For the last couple years we have received numerous reports from users of
monitor vm_events of spurious guest crashes when using events. In particular,
it has observed that the problem occurs when vm_events are being disabled. The
nature of the guest crash varied widely and has only occured occasionally. This
made debugging the issue particularly hard. We had discussions about this issue
even here on the xen-devel mailinglist with no luck figuring it out.
The bug has now been identified as a race-condition between register event
handling and disabling the monitor vm_event interface. The default behavior
regarding emulation of register write events is changed so that they get
postponed until the corresponding vm_event handler decides whether to allow such
write to take place. Unfortunately this can only be implemented by performing the
deny/allow step when the vCPU gets scheduled.
Due to that postponed emulation of the event if the user decides to pause the
VM in the vm_event handler and then disable events, the entire emulation step
is skipped the next time the vCPU is resumed. Even if the user doesn't pause
during the vm_event handling but exits immediately and disables vm_event, the
situation becomes racey as disabling vm_event may succeed before the guest's
vCPUs get scheduled with the pending emulation task. This has been particularly
the case with VMS that have several vCPUs as after the VM is unpaused it may
actually take a long time before all vCPUs get scheduled.
In this patch we are reverting the default behavior to always perform emulation
of register write events when the event occurs. To postpone them can be turned
on as an option. In that case the user of the interface still has to take care
of only disabling the interface when its safe as it remains buggy.
Fixes: 96760e2fba ('vm_event: deny register writes if refused by vm_event
reply').
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <rogerpau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Mediated access to the RTC was provided for PVHv1 dom0 using the PV
code paths (guest_io_{write/read}), but those accesses where never
implemented for PVHv2 dom0. This patch provides such mediated accesses
to the RTC for PVH dom0, just like it's provided for a classic PV
dom0.
Pull out some of the RTC logic from guest_io_{read/write} into
specific helpers that can be used by both PV and HVM guests. The
setup of the handlers for PVH is done in rtc_init, which is already
used to initialize the fully emulated RTC.
Without this a Linux PVH dom0 will read garbage when trying to access
the RTC, and one vCPU will be constantly looping in
rtc_timer_do_work.
Note that such issue doesn't happen on domUs because the ACPI
NO_CMOS_RTC flag is set in FADT, which prevents the OS from accessing
the RTC. Also the X86_EMU_RTC flag is not set for PVH dom0, as the
accesses are not emulated but rather forwarded to the physical
hardware.
No functional change expected for classic PV dom0.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
xen_pt_next_level() will retrieve the MFN from the entry right after the
page-table has been unmapped.
After calling xen_unmap_table(), there is no guarantee the mapping will
still be valid. Depending on the implementation, this may result to a
data abort in Xen.
Re-order the code to retrieve the MFN before the table is unmapped.
Fixes: 53abb9a1dc ("xen/arm: mm: Rework Xen page-tables walk during update")
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Since the golang bindings are now set to be re-generated whenever a
change is made to tools/libxl/libxl_types.idl, the call to go fmt in
gengotypes.py results in a dirty git tree for users without go
installed.
As an immediate fix, just remove the call to go fmt from gengotypes.py.
While here, make sure the DO NOT EDIT comment and package declaration
remain formatted correctly. All other generated code is left
un-formatted for now.
Signed-off-by: Nick Rosbrook <rosbrookn@ainfosec.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Remove trailing whitespace.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
The cronjob which renders https://xenbits.xen.org/docs/ has been broken for a
while. commitish_version() pulls an old version of xen/Makefile out of
history, and uses the xenversion rule.
Currently, this fails with:
tmp.support-matrix.xen.make:130: scripts/Kbuild.include: No such file or directory
which is because the Makefile legitimately references Kbuild.include with a
relative rather than absolute path.
Rework support-matrix-generate to use sed to extract the major/minor version,
rather than expecting xen/Makefile to be usable in a different tree.
