Various registers have per-guest-type or per-vendor locations or access
requirements. To support their use from common code, provide accessors which
allow for per-guest-type behaviour.
For now, just infrastructure handling default cases and expectations.
Subsequent patches will start handling registers using this infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 88d3ff7ab1
master date: 2022-01-20 16:32:11 +0000
While the problem report was for extreme errors, even smaller ones would
better be avoided: The calculated period to run calibration loops over
can (and usually will) be shorter than the actual time elapsed between
first and last platform timer and TSC reads. Adjust values returned from
the init functions accordingly.
On a Skylake system I've tested this on accuracy (using HPET) went from
detecting in some cases more than 220kHz too high a value to about
±2kHz. On other systems (or on this system, but with PMTMR) the original
error range was much smaller, with less (in some cases only very little)
improvement.
Reported-by: James Dingwall <james-xen@dingwall.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: a5c9a80af3
master date: 2022-01-13 14:31:52 +0100
Looping until reaching/exceeding a certain value is error prone: If the
target value is close enough to the wrapping point, the loop may not
terminate at all. Switch to using delta values, which then allows to
fold the two loops each into just one.
Fixes: 9334029780 ("x86/time: calibrate TSC against platform timer")
Reported-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 467191641d
master date: 2022-01-13 14:30:18 +0100
pt_pirq_iterate() will iterate in batch over all the PIRQs. The outer
loop will bail out if 'rc' is non-zero but the inner loop will continue.
This means 'rc' will get clobbered and we may miss any errors (such as
-ERESTART in the case of the callback pci_clean_dpci_irq()).
This is CVE-2022-23035 / XSA-395.
Fixes: c24536b636 ("replace d->nr_pirqs sized arrays with radix tree")
Fixes: f6dd295381 ("dpci: replace tasklet with softirq")
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 9480a1a519
master date: 2022-01-25 13:27:02 +0100
The grant unmapping hypercall (GNTTABOP_unmap_grant_ref) is not a
simple revert of the changes done by the grant mapping hypercall
(GNTTABOP_map_grant_ref).
Instead, it is possible to partially (or even not) clear some flags.
This will leave the grant is mapped until a future call where all
the flags would be cleared.
XSA-380 introduced a refcounting that is meant to only be dropped
when the grant is fully unmapped. Unfortunately, unmap_common() will
decrement the refcount for every successful call.
A consequence is a domain would be able to underflow the refcount
and trigger a BUG().
Looking at the code, it is not clear to me why a domain would
want to partially clear some flags in the grant-table. But as
this is part of the ABI, it is better to not change the behavior
for now.
Fix it by checking if the maptrack handle has been released before
decrementing the refcounting.
This is CVE-2022-23034 / XSA-394.
Fixes: 9781b51efd ("gnttab: replace mapkind()")
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 975a8fb45c
master date: 2022-01-25 13:25:49 +0100
Commit 2148a125b7 ("xen/arm: Track page accessed between batch of
Set/Way operations") allowed an entry to be invalid from the CPU PoV
(lpae_is_valid()) but valid for Xen (p2m_is_valid()). This is useful
to track which page is accessed and only perform an action on them
(e.g. clean & invalidate the cache after a set/way instruction).
Unfortunately, __p2m_set_entry() is only zeroing the P2M entry when
lpae_is_valid() returns true. This means the entry will not be zeroed
if the entry was valid from Xen PoV but invalid from the CPU PoV for
tracking purpose.
As a consequence, this will allow a domain to continue to access the
page after it was removed.
Resolve the issue by always zeroing the entry if it the LPAE bit is
set or the entry is about to be removed.
This is CVE-2022-23033 / XSA-393.
Reported-by: Dmytro Firsov <Dmytro_Firsov@epam.com>
Fixes: 2148a125b7 ("xen/arm: Track page accessed between batch of Set/Way operations")
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
master commit: a428b913a0
master date: 2022-01-25 13:25:01 +0100
Since this logic was introduced, opt_tsx has become more complicated and
shouldn't be compared to 0 directly. While there are no buggy logic paths,
the correct expression is !(opt_tsx & 1) but the rtm_disabled boolean is
easier and clearer to use.
