The ptr calculation shall take the offset into the page into account
when ptr is valid.
Reported regression on NetBSD's port-xen with last known working libxen
being rev 2.9. This corrupts the kernel symbol table when the table is
not loaded on a page boundary.
Issue was tracked down by FastIce and Jeff Rizzo. See also
http://mail-index.netbsd.org/port-xen/2013/10/16/msg008088.html
Signed-off-by: Jean-Yves Migeon <jym@NetBSD.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: cb08944a48
master date: 2013-11-29 11:07:01 +0000
For a pass-through device with MSI-x capability, when guest tries
to unmask the MSI-x interrupt for the passed through device, xen
doesn't clear the mask bit for MSI-x in hardware in the following
scenario, which will cause network disconnection:
1. Guest masks the MSI-x interrupt
2. Guest updates the address and data for it
3. Guest unmasks the MSI-x interrupt (This is the problematic step)
In the step #3 above, Xen doesn't handle it well. When guest tries
to unmask MSI-X interrupt, it traps to Xen, Xen just returns to Qemu
if it notices that address or data has been modified by guest before,
then Qemu will update Xen with the latest value of address/data by
hypercall. However, in this whole process, the MSI-X interrupt unmask
operation is missing, which means Xen doesn't clear the mask bit in
hardware for the MSI-X interrupt, so it remains disabled, that is why
it loses the network connection.
This patch fixes this issue.
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>
Only latch the address if the guest really is unmasking the entry.
Clean up the entire change.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 74fd0036de
master date: 2013-11-27 15:15:43 +0100
Also Coverity CID 1055180.
Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Use _SEGMENT_* instead of plain numbers and adjust a comment.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 6ed4bfbabd
master date: 2013-11-26 09:54:21 +0100
This patch solves XSA-60 security hole:
1. For guest w/o VT-d, and for guest with VT-d but snooped, Xen need
do nothing, since hardware snoop mechanism has ensured cache coherency.
2. For guest with VT-d but non-snooped, cache coherency can not be
guaranteed by h/w snoop, therefore it need emulate UC type to guest:
2.1). if it works w/ Intel EPT, set guest IA32_PAT fields as UC so that
guest memory type are all UC.
2.2). if it works w/ shadow, drop all shadows so that any new ones would
be created on demand w/ UC.
This patch also fix a bug of shadow cr0.cd setting. Current shadow has a
small window between cache flush and TLB invalidation, resulting in possilbe
cache pollution. This patch pause vcpus so that no vcpus context involved
into the window.
This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 62652c00ef
master date: 2013-11-06 10:12:36 +0100
XSA-60 security hole comes from the problematic vmx_set_uc_mode.
This patch remove vmx_set_uc_mode logic, which will be replaced by
PAT approach at later patch.
This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
master commit: 1c84d04673
master date: 2013-11-06 10:12:00 +0100
Recently Oracle developers found a Xen security issue as DOS affecting,
named as XSA-60. Please refer http://xenbits.xen.org/xsa/advisory-60.html
Basically it involves how to handle guest cr0.cd setting, which under
some environment it consumes much time resulting in DOS-like behavior.
This is a preparing patch for fixing XSA-60. Later patch will fix XSA-60
via PAT under Intel EPT case, which depends on cpu_has_vmx_pat.
This is CVE-2013-2212 / XSA-60.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
master commit: c13b0d65dd
master date: 2013-11-06 10:11:18 +0100
The recommendation is to set a bit in an MSR - do this if the firmware
didn't, considering that otherwise we expose ourselves to a guest
induced DoS.
This is CVE-2013-6885 / XSA-82.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 98162f256e
master date: 2013-12-03 09:49:54 +0100
Nonlazy xstates should be xsaved each time when vcpu_save_fpu.
Operation to nonlazy xstates will not trigger #NM exception, so
whenever vcpu scheduled in it got restored and whenever scheduled
out it should get saved.
Currently this bug affects AMD LWP feature, and later Intel MPX
feature. With the bugfix both LWP and MPX will work fine.