Fixes: 945e80a730 ("docs: Provide support-matrix-generate, to generate a support matrix in HTML")
Backport: 4.11+
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
While the issue is more general, I noticed that asm-macros.i not getting
re-generated as needed. This was due to its .*.d file mentioning
asm-macros.o instead of asm-macros.i. Use -MQ here as well, and while at
it also use -MQ to avoid the somewhat fragile sed-ary on the *.lds
dependency tracking files. While there, further avoid open-coding $(CPP)
and drop the bogus (Arm) / stale (x86) -Ui386.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
A recalculation NPT fault doesn't always require additional handling
in hvm_hap_nested_page_fault(), moreover in general case if there is no
explicit handling done there - the fault is wrongly considered fatal.
This covers a specific case of migration with vGPU assigned which
uses direct MMIO mappings made by XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping hypercall:
at a moment log-dirty is enabled globally, recalculation is requested
for the whole guest memory including those mapped MMIO regions
which causes a page fault being raised at the first access to them;
but due to MMIO P2M type not having any explicit handling in
hvm_hap_nested_page_fault() a domain is erroneously crashed with unhandled
SVM violation.
Instead of trying to be opportunistic - use safer approach and handle
P2M recalculation in a separate NPT fault by attempting to retry after
making the necessary adjustments. This is aligned with Intel behavior
where there are separate VMEXITs for recalculation and EPT violations
(faults) and only faults are handled in hvm_hap_nested_page_fault().
Do it by also unifying do_recalc return code with Intel implementation
where returning 1 means P2M was actually changed.
Since there was no case previously where p2m_pt_handle_deferred_changes()
could return a positive value - it's safe to replace ">= 0" with just "== 0"
in VMEXIT_NPF handler. finish_type_change() is also not affected by the
change as being able to deal with >0 return value of p2m->recalc from
EPT implementation.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Several options (TBOOT, XENOPROF, Scheduler) depend on EXPERT to be able to
deselect/configure.
Enabling EXPERT now causes the request of the Credit1 scheduler to be honoured
(rather than giving us Credit2), but take this opportunity to switch to Null,
as the previously problematic issues are now believed to be fixed.
Enabling EXPERT also allows XEN_SHSTK to be selected, and we don't want this
being built for shim. We also don't want TRACEBUFFER or GDBSX either.
Take this oppotunity to swap the disable of HVM_FEP for a general disable of
HVM (likely to have wider impliciations in the future), and disable ARGO (will
necesserily need plumbing work to function in shim).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
The pv-shim doesn't need the hypervisor filesystem, so disable it.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Commit 58263ed771 ("xen: add /buildinfo/config entry to hypervisor
filesystem") added a dependency to .config, but the hypervisor's build
config could be have another name via setting KCONFIG_CONFIG.
Fix that by using $(KCONFIG_CONFIG) instead. Additionally reference
the config file via $(XEN_ROOT) instead of a relative path.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
c/s 9267a439c "x86/ucode: Document the behaviour of the microcode_ops hooks"
identified several poor behaviours of the start_update()/end_update_percpu()
hooks.
AMD have subsequently confirmed that OSVW don't, and are not expected to,
change across a microcode load, rendering all of this complexity unecessary.
Instead of fixing up the logic to not leave the OSVW state reset in a number
of corner cases, delete the logic entirely.
This in turn allows for the removal of the poorly-named 'start_update'
parameter to microcode_update_one(), and for svm_host_osvw_{init,reset}() to
become static.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
It is reported that [] was removed by autoconf, which caused the
following error:
./configure: line 4681: -z: command not found
Switch to test. That's what is used throughout our configure scripts.
Also put the variable expansion in quotes.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reported-by: Bertrand Marquis <Bertrand.Marquis@arm.com>
Fixes: 8a6b1665d9 ("configure: also add EXTRA_PREFIX to {CPP/LD}FLAGS")
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
As compilers are free to choose the width of an enum they should be
avoided in stable interfaces when declaring a variable. So the
struct xenhypfs_dirent definition should be modified to have explicitly
sized members for type and encoding and the related enums should be
defined separately.
Additionally it is better to have a larger flags member in that struct
with the "writable" indicator occupying only a single bit. This will
make future additions easier.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
asprintf() can fail, so check its return value. Additionally fix a
memory leak in xenhypfs.
