The caller of writev_exact should be notified about malloc errors
when dealing with partial writes.
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0d8d289af7)
Making getBridge() static triggered a build error with some gcc versions:
error: 'strncpy' output may be truncated copying 15 bytes from a string of
length 255 [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
Fix that by using a buffer with 256 bytes instead.
Fixes: 6d0ec05390 ("tools: split libxenstat into new tools/libs/stat directory")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8099e48c3)
The do_ls() function has somewhat inconsistent handling of errors.
If reading the node's contents with xs_read() fails, then do_ls() will
just quietly not display the contents.
If reading the node's permissions with xs_get_permissions() fails, then
do_ls() will print a warning, continue, and ultimately won't exit with
an error code (unless another error happens).
If recursing into the node with xs_directory() fails, then do_ls() will
abort immediately, not printing any further nodes.
For persistent failure modes — such as ENOENT because a node has been
removed, or EACCES because it has had its permisions changed since the
xs_directory() on the parent directory returned its name — it's
obviously quite likely that if either of the first two errors occur for
a given node, then so will the third and thus xenstore-ls will abort.
The ENOENT one is actually a fairly common case, and has caused tools to
fail to clean up a network device because it *apparently* already
doesn't exist in xenstore.
There is a school of thought that says, "Well, xenstore-ls returned an
error. So the tools should not trust its output."
The natural corollary of this would surely be that the tools must re-run
xenstore-ls as many times as is necessary until its manages to exit
without hitting the race condition. I am not keen on that conclusion.
For the specific case of ENOENT it seems reasonable to declare that,
but for the timing, we might as well just not have seen that node at
all when calling xs_directory() for the parent. By ignoring the error,
we give acceptable output.
The issue can be reproduced as follows:
(dom0) # for a in `seq 1 1000` ; do
xenstore-write /local/domain/2/foo/$a $a ;
done
Now simultaneously:
(dom0) # for a in `seq 1 999` ; do
xenstore-rm /local/domain/2/foo/$a ;
done
(dom2) # while true ; do
./xenstore-ls -p /local/domain/2/foo | grep -c 1000 ;
done
We should expect to see node 1000 in the output, every time.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit beb105af19)
Add a check for snprintf return code and ignore the entry if we get an
error. This should in fact never happen and is more a trick to make gcc
happy and prevent compilation errors.
This is solving the following gcc warning when compiling for arm32 host
platforms with optimization activated:
xenpmd.c:92:37: error: '%s' directive output may be truncated writing
between 4 and 2147483645 bytes into a region of size 271
[-Werror=format-truncation=]
This is also solving the following Debian bug:
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=970802
Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@arm.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0dfddb2116)
In file included from /usr/include/string.h:495,
from libxl_internal.h:38,
from libxl_utils.c:20:
In function 'strncpy',
inlined from 'libxl__prepare_sockaddr_un' at libxl_utils.c:1262:5:
/usr/include/bits/string_fortified.h:106:10: error: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 108 equals destination size [-Werror=stringop-truncation]
106 | return __builtin___strncpy_chk (__dest, __src, __len, __bos (__dest));
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit fff1b7f50e)
It seems xlu_pci_parse_bdf has a state machine that is too complex for
gcc to understand. The build fails with:
libxlu_pci.c: In function 'xlu_pci_parse_bdf':
libxlu_pci.c:32:18: error: 'func' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
32 | pcidev->func = func;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:29: note: 'func' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~~
libxlu_pci.c:31:17: error: 'dev' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
31 | pcidev->dev = dev;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:24: note: 'dev' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~
libxlu_pci.c:30:17: error: 'bus' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
30 | pcidev->bus = bus;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:19: note: 'bus' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~
libxlu_pci.c:29:20: error: 'dom' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
29 | pcidev->domain = domain;
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~
libxlu_pci.c:51:14: note: 'dom' was declared here
51 | unsigned dom, bus, dev, func, vslot = 0;
| ^~~
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Workaround it by setting the initial value to invalid value (0xffffffff)
and then assert on each value being set. This way we mute the gcc
warning, while still detecting bugs in the parse code.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit d25cc3ec93)
ACPI specification contains statements describing memory marked with regular
"ACPI data" type as reclaimable by the guest. Although the guest shouldn't
really do it if it wants kexec or similar functionality to work, there
could still be ambiguities in treating these regions as potentially regular
RAM.
