Commit 0bc6a68da5 "xen/arm: Replace call_smc with arm_smccc_smc"
mistakenly forgot to populate arm_smccc_res. So a garbage value was
used as return value.
Coverity-ID: 1476827
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Split altp2m_vcpu_{enable,disable}_ve() out of the
HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_{enable,disable}_notify marshalling logic. A future change
is going to need to call altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve() from the domain_kill() path.
While at it, clean up the logic in altp2m_vcpu_{initialise,destroy}().
altp2m_vcpu_reset() has no external callers, so fold it into its two
callsites. This in turn allows for altp2m_vcpu_destroy() to reuse
altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve() rather than opencoding it.
No practical change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
pci_release_devices() takes the global PCI lock. Once pci_release_devices()
has completed, it will be called redundantly each time paging_teardown() and
vcpu_destroy_pagetables() continue.
This is liable to be millions of times for a reasonably sized guest, and is a
serialising bottleneck now that domain_kill() can be run concurrently on
different domains.
Instead of propagating the opencoding of the relinquish state machine, take
the opportunity to clean it up.
Leave a proper set of comments explaining that domain_relinquish_resources()
implements a co-routine. Introduce a documented PROGRESS() macro to avoid
latent bugs such as the RELMEM_xen case, and make the new PROG_* states
private to domain_relinquish_resources().
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
64-bit PV guest user mode runs on a different L4 table. Make sure
- the accessed bit gets set in the correct table (and in log-dirty
mode the correct page gets marked dirty) during guest walks,
- the correct table gets audited by sh_audit_gw(),
- correct info gets logged by print_gw().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Commit 19fb14622e "x86/pmtimer: move ACPI registers from PMTState to
hvm_domain" misconfigures pm1a_sts for hvm_acpi_sleep_button with
PWRBTN_STS instead of SLPBTN_STS, which leads to
XEN_DOMCTL_SENDTRIGGER_SLEEP causing guest powerdowns. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Varad Gautam <vrd@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The behaviour of vpmu=<bool> being exclusive of vpmu=bts|ipc|arch is odd and
contrary to Xen's normal command line parsing behaviour. Rewrite the parsing
to use the normal form, but retain the previous behaviour where the use of
bts/ipc/arch implies vpmu=true.
Parts of the documenation are stale, most notibly the HVM-only statement.
Update it for consistency and correctness.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The FreeBSD implementation is missing the following functions:
osdep_gnttab_dmabuf_exp_from_refs
osdep_gnttab_dmabuf_exp_wait_released
osdep_gnttab_dmabuf_imp_to_refs
osdep_gnttab_dmabuf_imp_release
Which all deal with dmabufs, that only exists on Linux. Implement them
using abort, since such functions should never be called on FreeBSD.
FTR, I realized those functions where missing when attempting to use
pygrub:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/local/lib/xen/bin/pygrub", line 19, in <module>
import xen.lowlevel.xc
ImportError: /usr/local/lib/libxengnttab.so.1: Undefined symbol "osdep_gnttab_dmabuf_exp_from_refs"
Fixes: ee8105 ("libgnttab: Add support for Linux dma-buf")
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksandr Andrushchenko <oleksandr_andrushchenko@epam.com>
Avoid printing a warning message when writing to a BAR register with
memory decoding enabled if the value written is the same as the
current one.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
HVMOP_altp2m_set_domain_state does not domain_pause(), presumably
on purpose (as it was originally supposed to cater to a in-guest
agent, and a domain pausing itself is not a good idea).
This can lead to domain crashes in the vmx_vmexit_handler() code
that checks if the guest has the ability to switch EPTP without an
exit. That code can __vmread() the host p2m's EPT_POINTER
(before HVMOP_altp2m_set_domain_state "for_each_vcpu()" has a
chance to run altp2m_vcpu_initialise(), but after
d->arch.altp2m_active is set).