Fixes: 8fe24090d9 ("x86/cpuid: Rework HLE and RTM handling")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 31f3bc97f4
master date: 2022-01-05 09:44:26 +0000
This reverts commit c22bd567ce.
While its description is correct from an abstract or real hardware pov,
the range is special inside HVM guests. The range being UC in particular
gets in the way of OVMF, which places itself at [FFE00000,FFFFFFFF].
While this is benign to epte_get_entry_emt() as long as the IOMMU isn't
enabled for a guest, it becomes a very noticable problem otherwise: It
takes about half a minute for OVMF to decompress itself into its
designated address range.
And even beyond OVMF there's no reason to have e.g. the ACPI memory
range marked UC.
Fixes: c22bd567ce ("hvmloader: PA range 0xfc000000-0xffffffff should be UC")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ea187c0b7a
master date: 2021-12-17 08:56:15 +0100
TSXLDTRK lives in CPUID leaf 7[0].edx, not 7[0].ecx.
Bit 16 in ecx is LA57.
Fixes: a6d1b55847 ("x86emul: support X{SUS,RES}LDTRK")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 249e0f1d8f
master date: 2021-12-14 12:30:48 +0000
With "nosmp" I did observe a flood of "APIC error on CPU0: 04(04), Send
accept error" log messages on an AMD system. And rightly so - nothing
excludes the use of the shorthand in send_IPI_mask() in this case. Set
"unaccounted_cpus" to "true" also when command line restrictions are the
cause.
Note that PV-shim mode is unaffected by this change, first and foremost
because "nosmp" and "maxcpus=" are ignored in this case.
Fixes: 5500d265a2 ("x86/smp: use APIC ALLBUT destination shorthand when possible")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 7621880de0
master date: 2021-12-10 10:26:52 +0100
Just like (in protected mode) reads may not go to exec-only segments and
writes may not go to non-writable ones, insn fetches may not access data
segments.
Fixes: 623e837167 ("hvm: Support hardware task switching")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 311297f421
master date: 2021-12-06 14:15:05 +0100
While domain_context_mapping() invokes domain_context_unmap() in a sub-
case of handling DEV_TYPE_PCI when encountering an error, thus avoiding
a leak, individual calls to domain_context_mapping_one() aren't
similarly covered. Such a leak might persist until domain destruction.
Leverage that these cases can be recognized by pdev being non-NULL.
Fixes: dec403cc66 ("VT-d: fix iommu_domid for PCI/PCIx devices assignment")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: e6252a51fa
master date: 2021-11-24 11:07:11 +0100
This logic will want invoking from elsewhere.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 9fdc10abe9
master date: 2021-11-24 11:06:20 +0100
Currently the max_store_size, remain_store_size and max_size in
compat_pf_efi_runtime_call are 4 byte aligned, which makes clang
13.0.0 complain with:
In file included from compat.c:30:
./runtime.c:646:13: error: passing 4-byte aligned argument to 8-byte aligned parameter 2 of 'QueryVariableInfo' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Werror,-Walign-mismatch]
&op->u.query_variable_info.max_store_size,
^
./runtime.c:647:13: error: passing 4-byte aligned argument to 8-byte aligned parameter 3 of 'QueryVariableInfo' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Werror,-Walign-mismatch]
&op->u.query_variable_info.remain_store_size,
^
./runtime.c:648:13: error: passing 4-byte aligned argument to 8-byte aligned parameter 4 of 'QueryVariableInfo' may result in an unaligned pointer access [-Werror,-Walign-mismatch]
&op->u.query_variable_info.max_size);
^
Fix this by bouncing the variables on the stack in order for them to
be 8 byte aligned.
Note this could be done in a more selective manner to only apply to
compat code calls, but given the overhead of making an EFI call doing
an extra copy of 3 variables doesn't seem to warrant the special
casing.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: be12fcca8b
master date: 2021-11-19 17:01:24 +0000
Set/Way flushes never work correctly in a virtualized environment.
Our current implementation is based on clearing the valid bit in the p2m
pagetable to track guest memory accesses. This technique doesn't work
when the IOMMU is enabled for the domain and the pagetable is shared
between IOMMU and MMU because it triggers IOMMU faults.
