When specifying a serial list in domain config, users of
libxl_console_get_tty cannot get the tty path of a second specified pty serial,
since right now it always returns the tty path of serial 0.
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 35dbf099ac)
(cherry picked from commit 822464961a)
Current code incorrectly adds 1 to full register instead of
incrementing the field in bits 15:12.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit a3336a5075)
(cherry picked from commit de781b47f4)
This is because libxl uses XEN_RUN_DIR to generate the socket path for
libxenstat while libxenstat itself uses hard-coded path, which is not
necessarily the same path as XEN_RUN_DIR. The default configuration
happened to work because XEN_RUN_DIR defaulted to /var/run/xen, which
matched the hard-coded path.
We should make libxenstat use XEN_RUN_DIR so that it works with
non-default configuration.
Generate a _paths.h because it is required to make this change work.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit dedb221889)
(cherry picked from commit ab75cdf635)
Conflicts:
tools/xenstat/libxenstat/src/xenstat_qmp.c
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
As the xen/COPYING file says:
"A few files are licensed under both GPL and a weaker BSD-style
license. This includes all files within the subdirectory
include/public, as described in include/public/COPYING. All such files
include the non-GPL license text as a source-code comment. Although
the license text refers generically to "the software", the non-GPL
license applies *only* to those source files that explicitly include
the non-GPL license text."
The libxenvchan.h is under xen/include/public/io directory
and the xen/include/public/COPYING says:
"XEN NOTICE
==========
This copyright applies to all files within this subdirectory and its
subdirectories:
include/public/*.h
include/public/hvm/*.h
include/public/io/*.h
The intention is that these files can be freely copied into the source
tree of an operating system when porting that OS to run on Xen. Doing
so does *not* cause the OS to become subject to the terms of the GPL.
All other files in the Xen source distribution are covered by version
2 of the GNU General Public License except where explicitly stated
otherwise within individual source files.
"
Having the libxenvchan.h as Lesser GPL v2.1 where the COPYING file
says otherwise is confusing to say at least.
Upon consulting with the authors of libxenvchan they said:
"FWIW Neither I, nor ITL staff (as author of original libvchan library)
have anything against converting it to the BSD-style licence."
(Marek Marczykowski-Górecki,
http://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-06/msg00995.html)
so as such lets change it.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Anil Madhavapeddy <anil@recoil.org>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jason Andryuk <andryuk@aero.org>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@entel.upc.edu>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
["I have spoken to my line manager. I can confirm that Citrix is happy
with this proposed change. So:
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This view from Citrix covers all contributions made to these files in
the course of Citrix's employees' employment, which I think is:
> Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> cc: George Dunlap <George.Dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
> Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
> Cc: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
> Cc: Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@entel.upc.edu>
> Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
> Cc: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
> Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
..
[in subsequent email]:
Wei points out that this ought also to include Keir Fraser's
contribution, which was (only) in 2012.
" (from Ian's email)
In a subsequent mail, Wei also points out that David Scott's
contribution is covered by Ian's ack.
]
master commit: 937324f032
(cherry picked from commit b5e124661c)
When trying to use xl cpupool-numa-split and dom0 is limited to less
vcpus than one numa node the operation will fail.
Correct this by allowing this configuration.
Reported-by: Glenn Enright <glenn@rimuhosting.com>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit c256d2afc1)
(cherry picked from commit 78a3010381)
From systemd change log, since version 209, libsystemd.so contain
everything, including libsystemd-daemon.so. Distro may, or may not provide
the compatibility libraries which libsystemd-daemon is part of.
So, if libsystemd-daemon is not available, check for the presence of
a recent enough libsystemd.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
[ wei: run autogen.sh ]
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7dec5b0c65)
Shifting into the sign bit of an integer is undefined behaviour.