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
domain_pause_except_self() was introduced to allow a domain to pause
itself while doing altp2m operations. However, as written, it has a
risk fo deadlock if two vcpus enter the loop at the same time.
Luckily, there's already a solution for this: Attempt to call domain's
hypercall_deadlock_mutex, and restart the entire hypercall if you
fail.
Make domain_pause_except_self() attempt to grab this mutex when
pausing itself, returning -ERESTART if it fails. Have the callers
check for errors and pass the value up. In both cases, the top-level
do_hvm_op() should DTRT when -ERESTART is returned.
The (necessary) reuse of the hypercall deadlock mutex poses the risk
of getting called from a context where the lock was already acquired
(e.g. someone may (say) call domctl_lock(), then afterwards call
domain_pause_except_self()). However, in the interest of not
overcomplicating things, no changes are made here to the mutex.
Attempted nesting of this lock isn't a security issue, because all
that will happen is that the vcpu will livelock taking continuations.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
There have been several reports of the dom0 builder running out of
memory when building a PVH dom0 without having specified a dom0_mem
value. Print a warning message if dom0_mem is not set when booting in
PVH mode.
This is a temporary workaround until accounting for internal memory
required by Xen (ie: paging structures) is improved.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The assert was originally added to make sure that higher order
regions (> PAGE_ORDER_4K) could not be used to bypass the
mmio_ro_ranges check performed by p2m_type_to_flags.
This however is already checked in set_mmio_p2m_entry, which makes
sure that higher order mappings don't overlap with mmio_ro_ranges,
thus allowing the creation of high order MMIO mappings safely.
Replace the assert to allow 2M/1G entries to be created for MMIO
regions and add some extra asserts as a replacement to make sure
there's no overlapping with MMIO read-only ranges.
Note that 1G MMIO entries will not be created unless mmio_order is
changed to allow it.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
So that the iommu is initialized before populating the p2m, and
entries added get the corresponding iommu page table entries if
required. This requires splitting the current pvh_setup_p2m into two
different functions. One that crafts dom0 physmap and sets the paging
allocation, and another one that actually populates the p2m with RAM
regions.
Note that this allows to remove the special casing done for the low
1MB in hwdom_iommu_map.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The p2m and iommu mapping code always had the requirement that
addresses and orders must be aligned when populating the p2m or the
iommu page tables.
PVH dom0 builder didn't take this requirement into account, and can
call into the p2m/iommu mapping helpers with addresses and orders that
are not aligned.
Fix this by making sure the orders passed to the physmap population
helpers are always aligned to the guest address to be populated.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Commit e3b93b3c59 "dmop: add xendevicemodel_modified_memory_bulk()" added
the implementation to the library almost 2 years ago, but the function
was not included in the map file, essentially making it useless. This
patch rectifies the situation.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
There are multiple arrays in the HVM interface that are accessed
with indices that are provided by the guest. To avoid speculative
out-of-bound accesses, we use the array_index_nospec macro.
When blocking speculative out-of-bound accesses, we can classify arrays
into dynamic arrays and static arrays. Where the former are allocated
during run time, the size of the latter is known during compile time.
On static arrays, compiler might be able to block speculative accesses
in the future.
This is part of the speculative hardening effort.
Reported-by: Pawel Wieczorkiewicz <wipawel@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
set_mmio_p2m_entry() may fail, in particular with -ENOMEM. Don't ignore
such an error, but instead cause domain creation to fail in such a case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Commit 32a5ea00ec ("IOMMU/x86: remove indirection from certain
IOMMU hook accesses") introduced iommu_ops initialized at boot time
with data declared as __initconstrel.
On Intel systems there is another path where iommu_ops is initialized
and this path is relevant on resume after returning from system suspend.
As the initialization data is no longer accessible in this case that
second initialization must be dropped in case the system isn't just
booting.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
In the early steps of compilation, the asm header files are created, such
as include/asm-$(TARGET_ARCH)/asm-offsets.h. These files depend on the
assembly file arch/$(TARGET_ARCH)/asm-offsets.s, which is generated
before. Depending on the used toolchain, there might be comments in the
assembly files. Especially the goto-gcc compiler of the bounded model
checker CBMC adds comments that start with a '#' symbol at the beginning
of the line.