Specifically, p2m_invalidate_root causes IOMMU faults if
iommu_use_hap_pt returns true for the domain.
Add a check in p2m_set_way_flush: if a set/way instruction is used
and iommu_use_hap_pt returns true, rather than failing with obscure
IOMMU faults, inject an undef exception straight away into the guest,
and print a verbose error message to explain the problem.
Also add an ASSERT in p2m_invalidate_root to make sure we don't
inadvertently stumble across this problem again in the future.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@xilinx.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2b45ff6030)
M2P and PoD stats need to remain in sync with P2M; if an update succeeds
only partially, respective adjustments need to be made. If updates get
made before the call, they may also need undoing upon complete failure
(i.e. including the single-page case).
Log-dirty state would better also be kept in sync.
Note that the change to set_typed_p2m_entry() may not be strictly
necessary (due to the order restriction enforced near the top of the
function), but is being kept here to be on the safe side.
This is CVE-2021-28705 and CVE-2021-28709 / XSA-389.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 74a11c43fd
master date: 2021-11-22 12:27:30 +0000
p2m_pod_decrease_reservation() may pass pages to the function which
aren't 4k, 2M, or 1G. Handle all intermediate orders as well, to avoid
hitting the BUG() at the switch() statement's "default" case.
This is CVE-2021-28708 / part of XSA-388.
Fixes: 3c352011c0 ("x86/PoD: shorten certain operations on higher order ranges")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 8ec13f68e0
master date: 2021-11-22 12:27:30 +0000
Users of XENMEM_decrease_reservation and XENMEM_populate_physmap aren't
required to pass in order-aligned GFN values. (While I consider this
bogus, I don't think we can fix this there, as that might break existing
code, e.g Linux'es swiotlb, which - while affecting PV only - until
recently had been enforcing only page alignment on the original
allocation.) Only non-PoD code paths (guest_physmap_{add,remove}_page(),
p2m_set_entry()) look to be dealing with this properly (in part by being
implemented inefficiently, handling every 4k page separately).
Introduce wrappers taking care of splitting the incoming request into
aligned chunks, without putting much effort in trying to determine the
largest possible chunk at every iteration.
Also "handle" p2m_set_entry() failure for non-order-0 requests by
crashing the domain in one more place. Alongside putting a log message
there, also add one to the other similar path.
Note regarding locking: This is left in the actual worker functions on
the assumption that callers aren't guaranteed atomicity wrt acting on
multiple pages at a time. For mis-aligned GFNs gfn_lock() wouldn't have
locked the correct GFN range anyway, if it didn't simply resolve to
p2m_lock(), and for well-behaved callers there continues to be only a
single iteration, i.e. behavior is unchanged for them. (FTAOD pulling
out just pod_lock() into p2m_pod_decrease_reservation() would result in
a lock order violation.)
This is CVE-2021-28704 and CVE-2021-28707 / part of XSA-388.
Fixes: 3c352011c0 ("x86/PoD: shorten certain operations on higher order ranges")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 182c737b9b
master date: 2021-11-22 12:27:30 +0000
domain_tot_pages() and d->max_pages are 32-bit values. While the order
should always be quite small, it would still be possible to overflow
if domain_tot_pages() is near to (2^32 - 1).
As this code may be called by a guest via XENMEM_increase_reservation
and XENMEM_populate_physmap, we want to make sure the guest is not going
to be able to allocate more than it is allowed.
Rework the allocation check to avoid any possible overflow. While the
check domain_tot_pages() < d->max_pages should technically not be
necessary, it is probably best to have it to catch any possible
inconsistencies in the future.