Signed-off-by: Liu Jinsong <jinsong.liu@intel.com>
Furthermore, during restore we also need to set nonlazy_xstate_used
according to the incoming accumulated XCR0.
Also adjust the changes to i387.c such that there won't be a pointless
clts()/stts() pair.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 7d8b5dd984
master date: 2013-11-25 11:19:04 +0100
nmi_shootdown_cpus() is called during a crash to park all the other
CPUs. This changes the NMI trap handlers which means there's no point
in having the watchdog still running.
This also disables the watchdog before executing any crash kexec image
and prevents the image from receiving unexpected NMIs.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
PVOps Linux as a kexec image shoots itself in the foot otherwise.
On a Core2 system, Linux declares a firmware bug and tries to invert some bits
in the performance counter register. It ends up setting the number of retired
instructions to generate another NMI to fewer instructions than the NMI
interrupt path itself, and ceases to make any useful progress.
The call to disable_lapic_nmi_watchdog() must be this late into the kexec path
to be sure that this cpu is the one which will execute the kexec image.
Otherwise there are race conditions where the NMIs might be disabled on the
wrong cpu, resulting in the kexec image still receiving NMIs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 2a16fcd5ba
master date: 2013-11-22 14:48:12 +0100
Host S3 implicitly resets the host TSC to 0, but the tsc offset for hvm
domains is not recalculated when they resume, causing it to go into
negative values. In Linux guest using tsc clocksource, this results in
a hang after wrap back to positive values since the tsc clocksource
implementation expects it reset.
Signed-off-by: Tomasz Wroblewski <tomasz.wroblewski@citrix.com>
master commit: e95dc6ba69
master date: 2013-11-22 14:47:24 +0100
The code in question runs after module ranges got already removed from
the E820 table, so when determining the new maximum page/PDX we need to
explicitly take them into account.
Furthermore we need to round up the ending addresses here, in order to
fully cover eventual partial trailing pages.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: a5db2c7aab
master date: 2013-11-18 13:57:20 +0100
Rather than ignoring failures to map the virtual VMCS as well as MSR or
I/O port bitmaps, convert those into failures of the respective
instructions (avoiding to dereference NULL pointers). Ultimately such
failures should be handled transparently (by using transient mappings
when they actually need to be accessed, just like nested SVM does).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
master commit: e02b14e531
master date: 2013-11-18 09:39:01 +0100
Add a utility function to update the rest of the timeslice
accounting fields when updating the timeslice of the
credit scheduler, so that capped CPUs behave correctly.
Before this patch changing the timeslice to a value higher
than the default would result in a domain not utilizing
its full capacity and changing the timeslice to a value
lower than the default would result in a domain exceeding
its capacity.
Signed-off-by: Nate Studer <nate.studer@dornerworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: 1320b8100c
master date: 2013-11-15 17:38:10 +0100
Anything else would allow for privilege escalation.
This is CVE-2013-4554 / XSA-76.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 5c447caaf4
master date: 2013-11-27 09:01:49 +0100
Coverity ID 1055652
(See the code comment.)
This is CVE-2013-4553 / XSA-74.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: 19f027cc5d
master date: 2013-11-27 09:00:41 +0100
If the named path is a leaf node, libxl__xs_directory can succeed,
returning non-null, but set *nb to 0.
In three places in libxl this may result in a zero size argument being
passed to malloc() or realloc(), which is not adviseable.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 48249a1403)
libxl__datacopier_prefixdata would prepend a deliberately short block
(not just a half-full one, but one with a short buffer) to the
dc->bufs queue. However, this is wrong because datacopier_readable
will find it and try to continue to fill it up.
Instead, allocate a full-sized buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Tested-by: Chunyan Liu <cyliu@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit f6d2a87f05)
Without this, code interrupted by SIGCHLD may experience strange
values of errno. (As far as I know this is not the cause of any
reported bugs.)