This commit adds handling comments in assembler during the creation of the
asm header files, especially ignoring lines that start with '#', which
indicate comments for both ARM and x86 assembler. The used tool goto-as
produces exactly comments of this kind.
Signed-off-by: Norbert Manthey <nmanthey@amazon.de>
Signed-off-by: Michael Tautschnig <tautschn@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
A previously bad situation has become worse with the early setting of
->max_vcpus: The value returned by shadow_min_acceptable_pages() has
further grown, and hence now holds back even more memory from use for
the p2m.
Make sh_min_allocation() account for all p2m memory needed for
shadow_enable() to succeed during domain creation (at which point the
domain has no memory at all allocated to it yet, and hence use of
d->tot_pages is meaningless).
Also make shadow_min_acceptable_pages() no longer needlessly add 1 to
the vCPU count.
Finally make the debugging printk() in shadow_alloc_p2m_page() a little
more useful by logging some of the relevant domain settings.
Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
These directories ought not to be even world-readable. If this script
for some reason runs with a lax umask they might be created
overly-writeable. Avoid any such bug by setting the mode explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
It is useful to have a single `xen' facility (in the LSB Provides
namespace). That allows other facilities to specify that they should
go after `xen' without needing to know the implementation details.
This service name is already Provide'd by the (fairly different) init
scripts used in Debian.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Document provides a brief introduction to the Argo interdomain
communication mechanism and a detailed description of the granular
locking used within the Argo implementation.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Will inhibit initialization of the domain's argo data structure to
prevent receiving any messages or notifications and access to any of
the argo hypercall operations.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Chris Patterson <pattersonc@ainfosec.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
XSM controls for argo ring registration with two distinct cases, where
the ring being registered is:
1) Single source: registering a ring for communication to receive messages
from a specified single other domain.
Default policy: allow.
2) Any source: registering a ring for communication to receive messages
from any, or all, other domains (ie. wildcard).
Default policy: deny, with runtime policy configuration via bootparam.
This commit modifies the signature of core XSM hook functions in order to
apply 'const' to arguments, needed in order for 'const' to be accepted in
signature of functions that invoke them.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Tested-by: Chris Patterson <pattersonc@ainfosec.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Queries for data about space availability in registered rings and
causes notification to be sent when space has become available.
The hypercall op populates a supplied data structure with information about
ring state and if insufficient space is currently available in a given ring,
the hypervisor will record the domain's expressed interest and notify it
when it observes that space has become available.
Checks for free space occur when this notify op is invoked, so it may be
intentionally invoked with no data structure to populate
(ie. a NULL argument) to trigger such a check and consequent notifications.
Limit the maximum number of notify requests in a single operation to a
simple fixed limit of 256.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Tested-by: Chris Patterson <pattersonc@ainfosec.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
sendv operation is invoked to perform a synchronous send of buffers
contained in iovs to a remote domain's registered ring.
It takes:
* A destination address (domid, port) for the ring to send to.
It performs a most-specific match lookup, to allow for wildcard.
* A source address, used to inform the destination of where to reply.
* The address of an array of iovs containing the data to send
* .. and the length of that array of iovs
* and a 32-bit message type, available to communicate message context
data (eg. kernel-to-kernel, separate from the application data).
If insufficient space exists in the destination ring, it will return
-EAGAIN and Xen will notify the caller when sufficient space becomes
available.
Accesses to the ring indices are appropriately atomic. The rings are
mapped into Xen's private address space to write as needed and the
mappings are retained for later use.
Notifications are sent to guests via VIRQ and send_guest_global_virq is
exposed in the change to enable argo to call it. VIRQ_ARGO is claimed
from the VIRQ previously reserved for this purpose (#11).