This is CVE-2021-28706 / part of XSA-385.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 143501861d
master date: 2021-11-22 11:11:05 +0000
With there being a way to disable v2 support, telling new guests to use
v2 exclusively is not a good suggestion.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Luca Fancellu <luca.fancellu@arm.com>
master commit: 2d72d2784e
master date: 2021-11-16 17:34:06 +0100
The value it returns may change from true to false in case
iommu_enable_x2apic() fails and, as a side effect, clears iommu_intremap
(as can happen at least on AMD). Latch the return value from the first
invocation to replace the second one.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 0f50d1696b
master date: 2021-11-04 14:44:43 +0100
x2apic_bsp_setup() gets called ahead of iommu_setup(), and since x2APIC
mode (physical vs clustered) depends on iommu_intremap, that variable
needs to be set to off as soon as we know we can't / won't enable
interrupt remapping, i.e. in particular when parsing of the respective
ACPI tables failed. Move the turning off of iommu_intremap from AMD
specific code into acpi_iommu_init(), accompanying it by clearing of
iommu_enable.
Take the opportunity and also fully skip ACPI table parsing logic on
VT-d when both "iommu=off" and "iommu=no-intremap" are in effect anyway,
like was already the case for AMD.
The tag below only references the commit uncovering a pre-existing
anomaly.
Fixes: d8bd82327b ("AMD/IOMMU: obtain IVHD type to use earlier")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 46c4061cd2
master date: 2021-11-04 14:44:01 +0100
set_xcr0() and set_msr_xss() use cached value to avoid setting the
register to the same value over and over. But suspend/resume implicitly
reset the registers and since percpu areas are not deallocated on
suspend anymore, the cache gets stale.
Reset the cache on resume, to ensure the next write will really hit the
hardware. Choose value 0, as it will never be a legitimate write to
those registers - and so, will force write (and cache update).
Note the cache is used io get_xcr0() and get_msr_xss() too, but:
- set_xcr0() is called few lines below in xstate_init(), so it will
update the cache with appropriate value
- get_msr_xss() is not used anywhere - and thus not before any
set_msr_xss() that will fill the cache
Fixes: aca2a985a5 "xen: don't free percpu areas during suspend"
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: f7f4a52392
master date: 2021-11-04 14:42:37 +0100
The call to debugger_trap_entry() should pass the correct vector. The
break-for-gdbsx logic is in practice unreachable because PV guests can't
generate #CP, but it will interfere with anyone inserting custom debugging
into debugger_trap_entry().
Fixes: 5ad05b9c24 ("x86/traps: Implement #CP handler and extend #PF for shadow stacks")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 512863ed23
master date: 2021-11-03 19:13:17 +0000
The call to setup_cpu_root_pgt(0) in smp_prepare_cpus() is too early. It
clones the BSP's stack while the .data mapping is still in use, causing all
mappings to be fully read read/write (and with no guard pages either). This
ultimately causes #DF when trying to enter the dom0 kernel for the first time.
Defer setting up BSPs XPTI pagetable until reinit_bsp_stack() after we've set
up proper shadow stack permissions.
Fixes: 6001660473 ("x86/shstk: Rework the stack layout to support shadow stacks")
Fixes: b60ab42db2 ("x86/shstk: Activate Supervisor Shadow Stacks")
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: b2851580b1
master date: 2021-11-03 13:08:42 +0000
The guest may access the pv vcpu_time_info immediately after
VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info. This is to borrow the idea of
VCPUOP_register_vcpu_time_memory_area, where the
force_update_vcpu_system_time() is called immediately when the new memory
area is registered.
Otherwise, we may observe clock drift at the VM side if the VM accesses
the clocksource immediately after VCPUOP_register_vcpu_info().
Reference: https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2021-10/msg00571.html
Signed-off-by: Dongli Zhang <dongli.zhang@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: b67f09721f
master date: 2021-11-03 10:19:06 +0100
Modern hardware may report more than 48 bits of physical address width.
For paging-external guests our P2M implementation does not cope with
larger values. Telling the guest of more available bits means misleading
it into perhaps trying to actually put some page there (like was e.g.
intermediately done in OVMF for the shared info page).
While there also convert the PV check to a paging-external one (which in
our current code base are synonyms of one another anyway).
Fixes: 5dbd60e16a ("x86/shadow: Correct guest behaviour when creating PTEs above maxphysaddr")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: b7635526ac
master date: 2021-10-19 10:08:30 +0200
At the time of d838ac2539 ("x86: don't allow Dom0 access to the HT
address range") documentation correctly stated that the range was
completely fixed. For Fam17 and newer, it lives at the top of physical
address space, though.