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Right now only docker is supported, when using the containerize script
for building inside containers. Enable podman as well.
Note that podman can be use in rootless mode too, but for that to work
the files /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid must be properly configured.
For instance:
dario@localhost> cat /etc/subuid
dario:100000:65536
dario@localhost:> cat /etc/subgid
dario:100000:65536
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
We need python3 (and the respective -devel package), these days.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Currently an array of 1024 xc_domaininfo_t is declared on stack. That alone
consumes ~112k. Since libxl_domain_info() creates a new gc this patch simply
uses it to allocate the array instead.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The default value '/' for DESTDIR is unusual, but does probably not hurt.
Fixes commit f2b40dabab
Fixes commit 8e986e5a61
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
All versions of clang used by Xen support _Static_assert, so use it
unconditionally when building Xen with clang.
No functional change expected.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Clang 3.5 complains with:
common.c:794:24: error: statement expression not allowed at file scope
i < ARRAY_SIZE(this_cpu(tss_page).ist_ssp); ++i )
^
/build/xen/include/asm/percpu.h:14:7: note: expanded from macro 'this_cpu'
(*RELOC_HIDE(&per_cpu__##var, get_cpu_info()->per_cpu_offset))
^
/build/xen/include/xen/compiler.h:104:3: note: expanded from macro 'RELOC_HIDE'
({ unsigned long __ptr; \
^
/build/xen/include/xen/lib.h:68:69: note: expanded from macro 'ARRAY_SIZE'
#define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof((x)[0]) + __must_be_array(x))
^
/build/xen/include/xen/compiler.h:85:57: note: expanded from macro '__must_be_array'
BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(__builtin_types_compatible_p(typeof(a), typeof(&a[0])))
^
/build/xen/include/xen/lib.h:39:57: note: expanded from macro 'BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO'
#define BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(cond) sizeof(struct { int:-!!(cond); })
^
Workaround this by defining the tss_page as a local variable. Adjust
other users of the per-cpu tss_page to also use the newly introduced
local variable.
No functional change expected.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
LLVM linker doesn't support discarding .shstrtab, and complains with:
ld -melf_i386_fbsd -N -T build32.lds -o reloc.lnk reloc.o
ld: error: discarding .shstrtab section is not allowed
Add an explicit .shstrtab, .strtab and .symtab sections to the linker
script after the text section in order to make LLVM LD happy and match
the behavior of GNU LD.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Clang 10 complains with:
mm.c:1239:10: error: converting the result of '<<' to a boolean always evaluates to true
[-Werror,-Wtautological-constant-compare]
if ( _PAGE_GNTTAB && (l1e_get_flags(l1e) & _PAGE_GNTTAB) &&
^
xen/include/asm/x86_64/page.h:161:25: note: expanded from macro '_PAGE_GNTTAB'
#define _PAGE_GNTTAB (1U<<22)
^
Remove the conversion of _PAGE_GNTTAB to a boolean and instead use a
preprocessor conditional to check if _PAGE_GNTTAB is defined.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
OSSTest reports:
credit2.c: In function 'cpu_runqueue_siblings_match':
credit2.c:883:29: error: implicit declaration of function 'cpu_nr_siblings' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
unsigned int nr_sibls = cpu_nr_siblings(cpu);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
credit2.c:883:5: error: nested extern declaration of 'cpu_nr_siblings' [-Werror=nested-externs]
unsigned int nr_sibls = cpu_nr_siblings(cpu);
^~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
For whatever reason, cpufeature.h's inclusion is conditional, and missing for
arm32. Inlcude it explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
OSSTest reports:
x86_64.S: Assembler messages:
x86_64.S:57: Error: no such instruction: `setssbsy'
/home/osstest/build.150510.build-amd64/xen/xen/Rules.mk:183: recipe for target 'head.o' failed
make[4]: Leaving directory '/home/osstest/build.150510.build-amd64/xen/xen/arch/x86/boot'
make[4]: *** [head.o] Error 1
All use of CET instructions, even those inside alternative blocks, needs to be
behind CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK, as it indicates suitable toolchain support.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
With all other plumbing in place, activate shadow stacks when possible.