This fix should be backported in due course.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 704d10289b)
The third parameter of __intel_iommu_iotlb_flush() is to indicate
whether the to be flushed entry was a present one. A few lines before,
we bailed if !dma_pte_present(*pte), so there's no need to check the
flag here again - we can simply always pass TRUE here.
This is XSA-78.
Suggested-by: Cheng Yueqiang <yqcheng.2008@phdis.smu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 85c72f9fe7
master date: 2013-11-18 13:55:55 +0100
... as being generally insufficient: Either has_arch_pdevs() or
cache_flush_permitted() should be used (in particular, it is
insufficient to consider MMIO ranges alone - I/O port ranges have the
same requirements if available to a guest).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 79233938ab
master date: 2013-11-12 16:28:47 +0100
There's a window during scheduling where "current" and the active VMCS
may disagree: The former gets set much earlier than the latter. Since
both vmx_vmcs_enter() and vmx_vmcs_exit() immediately return when the
subject vCPU is "current", accessing VMCS fields would, depending on
whether there is any currently active VMCS, either read wrong data, or
cause a crash.
Going forward we might want to consider reducing the window during
which vmx_vmcs_enter() might fail (e.g. doing a plain __vmptrld() when
v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs != this_cpu(current_vmcs) but arch_vmx->active_cpu
== -1), but that would add complexities (acquiring and - more
importantly - properly dropping v->arch.hvm_vmx.vmcs_lock) that don't
look worthwhile adding right now.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 5892924846
master date: 2013-11-12 11:52:19 +0100
For one, nestedsvm_vmcb_map() error checking must not consist of using
assertions: Global (permanent) mappings can fail, and hence failure
needs to be dealt with properly. And non-global (transient) mappings
can't fail anyway.
And then the I/O port access bitmap handling was broken: It checked
only to first of the accessed ports rather than each of them.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Egger <chegger@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>
master commit: b1e87805bf
master date: 2013-11-12 11:51:15 +0100
If the domain's NUMA node-affinity is being specified by the
user/toolstack (instead of being automatically computed by Xen),
we really should stick to that. This means domain_update_node_affinity()
is wrong when it filters out some stuff from there even in "!auto"
mode.
This commit fixes that. Of course, this does not mean node-affinity
is always honoured (e.g., a vcpu won't run on a pcpu of a different
cpupool) but the necessary logic for taking into account all the
possible situations lives in the scheduler code, where it belongs.
What could happen without this change is that, under certain
circumstances, the node-affinity of a domain may change when the
user modifies the vcpu-affinity of the domain's vcpus. This, even
if probably not a real bug, is at least something the user does
not expect, so let's avoid it.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 67348c3ac7
master date: 2013-11-12 10:54:28 +0100
Certain UEFI implementations reserve all memory below 1Mb at boot time,
making it impossible to properly allocate the chunk necessary for the
trampoline. Fall back to simply grabbing a chunk from EfiBootServices*
regions immediately prior to calling ExitBootServices().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: c1f2dfe8f6
master date: 2013-11-08 11:08:32 +0100
The commit 58afa7ef "x86/hvm: Run the RTC periodic timer on a
consistent time series" aligns the RTC periodic timer to the VM's boot time.
However, it's aligned later again to the system time in create_periodic_time()
with vpt_align=1. The next tick might be skipped.
Signed-off-by: Kouya Shimura <kouya@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: 48535f5798
master date: 2013-11-08 11:07:14 +0100
The domain destruction code, removes a domain from its cpupool
before attempting to destroy its scheduler information. Since
the scheduler framework uses the domain's cpupool information
to decide on which scheduler ops to use, this results in the
the wrong scheduler's destroy domain function being called
when the cpupool scheduler and the initial scheduler are
different.
Correct this by destroying the domain's scheduling information
before removing it from the pool.
Signed-off-by: Nathan Studer <nate.studer@dornerworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 117f67350f
master date: 2013-11-06 10:21:09 +0100
Just like for all other operations with 32-bit operand size.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
x86/HVM: 32-bit IN result must be zero-extended to 64 bits (part 2)
Just spotted a counterpart of what commit 9d89100b (same title) dealt
with.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 9d89100ba8
master date: 2013-11-05 14:51:53 +0100
master commit: 1e521eddeb
master date: 2013-11-15 11:01:49 +0100
Memory blocks outside of the always visible 1:1 mapping range get
passed to the allocator separately (once enough other setup was done).