To correctly determine the top of physical address space, we need to
account for their physical address reduction, hence the calculation of
paddr_bits also gets adjusted.
While for paddr_bits < 40 the HT range is completely hidden, there's no
need to suppress the range insertion in that case: It'll just have no
real meaning.
Reported-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: d6e38eea2d
master date: 2021-10-19 10:04:13 +0200
The SDM specifically allows for earlier writes to fully overlapping
ranges to be dropped. If a guest did so, hvmemul_phys_mmio_access()
would crash it if varying data was written to the same address. Detect
overlaps early, as doing so in hvmemul_{linear,phys}_mmio_access() would
be quite a bit more difficult. To maintain proper faulting behavior,
instead of dropping earlier write instances of fully overlapping slots
altogether, write the data of the final of these slots multiple times.
(We also can't pull ahead the [single] write of the data of the last of
the slots, clearing all involved slots' op_mask bits together, as this
would yield incorrect results if there were intervening partially
overlapping ones.)
Note that due to cache slot use being linear address based, there's no
similar issue with multiple writes to the same physical address (mapped
through different linear addresses).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: a8cddbac50
master date: 2021-10-19 10:02:39 +0200
This happens after nestedhvm_vcpu_initialise(), so its effects also need
to be undone.
Fixes: 40a4a9d72d ("viridian: add init hooks")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 66675056c6
master date: 2021-10-18 14:21:17 +0200
Temporary fix the list of headers that cmdline.c and reloc.c depends
on, until the next time the list is out of sync again.
Also, add the linker script to the list.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 2f5f0a1b77
master date: 2021-10-14 12:35:42 +0200
The conversion of the original code failed to recognize that the 32-bit
compat variant of this (sorry, two different meanings of "compat" here)
needs to continue to invoke the compat handler, not the native one.
Arrange for this by adding yet another #define.
Affected functions (having existed prior to the introduction of the new
hypercall) are PHYSDEVOP_set_iobitmap and PHYSDEVOP_apic_{read,write}.
For all others the operand struct layout doesn't differ.
Fixes: 1252e28231 ("x86/pv: Export pv_hypercall_table[] rather than working around it in several ways")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 834cb87610
master date: 2021-10-12 11:55:42 +0200
Hidden devices are associated with DomXEN but usable by the
hardware domain. Hence they need flushing as well when all devices are
to have flushes invoked.
While there drop a redundant ATS-enabled check and constify the first
parameter of the involved function.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
master commit: 036432e8b2
master date: 2021-10-12 11:54:34 +0200
Like for PV, 32-bit guests need to invoke the compat handler, not the
native one.
Fixes: db984809d6 ("hvm: wire up domctl and xsm hypercalls")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: b6b672e8a9
master date: 2021-10-11 10:58:44 +0200
The xen-syms and xen.efi linking steps are serialized only when the
intermediate note.o file is necessary. Otherwise both may run in
parallel. This in turn means that the compiler / linker invocations to
create efi/check.o / efi/check.efi may also happen twice in parallel.
Obviously it's a bad idea to have multiple producers of the same output
race with one another - every once in a while one may e.g. observe
objdump: efi/check.efi: file format not recognized
We don't need this EFI related checking to occur when producing the
intermediate symbol and relocation table objects, and we have an easy
way of suppressing it: Simply pass in "efi-y=", overriding the
assignments done in the Makefile and thus forcing the tool chain checks
to be bypassed.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
master commit: 24b0ce9a5d
master date: 2021-10-11 10:58:17 +0200
Bus number 0xff is valid according to the PCI spec. Using u8 typed sub_bus
and assigning 0xff to it will result in the following loop getting stuck.
for ( ; sec_bus <= sub_bus; sec_bus++ ) {...}
Just change its type to unsigned int similarly to what is already done in
dmar_scope_add_buses().
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
master commit: 9c3b9800e2
master date: 2021-09-28 16:04:50 +0200
Whether to clear an IOMMU's bit in the domain's bitmap should depend on
all devices the domain can control. For the hardware domain this
includes hidden devices, which are associated with DomXEN.