Only the first integer is actually undefined, but switch all the shifts
for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
master commit: ab8fc3937e
master date: 2016-08-03 18:46:59 +0100
The initial placement algorithm sometimes picks cpus outside of the
mask it's given, does a lot of unnecessary bitmasking, does its own
separate load calculation, and completely ignores vcpu hard and soft
affinities. Just get rid of it and rely on the schedulers to do
initial placement.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: d5438accce
master date: 2016-07-26 10:44:06 +0100
The generic domain creation logic in
xen/common/domctl.c:default_vcpu0_location() attempts to try to do
initial placement load-balancing by placing vcpu 0 on the least-busy
non-primary hyperthread available. Unfortunately, the logic can end
up picking a pcpu that's not in the online mask. When this is passed
to a scheduler such which assumes that the initial assignment is
valid, it causes a null pointer dereference looking up the runqueue.
Furthermore, this initial placement doesn't take into account hard or
soft affinity, or any scheduler-specific knowledge (such as historic
runqueue load, as in credit2).
To solve this, when inserting a vcpu, always call the per-scheduler
"pick" function to revise the initial placement. This will
automatically take all knowledge the scheduler has into account.
csched2_cpu_pick ASSERTs that the vcpu's pcpu scheduler lock has been
taken. Grab and release the lock to minimize time spend with irqs
disabled.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Meng Xu <mengxu@cis.upenn.edu>
Reviwed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
master commit: 9f358ddd69
master date: 2016-07-26 10:42:49 +0100
Some VMX MSRs may not exist on certain processor models, or may
be disabled because of configuration settings. It is only safe to
access these MSRs if configuration flags in other MSRs are set. These
prerequisites are listed in the Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures
Software Developer’s Manual, Vol 3, Appendix A.
nvmx_msr_read_intercept() does not check the prerequisites before
accessing MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2, MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC on the host. Accessing these MSRs from a nested
VMX guest running on a host which does not support them will cause
Xen to crash with a GPF.
Signed-off-by: Euan Harris <euan.harris@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 5e02972646
master date: 2016-06-13 12:44:32 +0100
Guest reads of MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC should be handled by
the logic in vmx_msr_read_intercept(). Otherwise a guest
can read the raw host value of this MSR, even if nested
vmx is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Euan Harris <euan.harris@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 6439d23319
master date: 2016-06-08 14:14:33 +0200
In serial_parse_handler(), length of strncmp for dtuart should have been
6, not 5.
Signed-off-by: Jiandi An <anjiandi@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
master commit: ba98196b54
master date: 2016-06-08 11:10:23 +0200
The function get_page_from_gva translates a guest virtual address to a
machine address. The translation involves the register VTTBR_EL2,
TTBR0_EL1, TTBR1_EL1 and SCTLR_EL1.
Currently, only the first register is context switch is the current
domain is not the same. This will result to use the wrong TTBR*_EL1 and
SCTLR_EL1 for the translation.
To fix the code properly, we would have to context switch all the
registers mentioned above when the vCPU in parameter is not the current
one. Similar things would need to be done in the callee
p2m_mem_check_and_get_page.
Given that the only caller of this function with the vCPU that may not
be current is a guest debugging function (show_guest_stack), restrict
the usage to the current vCPU for the time being.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
The function get_page_from_gva translates a guest virtual address to a
machine address. The translation involves the register VTTBR_EL2,
TTBR0_EL1, TTBR1_EL1 and SCTLR_EL1. Whilst the first register is per
domain (the p2m is common to every vCPUs), the last 3 are per-vCPU.
Therefore, the function should take the vCPU in parameter and not the
domain. Fixing the actual code path will be done a separate patch.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
The parameter to store the flags is called 'x' and not 'flags'.
Thankfully all the user of the macro is passing 'flags'.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
A 32bit guest kernel might be running on user mappings.
compat_create_bounce_frame() must whitelist its guest accesses to avoid
risking a SMAP violation.
For both variants of create_bounce_frame(), re-blacklist user accesses if
execution exits via an exception table redirection.