The VIRQ notification method is used rather than sending events using
evtchn functions directly because:
* no current event channel type is an exact fit for the intended
behaviour. ECS_IPI is closest, but it disallows migration to
other VCPUs which is not necessarily a requirement for Argo.
* at the point of argo_init, allocation of an event channel is
complicated by none of the guest VCPUs being initialized yet
and the event channel logic expects that a valid event channel
has a present VCPU.
* at the point of signalling a notification, the VIRQ logic is already
defensive: if d->vcpu[0] is NULL, the notification is just silently
dropped, whereas the evtchn_send logic is not so defensive: vcpu[0]
must not be NULL, otherwise a null pointer dereference occurs.
Using a VIRQ removes the need for the guest to query to determine which
event channel notifications will be delivered on. This is also likely to
simplify establishing future L0/L1 nested hypervisor argo communication.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Tested-by: Chris Patterson <pattersonc@ainfosec.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Takes a single argument: a handle to the ring unregistration struct,
which specifies the port and partner domain id or wildcard.
The ring's entry is removed from the hashtable of registered rings;
any entries for pending notifications are removed; and the ring is
unmapped from Xen's address space.
If the ring had been registered to communicate with a single specified
domain (ie. a non-wildcard ring) then the partner domain state is removed
from the partner domain's argo send_info hash table.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Chris Patterson <pattersonc@ainfosec.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The register op is used by a domain to register a region of memory for
receiving messages from either a specified other domain, or, if specifying a
wildcard, any domain.
This operation creates a mapping within Xen's private address space that
will remain resident for the lifetime of the ring. In subsequent commits,
the hypervisor will use this mapping to copy data from a sending domain into
this registered ring, making it accessible to the domain that registered the
ring to receive data.
Wildcard any-sender rings are default disabled and registration will be
refused with EPERM unless they have been specifically enabled with the
new mac-permissive flag that is added to the argo boot option here. The
reason why the default for wildcard rings is 'deny' is that there is
currently no means to protect the ring from DoS by a noisy domain
spamming the ring, affecting other domains ability to send to it. This
will be addressed with XSM policy controls in subsequent work.
Since denying access to any-sender rings is a significant functional
constraint, the new option "mac-permissive" for the argo bootparam
enables overriding this. eg: "argo=1,mac-permissive=1"
The p2m type of the memory supplied by the guest for the ring must be
p2m_ram_rw and the memory will be pinned as PGT_writable_page while the ring
is registered.
This hypercall op and its interface currently only supports 4K-sized pages.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Tested-by: Chris Patterson <pattersonc@ainfosec.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
EMSGSIZE: Argo's sendv operation will return EMSGSIZE when an excess amount
of data, across all iovs, has been supplied, exceeding either the statically
configured maximum size of a transmittable message, or the (variable) size
of the ring registered by the destination domain.
ECONNREFUSED: Argo's register operation will return ECONNREFUSED if a ring
is being registered to communicate with a specific remote domain that does
exist but is not argo-enabled.
These codes are described by POSIX here:
http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/errno.h.html
EMSGSIZE : "Message too large"
ECONNREFUSED : "Connection refused".
The numeric values assigned to each are taken from Linux, as is the case
for the existing error codes.
EMSGSIZE : 90
ECONNREFUSED : 111
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Initialises basic data structures and performs teardown of argo state
for domain shutdown.
Inclusion of the Argo implementation is dependent on CONFIG_ARGO.
Introduces a new Xen command line parameter 'argo': bool to enable/disable
the argo hypercall. Defaults to disabled.
New headers:
public/argo.h: with definions of addresses and ring structure, including
indexes for atomic update for communication between domain and hypervisor.
xen/argo.h: to expose the hooks for integration into domain lifecycle:
argo_init: per-domain init of argo data structures for domain_create.
argo_destroy: teardown for domain_destroy and the error exit
path of domain_create.
argo_soft_reset: reset of domain state for domain_soft_reset.