While touching related logic
- convert the "current device" exclusion check to a simple pointer
comparison,
- convert "found" to "bool",
- adjust style and correct a typo in an existing comment.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 75bfe6ec48
master date: 2021-09-20 10:24:27 +0200
LLVM ld seems to require section names to be quoted at both definition
and when referencing them for a match to happen, or else we get the
following errors:
ld: error: xen.lds:45: undefined section ".text"
ld: error: xen.lds:69: undefined section ".rodata"
ld: error: xen.lds:104: undefined section ".note.gnu.build-id"
[...]
The original fix for GNU ld 2.37 only quoted the section name when
referencing it in the ADDR function. Fix by also quoting the section
names when declaring them.
Fixes: 58ad654ebc ("x86: work around build issue with GNU ld 2.37")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 6254920587
master date: 2021-09-15 11:02:21 +0200
We already print Intel features that aren't yet implemented/used, so be
consistent on AMD too.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 3d189f16a1
master date: 2021-09-09 12:36:17 +0100
The opencoded legacy Memory Disambiguation logic in init_amd() neglected
Fam19h for the Zen3 microarchitecture. Further more, all Zen2 based system
have the architectural MSR_SPEC_CTRL and the SSBD bit within it, so shouldn't
be using MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG.
Implement the algorithm given in AMD's SSBD whitepaper, and leave a
printk_once() behind in the case that no controls can be found.
This now means that a user explicitly choosing `spec-ctrl=ssbd` will properly
turn off Memory Disambiguation on Fam19h/Zen3 systems.
This still remains a single system-wide setting (for now), and is not context
switched between vCPUs. As such, it doesn't interact with Intel's use of
MSR_SPEC_CTRL and default_xen_spec_ctrl (yet).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 2a4e6c4e4b
master date: 2021-09-08 14:16:19 +0100
There is a step change in speculation protections between the Zen1 and Zen2
microarchitectures.
Zen1 and older have no special support. Control bits in non-architectural
MSRs are used to make lfence be dispatch-serialising (Spectre v1), and to
disable Memory Disambiguation (Speculative Store Bypass). IBPB was
retrofitted in a microcode update, and software methods are required for
Spectre v2 protections.
Because the bit controlling Memory Disambiguation is model specific,
hypervisors are expected to expose a MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL interface which
abstracts the model specific details.
Zen2 and later implement the MSR_SPEC_CTRL interface in hardware, and
virtualise the interface for HVM guests to use. A number of hint bits are
specified too to help guide OS software to the most efficient mitigation
strategy.
Zen3 introduced a new feature, Predictive Store Forwarding, along with a
control to disable it in sensitive code.
Add CPUID and VMCB details for all the new functionality.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 747424c664
master date: 2021-09-08 14:16:19 +0100
Separate the read-only hints from the features requiring active actions on
Xen's behalf.
Also take the opportunity split the IBRS/IBPB and IBPB mess. More features
with overlapping enumeration are on the way, and and it is not useful to split
them like this.
No practical change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 565ebcda97
master date: 2021-09-08 14:16:19 +0100
In order to avoid flask/Makefile.common calling `make xenversion`, we
override POLICY_FILENAME with the value we are going to use anyway.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: c81e7efe21
master date: 2021-09-08 14:40:00 +0200
Ignoring a specific error code here was not meant to short circuit
deassign to _just_ the unmapping of RMRRs. This bug was previously
hidden by the bogus (potentially indefinite) looping in
pci_release_devices(), until f591755823 ("IOMMU/PCI: don't let domain
cleanup continue when device de-assignment failed") fixed that loop.
This is CVE-2021-28702 / XSA-386.
Fixes: 8b99f4400b ("VT-d: fix RMRR related error handling")
Reported-by: Ivan Kardykov <kardykov@tabit.pro>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Ivan Kardykov <kardykov@tabit.pro>
(cherry picked from commit 24ebe875a77833696bbe5c9372e9e1590a7e7101)
Andrew Cooper
Jan Beulich
Julien Grall
Roger Pau Monné
Stefano Stabellini
Ian Jackson
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Dongli Zhang
Anthony PERARD
Igor Druzhinin
Kevin Stefanov