This is XSA-183 / CVE-2016-6259
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
All changes in writeability and cacheability must go through full
re-validation.
Rework the logic as a whitelist, to make it clearer to follow.
This is XSA-182
Reported-by: Jérémie Boutoille <jboutoille@ext.quarkslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
This is more accurate, since we are past 4.6.0 now. We don't want to
update the README for each point release. (This change should have
been done shortly after the release of 4.6.0.)
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Update to what we hope to make a stable release of soon. Includes
XSA-180 fix and Ubuntu build fix.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
If grep 2.23 is installed, build fails like this:
...
mkdir -p compat
grep -v 'DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(long)' public/grant_table.h | \
python /home/SOURCES/xen/xen/xen.git/xen/tools/compat-build-source.py >compat/grant_table.c.new
mv -f compat/grant_table.c.new compat/grant_table.c
gcc ... -o compat/grant_table.i compat/grant_table.c
compat/grant_table.c:33:1: error: unterminated comment
/*
^
compat/grant_table.c:28:0: error: unterminated #ifndef
#ifndef __XEN_PUBLIC_GRANT_TABLE_H__
^
Makefile:62: recipe for target 'compat/grant_table.i' failed
make[3]: *** [compat/grant_table.i] Error 1
rm compat/grant_table.c
make[3]: Leaving directory '/home/SOURCES/xen/xen/xen.git/xen/include'
...
This is because grant_table.h contains this (note the
apostrophe): "granters memory", and `grep -v', in version
2.23, stops processing the file (while, for instance,
until 2.22, this was not happening).
Although the above behavior is likely an issue in grep,
(https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=22461)
I think we better switch to using " ' " in that line
anyway, as we do basically everywhere else (even in
the same file).
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
master commit: 3f293c7caa
master date: 2016-02-25 13:03:04 +0100
XSA-180 provides a patch to QEMU to bodge QEMU logging issue. We
explicitly set the limit in libxl for 4.7.
Introduce a function for setting the environment variable and call it in
the right places.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit b0d409d9c4)
In "libxl: Do not trust backend for disk eject vdev" (c69871a2fb on
xen.git#staging) we changed libxl_evenable_disk_eject to read the
device vdev out of xenstore from the /libxl path, rather than the
backend path, and to read it during setup rather than on each event.
However, the patch has a mistake:
- GCSPRINTF("%s/dev", backend), NULL);
+ GCSPRINTF("%s/vdev", libxl_path), &configured_vdev);
^
Spot the extra "v". This causes configured_vdev always to be NULL.
configured_vdev is passed to [libxl__]strdup.
In Xen 4.6 and later libxl__strdup is used and tolerates NULL.
evg->vdev is set to NULL. This propagates to the `vdev' field in the
generated event. This may or may not cause further trouble, depending
on the calling application. In our osstest test cases it does not
cause any trouble, so the bug goes undetected.
In Xen 4.5 and earlier, the strdup does not tolerate NULL, and libxl
crashes immediately. This has been detected by osstest as a
regression in Xen 4.5.
IMO this patch should be applied immediately to
xen.git#staging-4.5 (to check that it fixes the osstest regression)
xen.git#staging (to check that it does not break master
Subject to passes, it should then be propagated to all supported
stable trees and also be mentioned in an update to XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
CC: security@xenproject.org
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 62b4d4769c)
Commit 56fb5fd623 ("libxl: adjust PoD target by memory fudge, too")
introduced target_memkb adjustment for HVM PoD domains on create,
wherein the value it wrote to target is always 1MiB lower than the
actual target_memkb. Unfortunately, on reboot, it is this value which
is read *unmodified* to feed into the next domain creation; from which
1MiB is subtracted *again*. This means that any guest which reboots
with memory < maxmem will have its memory target decreased by 1MiB on
every boot.