Skipping non-RAM regions, however, was forgotten in adc5afbf ("x86:
support up to 16Tb").
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 2272589834
master date: 2013-11-04 14:29:24 +0100
Other than for the legacy APIC, the x2APIC MADT entries have valid
ranges possibly extending beyond what our internal arrays can handle,
and hence we need to guard ourselves against corrupting memory here.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 2c24cdcce3
master date: 2013-11-04 10:10:04 +0100
In commit 40d66baa ("x86: correct LDT checks") and d06a0d71 ("x86: add
address validity check to guest_map_l1e()") I didn't really pay
attention to the fact that these checks would better be done before the
paging_mode_translate() ones, as there's also no equivalent check down
the shadow code paths involved here (at least not up to the first use
of the address), and such generic checks shouldn't really be done by
particular backend functions anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: 343cad8c70
master date: 2013-10-28 12:00:36 +0100
Commit 00a4b65f85 Sep 7 2010
"libxc: provide notification of final checkpoint to restore end"
broke migration from any version of Xen using tools from prior to that commit
Older tools have no idea about an XC_SAVE_ID_LAST_CHECKPOINT, causing newer
tools xc_domain_restore() to start reading the qemu save record, as
ctx->last_checkpoint is 0.
The failure looks like:
xc: error: Max batch size exceeded (1970103633). Giving up.
where 1970103633 = 0x756d6551 = *(uint32_t*)"Qemu"
With this fix in place, the behaviour for normal migrations is reverted to how
it was before the regression; the migration is considered non-checkpointed
right from the start. A XC_SAVE_ID_LAST_CHECKPOINT chunk seen in the
migration stream is a nop. For checkpointed migrations the behaviour is
unchanged.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Shriram Rajagopalan <rshriram@cs.ubc.ca> (Remus bits)
master commit: 7051d5c872
master date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 11:28:21 +0000
Backport to Xen-4.3:
As remus was not a supported feature in libxl in 4.3 and earlier, this
backport hardcodes a non-checkpointed stream from libxl, removing the need to
any playing around with the IDL and API.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
In particular when the origin construct is in a header file (and
hence the file name is an absolute path instead of just the file name
portion) the information can otherwise become rather useless when the
build tree isn't sitting relatively close to the file system root.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: f72cb6bbc1
master date: 2013-10-17 11:35:26 +0200
A capped out vcpu must be unpaused in case of moving it to another cpupool,
otherwise it will be paused forever.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
master commit: d38a668b6e
master date: 2013-10-16 12:26:48 +0200
sched_move_domain() changes v->processor for all the domain's VCPUs.
If another domain, softirq etc. triggers a simultaneous call to
vcpu_wake() (e.g., by setting an event channel as pending), then
vcpu_wake() may lock one schedule lock and try to unlock another.
vcpu_schedule_lock() attempts to handle this but only does so for the
window between reading the schedule_lock from the per-CPU data and the
spin_lock() call. This does not help with sched_move_domain()
changing v->processor between the calls to vcpu_schedule_lock() and
vcpu_schedule_unlock().
Fix the race by taking the schedule_lock for v->processor in
sched_move_domain().
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@ts.fujitsu.com>
Use vcpu_schedule_lock_irq() (which now returns the lock) to properly
retry the locking should the to be used lock have changed in the course
of acquiring it (issue pointed out by George Dunlap).
Add a comment explaining the state after the v->processor adjustment.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: ef55257bc8
master date: 2013-10-14 08:58:31 +0200
So commit eedd6039 ("scheduler: adjust internal locking interface")
uncovered - by now using proper spin lock constructs - a bug after all:
When bringing down a CPU, cpu_disable_scheduler() gets called with
interrupts disabled, and hence the use of vcpu_schedule_lock_irq() was
never really correct (i.e. the caller ended up with interrupts enabled
despite having disabled them explicitly).