Note that CET shares the similar problems to SMEP/SMAP with Ring1 being
supervisor to the processor, and that the layout of the shadow stack differs
between an IRET to Ring 1 and Ring 3. Therefore, we disable PV32 when CET is
enabled. Compatibility can be maintained if necessary via PV-Shim.
The BSP needs to wait until alternatives have run (to avoid interaction with
CR0.WP), and after the first reset_stack_and_jump() to avoid having a pristine
shadow stack interact in problematic ways with an in-use regular stack.
Activate shadow stack in reinit_bsp_stack().
APs have all infrastructure set up by the booting CPU, so enable shadow stacks
before entering C. Adjust the logic to call start_secondary rather than jump
to it, so stack traces make more sense.
The crash path needs to turn CET off to avoid interfering with the crash
kernel's environment.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The SYSCALL/SYSENTER/SYSRET paths need to use {SET,CLR}SSBSY. The IRET to
guest paths must not. In the SYSRET path, re-position the mov which loads rip
into %rcx so we can use %rcx for CLRSSBSY, rather than spilling another
register to the stack.
While we can in principle detect shadow stack corruption and a failure to
clear the supervisor token busy bit in the SYSRET path (by inspecting the
carry flag following CLRSSBSY), we cannot detect similar problems for the IRET
path (IRET is specified not to fault in this case).
We will double fault at some point later, when next trying to enter Xen, due
to an already-set supervisor shadow stack busy bit. As SYSRET is a uncommon
path anyway, avoid the added complexity for no appreciable gain.
The IST switch onto the primary stack is not great as we have an instruction
boundary with no shadow stack. This is the least bad option available.
These paths are not used before shadow stacks are properly established, so can
use alternatives to avoid extra runtime CET detection logic.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Ensure the dirty bit is clear when creating read-only EFI mappings.
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The current alternatives algorithm clears CR0.WP and writes into .text. This
has a side effect of the mappings becoming shadow stacks once CET is active.
Adjust _alternative_instructions() to clean up after itself. This involves
extending the set of bits modify_xen_mappings() to include Dirty (and Accessed
for good measure).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When adjusting an IRET frame to recover from a fault, and equivalent
adjustment needs making in the shadow IRET frame.
The adjustment in exception_with_ints_disabled() could in principle be an
alternative block rather than an ifdef, as the only two current users of
_PRE_EXTABLE() are IRET-to-guest instructions. However, this is not a
fastpath, and this form is more robust to future changes.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The 32 calls need dropping from the shadow stack as well as the regular stack.
To shorten the code, we can use the 32bit forms of RDSSP/INCSSP, but need to
double up the input to INCSSP to counter the operand size based multiplier.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
We need to unwind up to the supervisor token. See the comment for details.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
When executing an IRET-to-self, the shadow stack must agree with the regular
stack. We can't manipulate SSP directly, so have to fake a shadow IRET frame
by executing 3 CALLs, then editing the result to look correct.
This is not a fastpath, is called on the BSP long before CET can be set up,
and may be called on the crash path after CET is disabled. Use the fact that
INCSSP is allocated from the hint nop space to construct a test for CET being
active which is safe on all processors.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Introduce HYPERVISOR_SHSTK pagetable constants, which are Read-Only + Dirty.
Use these in place of _PAGE_RW for memguard_guard_stack(), to create real
shadow stacks on capable hardware.
Supervisor shadow stacks need a token written at the top, which is most easily
done before making the frame read only.
Allocate the shadow IST stack block in struct tss_page. It doesn't strictly
need to live here, but it is a convenient location (and XPTI-safe, for testing
purposes), and placing it ahead of the TSS doesn't risk colliding with a bad
IO Bitmap offset and turning into some IO port permissions.