This patch makes it so that when reading target on reboot, we adjust the
value we read *up* by 1MiB, so that the domain will be build with the
appropriate amount of memory and the target will remain the same after
reboot.
This is still not quite a complete fix, as the 1MiB offset is only
subtracted when creating or rebooting; it is not subtracted when 'xl
set-memory' is called. But it will prevent any situations where memory
is continually increased or decreased. A better fix will have to wait
until after the release.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7e81d992b1)
xenstore-paths.markdown talked about ~/device/serial/, but that's not
used.
(It is very wrong for this value, which contains a driver domain
filesystem path, to be in the guest's area of xenstore. However, it
is only ever created by libxl and ready by xenconsoled. When it is
created, it inherits the read-only permissions of /local/domain/DOMID.
So there is no security bug.)
This is a followup to XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Rather than an open-coded sscanf. No functional change with correct
input.
This is a followup to XSA-175 and XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
When allocating a vdev for a new disk, look in /libxl/device, rather
than the frontends directory in xenstore.
This is more in line with the other parts of libxl, which ought not to
trust frontends. In this case, though, there is no security bug prior
to this patch because the frontend is the toolstack domain itself.
If libxl__alloc_vdev were ever changed to take a frontend domain
argument, this patch will fix a latent security bug.
This is a followup to XSA-175.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Read the name from /libxl/device. Pass the /libxl path to
libxl__device_channel_from_xenstore.
This removes the final route by which READ_LIBXLDEV might receive a
backend path.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
v2: Remove be_path variable which is now no longer used.
libxl_device_nic_list should use the /libxl path to search for
devices, and for obtaining the device information.
The "type" parameter was always "vif". Abolish it. (In any case,
paths in /libxl/device are named after the frontend type which is
constant, not the backend type which might in future vary.)
Abolish a redundant store to pnic->backend_domid. Before this commit,
that store was not needed because libxl_device_nic_init (called by
libxl__device_nic_from_xenstore) would zero it. Now it overwrites the
correct backend domid with zero; so remove it.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
libxl_devid_to_device_nic should read the information it needs from
the /libxl/device path, not the backend.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Fix the just-introduced bug in this macro: now it reads the
trustworthy libxl_path. Change the variable name in the two functions
(nic and channel) which use it.
Shuffling the bump in the carpet along, we now introduce three new
bugs: the three call sites pass a backend path where a frontend path
is expected.
No functional change.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
We are going to want to change all the functions that use READ_BACKEND
to get untrustworthy information from the backend, to use trustworthy
information from /libxl.
This will involve replacing READ_BACKEND, which reads from be_path,
with a similar macro READ_LIBXLDEV, which reads from libxl_path.
The macro name change generates a lot of clutter in the diff. So we
break it out into this separate patch. Here, we rename the macro, but
the implementation does not really match the new name.
So, another way to look at this, is that we have transformed the bug:
* All of the backends use READ_BACKEND, which is unsafe
into the new bug:
* READ_LIBXLDEV actually reads be_path, which is unsafe.
There is no functional change as yet.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
We are going to change these functions to expect, and be passed, a
/libxl path. So it is wrong that they are called _from_xs_be.
Neither function reads anything which isn't found in both places, so
we can and will change the call sites later.
The only remaining function in libxl called *_from_xs_be relates to
PCI devices, for which the backend domain is hardcoded to 0 throughout
the libxl_pci.c.
No functional change.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Do not read the frontend path out of the backend. We have it in our
hand. Likewise the guest (frontend) domid was one of our parameters (!)
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Use the /libxl path where appropriate. Rename `path' variable to
`be_path' to make sure we caught all the occurrences.
Specifically, when checking that the device still exists, check the
`frontend' value in /libxl, rather than anything in the backend
directory.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Do not read the frontend path out of the backend. We have it in our
hand. Likewise the guest (frontend) domid was one of our parameters (!)
