gmfn mask inverted; it
needs to set a bit to release the gmfn, not clear it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: cb791b84e7
master date: 2015-04-24 12:13:48 +0200
Some EFI firmware implementations may place the SMBIOS table in RAM
marked as BootServicesData, which Xen does not consider as reserved.
When dom0 tries to access the SMBIOS, the region is not contained in the
initial P2M and it crashes with a page fault. To fix this, reserve the
SMBIOS region.
Also, fix the memcmp checks for existence of the SMBIOS.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: bf68adcada
master date: 2015-04-17 10:44:48 +0200
In 2417e243 "QEMU_TAG update" my tag update script mangled the
machinery which sets QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION, by replacing the first
assignment to QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION it found rather than the one
which ought to have been replaced.
The result was that from that commit on, QEMU_TAG was no longer
honoured although QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION still was.
Fix this by restoring the transfer from QEMU_TAG.
This fix is analogous to 5d4c0952 "Config.mk: Fix (and, effectively,
update) QEMU_TAG" from xen.git#staging, but in 4.5 there has not been
a subsequent attempt to update the qemu revision, so both settings of
QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION are the same, and restoring the proper
behaviour will not have the side effect of making a previous qemu tag
update effective.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
CC: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This bug will be trigged when NMI happen in the L2 guest. The current
code handles the NMI incorrectly. According to Intel SDM 31.7.1.2
(Resuming Guest Software after Handling an Exception), If bit 31 of the
IDT-vectoring information fields is set, and the virtual NMIs VM-execution
control is 1, while bits 10:8 in the IDT-vectoring information field is
2, bit 3 in the interruptibility-state field should be cleared to avoid
the next VM entry fail.
Signed-off-by: Liang Li <liang.z.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: f7708796db
master date: 2015-04-10 11:35:46 -0400
In the hopes of making any future errors along the lines of XSA-123
into clean crashes instead of memory corruption bugs.
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: dd766684e7
master date: 2015-03-27 16:13:07 +0100
I got repeatedly annoyed by there not getting anything logged by
default on VT-d faults (and hence having to tell people to add extra
command line options), and hence I think it is time to redo this code:
Log basic fault information at guest-warning level (rate limited by
default), and show the page walk in verbose rather than only in debug
mode. Break up multi-line message so that each gets a proper log level
attached, at once splitting out the common part. Also don't log
"unknown" faults as interrupt-remapping ones.
As a minor cleanup fix the type of the involved "fault_type" variables.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
master commit: f0250f4b48
master date: 2015-03-27 15:23:25 +0100
__setup_msi_irq() needs to undo what it did before calling
write_msi_msg() in case that returned an error.
map_domain_pirq() needs to get rid of the MSI descriptor it
(implicitly) allocated. The case of a setup_msi_irq() failure on a
non-initial multi-vector-MSI interrupt needs special handling: While
the initial IRQ will get freed by the caller (who also passed it to
us), we need to undo the effect setup_msi_irq() had on it. (As a
benefit from the added call to msi_free_irq() we no longer need to
explicitly call destroy_irq() on the non-initial slots.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 29c1b7886c
master date: 2015-03-26 11:19:57 +0100
If the part of the compression data are corrupted, or the compression
data is totally fake, the memory access over the limit is possible.
This is the log from my system usning lz4 decompression.
[6502]data abort, halting
[6503]r0 0x00000000 r1 0x00000000 r2 0xdcea0ffc r3 0xdcea0ffc
[6509]r4 0xb9ab0bfd r5 0xdcea0ffc r6 0xdcea0ff8 r7 0xdce80000
[6515]r8 0x00000000 r9 0x00000000 r10 0x00000000 r11 0xb9a98000
[6522]r12 0xdcea1000 usp 0x00000000 ulr 0x00000000 pc 0x820149bc
[6528]spsr 0x400001f3
and the memory addresses of some variables at the moment are
ref:0xdcea0ffc, op:0xdcea0ffc, oend:0xdcea1000
As you can see, COPYLENGH is 8bytes, so @ref and @op can access the momory
over @oend.
Signed-off-by: JeHyeon Yeon <tom.yeon@windriver.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.cz>
[Linux commit d5e7cafd69da24e6d6cc988fab6ea313a2577efc]
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: fcc17f96c2
master date: 2015-03-26 11:19:10 +0100
Some platform (such as the VFP Base AEMv8 model) has a memory mapped
timer. We don't want DOM0 use this timer rather than the generic ARM
timer. So blacklist it for all platforms.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 770ca104b5)
This embodies the logic on arm64 that userspace can be either 32-bit
or 64-bit. It will be used in other places shortly.
Note that the logic differs slightly because the original (in
inject_abt64_exception) knew that the kernel was 64-bit and could
therefore assume that any 32-bit mode was userspace. Instead the
refactored code explicitly checks for usr mode.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e1342cf1a)
It using CLZ on a 64-bit register while specifying the input operand as
only 32 bits wide is wrong: An operand intentionally shrunk down to 32
bits at the source level doesn't imply respective zero extension also
happens at the machine instruction level, and hence the wrong result
could get returned.
Add suitable inline assembly abstraction so that the function can
remain shared between arm32 and arm64. The need to include asm_defns.h
in bitops.h makes it necessary to adjust processor.h though - it is
generally wrong to include public headers without making sure that
integer types are properly defined. (I didn't innvestigate or try
whether the possible alternative of moving the public/arch-arm.h
inclusion down in the file would also work.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit e9c1747a25)
The 64-bit ABI is different to 32-bit:
- uses x16 as the op register rather than r12.
- arguments in x0..x5 and not r0..r5. Using rN here potentially
truncates.
- return value goes in x0, not r0.
Hypercalls can only be made directly from kernel space, so checking
the domain's size is sufficient.
Spotted due to spurious -EFAULT when destroying a domain, due to the
hypercall's pointer argument being truncated. I'm unclear why I am
only seeing this now.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7466b88ec2)
... and make it tunable via the command line.
1/8 of RAM is 128M on a 1GB system and 256M on a 2GB system etc,
which is a lot. 1/32 of RAM seems more reasonable. Also drop the
minimum to 32M.
Leave the maximum at 1GB.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Cc: Jintack Lim <jintack@cs.columbia.edu>
Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit 67c7e46c7c)
This register is shared between every vCPUs and the lock was already
taken for read.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 26ea82f165)
All the GICv2 registers are word-accessible. Some them are also
byte-accessible (see GICD_IPRIORITYR*).
Those registers are incorrectly implemented when they should be RAZ. Only
word-access size are currently allowed for them.
To avoid further issues, introduce different label following the access-size
of the registers:
- read_as_zero_32 and write_ignore_32: Used for registers accessible
via a word.
- read_as_zero: Used when we don't have to check the access size.
The latter is used when the access size has already been checked in the
register emulation and/or when the register offset is reserved/implementation
defined.
Note that, only used labels has been introduced.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1fefa55027)
Ross Lagerwall
Roger Pau Monné
Andrew Cooper
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Ian Jackson
Jan Beulich
Dario Faggioli
Ian Campbell
Eugene Korenevsky
Paul Durrant
Liang Li
Tim Deegan
JeHyeon Yeon
denys drozdov
Julien Grall