Adds a new field to struct domain: struct argo_domain *argo;
In accordance with recent work on _domain_destroy, argo_destroy is
idempotent. It will tear down: all rings registered by this domain, all
rings where this domain is the single sender (ie. specified partner,
non-wildcard rings), and all pending notifications where this domain is
awaiting signal about available space in the rings of other domains.
A count will be maintained of the number of rings that a domain has
registered in order to limit it below the fixed maximum limit defined here.
Macros are defined to verify the internal locking state within the argo
implementation. The macros are ASSERTed on entry to functions to validate
and document the required lock state prior to calling.
The hash function for the hashtables that hold ring state is derived from
the string hashing function djb2 (http://www.cse.yorku.ca/~oz/hash.html)
by Daniel J. Bernstein. Basic testing with a limited number of domains and
ports has shown reasonable distribution for the table size.
The software license on the public header is the BSD license, standard
procedure for the public Xen headers. The public header was originally
posted under a GPL license at: [1]:
https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2013-05/msg02710.html
The following ACK by Lars Kurth is to confirm that only people being
employees of Citrix contributed to the header files in the series posted at
[1] and that thus the copyright of the files in question is fully owned by
Citrix. The ACK also confirms that Citrix is happy for the header files to
be published under a BSD license in this series (which is based on [1]).
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Lars Kurth <lars.kurth@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Chris Patterson <pattersonc@ainfosec.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
A convenience for working on development of the argo subsystem:
setting a #define variable enables additional debug messages.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Presence is gated upon CONFIG_ARGO.
Registers the hypercall previously reserved for this.
Takes 5 arguments, does nothing and returns -ENOSYS.
Implementation will provide a compat ABI so COMPAT_CALL is the selected
macro for the hypercall tables.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Defines CONFIG_ARGO when enabled. Default: disabled.
When the Kconfig option is enabled, the Argo hypercall implementation
will be included, allowing use of the hypervisor-mediated interdomain
communication mechanism.
Argo is implemented for x86 and ARM hardware platforms.
Availability of the option depends on EXPERT and Argo is currently an
experimental feature.
Signed-off-by: Christopher Clark <christopher.clark6@baesystems.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
On i.MX8, we implemented partition reboot which means Cortex-A reboot
will not impact M4 cores and System control Unit core. However GICv3 is
not reset because we also need to support A72 Cluster reboot without
affecting A53 Cluster.
The gic-v3 controller is configured with EOImode to 1, so during xen
reboot, there is a function call "smp_call_function(halt_this_cpu, NULL, 0);"
but halt_this_cpu never returns, that means other CPUs have no chance to
deactivate the SGI interrupt, because the deactivate_irq operation is at
the end of do_sgi. During the next boot of Xen, CPU0 will issue
GIC_SGI_CALL_FUNCTION to other CPUs. As the Active state for SGI is left
untouched during the reboot, the GIC_SGI_CALL_FUNCTION will still be active
on the non-boot CPUs. This means the interrupt cannot be triggered again
until it get deactivated.
And according to IHI0069D_gic_architecture_specification, chapter
"8.11.3 GICR_ICACTIVER0, Interrupt Clear-Active Register 0", the RW
field of GICR_ICACTIVER0 resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.
So make sure all interrupts are deactivated during initialization by
clearing the state.
Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
This utility can't possibly work with modern Xen setup: none of the
sysfs path used (under /sys/devices/xen-backend) is documented as
stable ABI in upstream Linux kernel.
Archaeology shows that the path used could have been part of the
xenolinux fork which never got upstreamed.
Its utility is zero nowadays. Drop it.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
no_irq_type handlers are used when an IRQ does not have action attached.
This is useful to detect misconfiguration between the interrupt
controller and the software.
Currently, all the handlers will do nothing on spurious interrupt. This
means if such interrupt is received, the priority of the interrupt will
not be dropped and the processor will lose the ability to receive any
interrupt lower or equal to the priority.