Fixing this however surfaced another problem: The call path
vcpu_migrate() -> evtchn_move_pirqs() wants to acquire the event lock,
which however is a non-IRQ-safe once, and hence check_lock() doesn't
like this lock to be acquired when interrupts are already off. As we're
in stop-machine context here, getting things wrong wrt interrupt state
management during lock acquire/release is out of question though, so
the simple solution to this appears to be to just suppress spin lock
debugging for the period of time while the stop machine callback gets
run.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 41a0cc9e26
master date: 2013-10-29 09:57:14 +0100
Make the locking functions return the lock pointers, so they can be
passed to the unlocking functions (which in turn can check that the
lock is still actually providing the intended protection, i.e. the
parameters determining which lock is the right one didn't change).
Further use proper spin lock primitives rather than open coded
local_irq_...() constructs, so that interrupts can be re-enabled as
appropriate while spinning.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: eedd603916
master date: 2013-10-14 08:57:56 +0200
Coverity ID 1087189
Correct a lock order reversal between a domains page allocation and grant
table locks.
This is CVE-2013-4494 / XSA-73.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Consolidate error handling.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
Tested-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
master commit: a321abc6d8
master date: 2013-11-04 10:06:36 +0100
This fixes the issue for both C and ocaml xenstored, however only the ocaml
xenstored is vulnerable in its default configuration.
Adding a new error appears to be safe, since bit libxenstore and the Linux
driver at least treat an unknown error code as EINVAL.
This is XSA-72 / CVE-2013-4416.
Original ocaml patch by Jerome Maloberti <jerome.maloberti@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Sanders <thomas.sanders@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8b2c441a1b)
When the permission checks for memory mapping were moved from
get_pg_owner to xsm_mmu_update in aaba7a677, the exception for DOMID_IO
was not taken into account. This will cause IO memory mappings by PV
domains (mini-os in particular) to fail when XSM/FLASK is not being
used. This patch reintroduces the exception for DOMID_IO; the actual
restrictions on IO memory mappings have always been checked separately
using iomem_access_permitted, so this change should not break existing
access control.
Reported-by: Eduardo Peixoto Macedo <epm@cin.ufpe.br>
Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
master commit: 07344c0f33
master date: 2013-09-26 10:15:47 +0200
... as there doesn't really exists any valid mapping for them.
Particularly in the case of do_page_walk() this also avoids returning
non-NULL for such invalid input.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 6fd9b0361e
master date: 2013-10-11 09:31:16 +0200
Just like for guest_get_eff_l1e() this prevents accessing as page
tables (and with the wrong memory attribute) internal data inside Xen
happening to be mapped with 1Gb pages.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: d06a0d715e
master date: 2013-10-11 09:29:43 +0200
- MMUEXT_SET_LDT should behave as similarly to the LLDT instruction as
possible: fail only if the base address is non-canonical
- instead LDT descriptor accesses should fault if the descriptor
address ends up being non-canonical (by ensuring this we at once
avoid reading an entry from the mach-to-phys table and consider it a
page table entry)
- fault propagation on using LDT selectors must distinguish #PF and #GP
(the latter must be raised for a non-canonical descriptor address,
which also applies to several other uses of propagate_page_fault(),
and hence the problem is being fixed there)
- map_ldt_shadow_page() should properly wrap addresses for 32-bit VMs
At once remove the odd invokation of map_ldt_shadow_page() from the
MMUEXT_SET_LDT handler: There's nothing really telling us that the
first LDT page is going to be preferred over others.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xen.org>
master commit: 40d66baa46
master date: 2013-10-11 09:28:26 +0200
Jean-Yves Migeon
Feng Wu
Tim Deegan
Liu Jinsong
Jan Beulich
David Vrabel
Tomasz Wroblewski
Dario Faggioli
Nate Studer
Ian Jackson
Kouya Shimura
Andrew Cooper
Juergen Gross
Daniel De Graaf