linux default implementations of dma_declare_coheremnt_memory() and its
families which is defined in include/linux/dma-mapping.h.
So those in pci-dma-xen.c are unnecessary. #ifdef out them.
PATCHNAME: pci-dma-xen-common
Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <yamahata@valinux.co.jp>
space handlers were making calls into ACPI code which uses semaphores.
Since semaphores can not be locked while atomic (because they could
sleep), I changed the way the PCI backend responds to requests from the
frontend. Previously, the virtual configuration space handlers ran in
the same context as the event channel interrupt handler (which was often
atomic if not always atomic). Now the interrupt handler schedules a
callback function (a bottom half) in the system work queue (keventd)
that will get called in process context at a slightly later time. This
allows the handlers in the virtual configuration space to run in process
context and to call any core PCI function regardless of whether it will
sleep or not.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Wilson <hap9@epoch.ncsc.mil>
controlled by the outcome of the table scan, if apic= was given on the
command line its effect should not be overridden here.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com>
Since part of the VMX guest initialization is running in the context of
dom0, so when we want to make sure the operation of shadow ops is
always done by vcpu0 of the guest VMX domain, we should make sure
the current vcpu0 is running in guest domain and not in the dom0.
Signed-off-by: Xiaohui Xin xiaohui.xin@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin.b.li@intel.com>
the integrated access control management commands. The man page is a
good place to start exploring these commands.
Signed-off by: Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
integrate into Xen Management and which support the new access control
labels (labels replace the ssidref numbers at the management user
interface).
Signed-off by: Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
introduced into security policies. It also fixes a minor problem related
to handling unsupported boot policies.
Signed-off by: Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
introduced into security policies. It also fixes a minor problem related
to handling unsupported boot policies.
Signed-off by: Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
must be unique and must change if the content of the file changes. The
policy name is used to ensure that the XM tools and the hypervisor work
on the same policy, i.e., interpret the security information on domains
consistently. This patch also simplifies the policy management by moving
policy and labels into a single file.
Signed-off by: Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
checksums into already encrypted packets (esp4) in dom0. Obviously,
it is not possible to insert a checksum into an already encrypted
packet, so this patch inserts the checksum prior to encrypting
packets in net/ipv4/xfrm4_output.c.
To do this cleanly, the TCP/UDP header pointers need to be pointed to
the correct spot, so this functionality has been abstracted into a new
function.
This patch fixes bug 143 (verified by Jim Dykman). Earlier version
verified by Jon McCune.
Signed-off-by: James Dykman <dykman@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Mason <jdmason@us.ibm.com>
This is rebased to the new PIT code now. It has the same logic as
earlier. PIT tries to catch up the missed timer ticks by injected all
the ticks one by one so that Guest time stays close to the wall clock.
But while debugging a hvm guest if you stop the guest by debugger and
then continue, the guest sees flood of interrupts compensating the
missed ticks for the stopped time. This patch just check if the guest is
being debugged, if yes then it does not try to catch up with the missed
ticks.
Signed-off-by: Nitin A Kamble <nitin.a.kamble@.intel.com>
generous about what we accept, avoid stack overflow, and
print the command line during boot (rather useful!).
This should fix the 'lapic' and 'nolapic' boot options.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>
This support is only active when supervisor_mode_kernel is enabled
in the Xen build (and when the hardware supports sysenter).
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@xensource.com>
contains code that allows to at least detect local migration of a
virtual machine and handles this for the virtual TPM (results in a no-op
for local migr.). If migration of a virtual machine with attached vTPM
to another machine is attempted, XenD will return an error.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@us.ibm.com>
of chipset IO-APICs to Xen. If REGSEL is bad (some old SiS
chipsets) then we have a slower read-modify-write routine.
Loosely based on an original patch from Jan Beulich.
Signed-off-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xensource.com>
host.
Occasionally when injecting an IDE DMA interrupt into the guest, a
page fault occurs (e.g., because the IDT mapping is not present in
shadow pagetables). This causes an immediate vmexit and, because it
occurred during event delivery, the original VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD
is kept in IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD.
The current code copies IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD back to
VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intending that the interrupt will be
injected again on next vmresume.
However, there is a corner case: if, before the next vmresume, a timer
interrupt happened then vmx_intr_assist may overwrite the information
on VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, and the IDE DMA interrupt is effectively
lost.
This patch checks the IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD in vmx_intr_assist and,
if it is set, copies it to VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD and returns.
Signed-off-by: Yunhong Jiang <Yunhong.jiang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Eddie Dong <eddie.dong@intel.com>
MP enabled kernel. In such situations we should have a workaround to
guarantee hvm guests will not detect MP.
For example, in the absence of ACPI and MPS the installation code in some
linux distributions key off the presence of cpuid edx/HTT bit (indicating
the presence of Hyper-Threading Technology) to determine if another
logical processor is present and if so load an MP enabled kernel instead
of a uniprocessor kernel. SMBIOS is also looked at for the same purpose
and presents a potential problem as well. While both approaches for
selecting an MP kernel are debatable (since using MPS or ACPI have long
been the standard for MP detection), these approaches are something we
have to live and work around with because making a change in the fully
virtualized guest is not an option.
To solve the problem we need to hide all secondary processors from the hvm
guest. Since the hvm does not surface MPS tables, we only need to deal
with ACPI, cpuid HTT, and possibly SMBIOS. (I did not have time right
now to look closely at the hvm BIOS to know if SMBIOS is also going to be
a problem.)
Also fixes a logic problem the code path where apic=0 was not
being handled correctly (vmx path only).
Signed-off-by: Clyde Griffin <cgriffin@novell.com>