Spurious interrupt can happen while releasing interrupt assigned to
guest (happen during domain destruction). The interaction is roughly
CPU0 CPU1
release_guest_irq(A)
spin_lock(&desc->lock)
gic_remove_irq_from_guest
receive IRQ A
spin_lock(&desc->lock)
desc->handler->shutdown()
set_bit(IRQ_DISABLED)
desc->handler = &no_irq_type
spin_unlock(&desc->lock)
desc->handler->end();
spin_unlock(&desc->lock)
Because the no_irq_type.end callback is implemented as a NOP, CPU1 will
not drop the priority of the interrupt. So the CPU will not be able to
receive any interrupt route to any guest afterwards.
The problem can be prevented by dropping the priority and deactivating
the interrupt via gic_hw_ops->gic_host_irq->end().
Note that, for now, interrupt used by Xen are safe because it is not
using no_irq_type on release.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
xen-bugtool relies on code that has been removed in commit 9e8672f1c3
"tools: remove xend and associated python modules", more than 5 years
ago. Remove it, since it confuses users.
-$ /usr/sbin/xen-bugtool
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/sbin/xen-bugtool", line 9, in <module>
from xen.util import bugtool
ImportError: No module named xen.util
Signed-off-by: Hans van Kranenburg <hans.van.kranenburg@mendix.com>
Link: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=866380
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Make qemu-smoke-x86-64.sh take a variant argument. Make two new tests
in test.yaml.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Doug Goldstein <cardoe@cardoe.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
libxl runs the command "cont" later during guest creation; i.e. it
is expecting that QEMU would not do any emulation. Use the "-S"
command option to achieve this.
Unfortunately, when QEMU is started with "-S", it won't write QEMU's
readiness into xenstore. So only activate this option when we have a
QEMU startup notification via QMP available, i.e. when dm_restrict
is activated.
The -S option has the side-effect of suppressing the startup
notification via xenstore: libxl will only get the notification via
QMP.
It is important to rely only on QMP for notification when we have
QMP available, as (due to a qemu bug) not waiting for that QMP
notification may result in the QMP socket becoming blocked, so that
QEMU stops responding to new connections even if no existing ones
are active.
When the QEMU bug happens, the actions taken by both libxl and QEMU
are roughly as follows:
- libxl connects and handshakes with QEMU, then sends the
cmd "query-status".
- QEMU prepares and maybe tries to send the response,
while also writing "running" into xenstore.
- libxl sees via xenstore that QEMU is running and disconnects from the
QMP socket before receiving the response from the cmd.
=> The QMP socket (monitor) is thereby blocked and will never reply
to commands on new connections.
This is due to QEMU only responding to one command at a time, and
suspending its monitor (QMP) until the command has been processed and
sent. Disconnecting from the socket doesn't unsuspend the monitor. The
race described here is very likely to happen with QEMU 3.1.50 (during
3.2 development), but can be reproduced with QEMU 3.1.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Sadly, a lone:
(XEN) emulate.c:156:d2v0 svm_get_insn_len: Mismatch between expected and actual instruction: eip = fffff804564139c0
on the console is of no use trying to identify what went wrong. Dump as much
state as we can to help identify what went wrong.
(XEN) Insn mismatch: Expected opcode 0xf0031, modrm 0, got nrip_len 3, emul_len 3
(XEN) SVM Insn len emulation failed (1): d1v0 64bit @ 0008:0010475f -> 0f 01 f9 0f 31 5b 31 ff 31 c0 e9 c2 db ff ff 00
Drop the debug-only early exit if the sources of length disagree, because the
only effect it has it to avoid the more detailed analysis of what went wrong.
Reported-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Brian Woods <brian.woods@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Julien Grall
Andrew Cooper
Jan Beulich
Varad Gautam
Roger Pau Monne
Razvan Cojocaru
George Dunlap
Paul Durrant
Norbert Manthey
Juergen Gross
Norbert Manthey
Ian Jackson
Stefano Stabellini
Christopher Clark
Peng Fan
Wei Liu
Hans van Kranenburg
Anthony PERARD