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Rework libxl__device_disk_from_xs_be (which takes a backend path) into
to libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore (which takes a libxl path).
libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore now finds the backend path itself,
although it doesn't use it any more for most of its functions. We
rename the variable from be_path to backend_path to make sure we
didn't miss any cases.
All the data collection is now done by reading from the copy in
/libxl.
libxl_device_disk_list and its helper libxl__append_disk_list (which
used to be libxl__append_disk_list_of_type) need extensive rework,
because they now need to specify the /libxl path rather than the
backend path.
To do that they enumerate disks by looking in the appropriate area in
/libxl. Previously they scanned various of the backend directories in
dom0 (which was broken for driver domains). It is no longer necessary
to enumerate the various disk backends, because they all use the same
paths in /devices. libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore will parse the
type out of the backend path, for itself. (Indeed, it did so before -
the now-gone type parameter to libxl__append_disk_list_of_type wasn't
used other than to construct the directory to list.)
Finally, remove a redundant store to pdisk->backend_domid in
libxl__append_disk_list[_of_type]. Even before this commit, that
store was not needed because libxl_device_disk_init (called by
libxl__device_disk_from_xenstore) would zero it. Now it overwrites
the correct backend domid with zero; so remove it.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
---
v2: Also fix up COLO reads, following rebase
For disk eject, use configured vdev from /libxl, not backend.
The backend directory is writeable by driver domains. This means that
a malicious driver domain could cause libxl to see a wrong vdev,
confusing the user or the toolstack.
Use the vdev from the /libxl space, rather than the backend.
For convenience, we read the vdev from the /libxl space into the evg
during setup and copy it on each event, rather than reading it afresh
each time (which would in any case involve generating or saving a copy
of the relevant /libxl path).
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Copy the new type and params values to /libxl, so that the information
in /libxl is kept up to date.
This is needed so that we can return this trustworthy information,
rather than trusting the backend-writeable parts of xenstore.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Use uuid from /libxl, rather than from backend. I think the backend
is not supposed to change the uuid, since it seems to be set by libxl
during setup.
If in fact the backend is supposed to be able to change the uuid, this
patch needs to be dropped and replaced by a patch which makes the vtpm
uuid lookup tolerate bad or missing data.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
* Do not check the backend for existence. We have already read the
/libxl path so know that the vtpm exists (or is supposed to); if the
backend doesn't exist then that must be the backend's doing.
* Get the frontend path from the /libxl directory.
* The frontend domid is the guest domid, and does not need to be read
from xenstore (!)
We still attempt to read the uuid from the backend. This will be
fixed in the next patch.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
To determine whether a device is supposed to exist, look in /libxl,
rather than the backend.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
We want to stop libxl trustingly reading information from the backend
directory (since this is, of course, writeable by the backend, which
might be a semi-trusted driver domain).
In principle it is wrong in current libxl for anything to try to
divine virtual device configuration from xenstore: the JSON domain
config ought to supply that, and xenstore should only tell us which
devices actually exist.
However:
Firstly, there are several existing places where configuration
information is retrieved from xenstore rather than JSON. We do not
want to reen gineer this in a security patch.
Secondly, we want to make a security patch which can be backported to
versions of libxl without the JSON configuration machinery.
So we take the expedient approach of keeping a copy of the
configuration somewhere we trust, namely /libxl. This is obviously
fairly low-risk, although it does write significantly more keys in
xenstore.
In this patch we make this change in libxl__device_generic_add. This
is responsible for actually writing the vast majority of device
information to xenstore. There are a few loose ends which will be
dealt with in a moment.
Likewise, changes to readers to use the new location will appear in
further patches.
This is part of XSA-178.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Bob Liu
Boris Ostrovsky
Wei Liu
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Juergen Gross
Anthony PERARD
Jan Beulich
Andrew Cooper
George Dunlap
Euan Harris
Jiandi An
Julien Grall
Ian Jackson
Dario Faggioli
Vitaly Kuznetsov