Have load_system_tables() set up the shadow IST stack table when setting up
the regular IST in the TSS.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
We have two free pages in the current stack. A useful property of shadow
stacks and regular stacks is that they act as each others guard pages as far
as OoB writes go. As wild OoB stack reads aren't likely, we don't lose any
meaningful protection from using read-only guard pages in general (rather than
non-present guard pages), but result is far simpler for Xen as a whole by not
having a feature/mode dependent stack configuration.
Move the regular IST stacks up by one page, to allow their shadow stack page
to be in slot 0. The primary shadow stack uses slot 5.
As the shadow IST stacks are only 1k large, shuffle the order of IST vectors
to have #DF numerically highest, so there is no chance of a shadow stack
overflow clobbering the supervisor token.
The XPTI code already breaks the MEMORY_GUARD abstraction for stacks by
forcing it to be in effect (i.e. guard page not present). To avoid having too
many configurations, do away with the concept entirely, and unconditionally
map the pages in their read-only form.
A later change will turn these properly into shadow stacks. Some of the
comments written here are the intended result, and will become true in the
subsequent change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
For now, any #CP exception or shadow stack #PF indicate a bug in Xen, but
attempt to recover from #CP if taken in guest context.
This will of course have to change as part of introducing CET-SS support for
PV guests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Introduce CONFIG_HAS_AS_CET_SS to determine whether CET Shadow Stack
instructions are supported in the assembler, and CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK as the main
build option.
Introduce cet={no-,}shstk to for a user to select whether or not to use shadow
stacks at runtime, and X86_FEATURE_XEN_SHSTK to determine Xen's overall
enablement of shadow stacks.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
UD faults never had any diagnostics printed, and the others were inconsistent.
Don't use dprintk() because identifying traps.c is actively unhelpful in the
message, as it is the location of the fixup, not the fault. Use the new
vec_name() infrastructure, rather than leaving raw numbers for the log.
(XEN) Running stub recovery selftests...
(XEN) Fixup #UD[0000]: ffff82d07fffd040 [ffff82d07fffd040] -> ffff82d0403ac9d6
(XEN) Fixup #GP[0000]: ffff82d07fffd041 [ffff82d07fffd041] -> ffff82d0403ac9d6
(XEN) Fixup #SS[0000]: ffff82d07fffd040 [ffff82d07fffd040] -> ffff82d0403ac9d6
(XEN) Fixup #BP[0000]: ffff82d07fffd041 [ffff82d07fffd041] -> ffff82d0403ac9d6
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
For one, they render the vector in a different base.
Introduce X86_EXC_* constants and vec_name() to refer to exceptions by their
mnemonic, which starts bringing the code/diagnostics in line with the Intel
and AMD manuals.
Provide constants for every archtiecturally defined exception, even those not
implemented by Xen yet, as do_reserved_trap() is a catch-all handler.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xen/tools/binfile contains a bash specific command (let). This leads
to build failures on systems not using bash as /bin/sh.
Replace "let SHIFT=$OPTIND-1" by "SHIFT=$((OPTIND-1))".
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The ARM side of the cpu_nr_siblings() was missing a return type. OSSTest
reports:
/home/osstest/build.150502.build-arm64-xsm/xen/xen/include/asm/cpufeature.h:67:15:
error: return type defaults to 'int' [-Werror=implicit-int]
static inline cpu_nr_siblings(unsigned int)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
My local build test then reported:
/local/xen.git/xen/include/asm/cpufeature.h: In function ‘cpu_nr_siblings’:
/local/xen.git/xen/include/asm/cpufeature.h:67:1: error: parameter name omitted
static inline int cpu_nr_siblings(unsigned int)
^
Fix it up to match its x86 counterpart.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
toggle_guest_pt() is called in pairs, to read guest kernel data
structures when emulating a guest userspace action. Hence this doesn't
modify cr3 from the guest's point of view, and therefore doesn't need
any resync on the exit-to-guest path. Therefore move the updating of
->pv_cr3 and ->root_pgt_changed into toggle_guest_mode(), since undoing
the changes during the second of these invocations wouldn't be a safe
thing to do.
While at it, add a comment ahead of toggle_guest_pt() to clarify its
intended usage.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tamas K Lengyel