One such example is SeaBIOS which currently reports "ACPI data" regions as
RAM to the guest in its e801 call. Which it might have the right to do as any
user of this is expected to be ACPI unaware. But a QEMU bootloader later seems
to ignore that fact and is instead using e801 to find a place for initrd which
causes the tables to be erased. While arguably QEMU bootloader or SeaBIOS need
to be fixed / improved here, that is just one example of the potential problems
from using a reclaimable memory type.
Flip the type to "ACPI NVS" which doesn't have this ambiguity in it and is
described by the spec as non-reclaimable (so cannot ever be treated like RAM).
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: de6d188a51
master date: 2020-10-20 08:54:23 +0200
Guest kernel does need to know in some cases where the tables are located
to treat these regions properly. One example is kexec process where
the first kernel needs to pass ACPI region locations to the second
kernel which is now a requirement in Linux after 02a3e3cdb7f12 ("x86/boot:
Parse SRAT table and count immovable memory regions") in order for kexec
transition to actually work.
That commit introduced accesses to XSDT and SRAT while the second kernel
is still using kexec transition tables. The transition tables do not have
e820 "reserved" regions mapped where those tables are located currently
in a Xen guest. Instead "ACPI data" regions are mapped with the transition
tables that was introduced by the following commit 6bbeb276b7 ("x86/kexec:
Add the EFI system tables and ACPI tables to the ident map").
Reserve 1MB (out of 16MB currently available) right after ACPI info page for
ACPI tables exclusively but populate this region on demand and only indicate
populated memory as "ACPI data" since according to ACPI spec that memory is
reclaimable by the guest if necessary. That is close to how we treat
the same ACPI data in PVH guests. 1MB should be enough for now but could be
later extended if required.
Signed-off-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8efa46516c
master date: 2020-09-09 17:56:13 +0200
... including serialisation/deserialisation logic and unit tests.
There is no current way to configure this MSR correctly for guests.
The toolstack side this logic needs building, which is far easier to
do with it in place.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: e32605b07e
master date: 2020-08-27 12:48:46 +0100
The hardcoded tpm_signature is too restrictive to detect many TPMs. For
instance, it doesn't accept a QEMU emulated TPM (VID 0x1014 DID 0x0001).
Make the TPM detection match that in rombios which accepts a wider
range.
With this change, the TPM's TCPA ACPI table is generated and the guest
OS can automatically load the tpm_tis driver. It also allows seabios to
detect and use the TPM. However, seabios skips some TPM initialization
when running under Xen, so it will not populate any PCRs unless modified
to run the initialization under Xen.
Signed-off-by: Jason Andryuk <jandryuk@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: d3db7e043c
master date: 2020-06-16 10:31:08 +0200
Users of EMBEDDED_EXTRA_CFLAGS already use -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables, or
ought to. This shrinks the size of the rombios 32bit stubs in guest memory.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
xc_cpuid_set() returns allocated memory via cpuid_res, which libxl needs to
free() seeing as it discards the results.
This is logically a backport of c/s b91825f628 "tools/libxc: Drop
config_transformed parameter from xc_cpuid_set()" but rewritten as one caller
of xc_cpuid_set() does use returned values.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
With the max base leaf using 0, this one should be using the extended
leaf counterpart thereof, rather than some arbitrary extended leaf.
Fixes: 588a966a57 ("libx86: Introduce x86_cpu_policies_are_compatible()")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 0135be8bd8
master date: 2020-04-30 10:45:09 +0200
It turns out that a bug (since forever) in Xen causes XSAVE records to have
non-architectural behaviour on xsave-capable hardware, when a PV guest has not
touched the state.
In such a case, the data record returned from Xen is 2*uint64_t, both claiming
the (illegitimate) state of %xcr0 and %xcr0_accum being 0.
Adjust the bound in handle_x86_pv_vcpu_blob() to cope with this.
Fixes: 2a62c22715 "libxc/restore: Fix data auditing in handle_x86_pv_vcpu_blob()"
Reported-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0729830cc4)
Despite as suggested in c/s 685e922d6f, not all HVM_PARAMs are handled
in the same way. HVM_PARAM_PAE_ENABLED is a toolstack-only value, and
the xc_cpuid_apply_policy() used to be the only consumer.
Reinstate the old behaviour (mad as it is) to avoid regressions.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
(cherry picked from commit d79cc6bc2b)
The current logic only works by chance, in that XSAVE records also tend to be
a multiple of 128. Implement the missing logic for XSAVE.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2a62c22715)
handle_x86_pv_info() has a subtle bug. It uses an 'else if' chain with a
clause in the middle which doesn't exit unconditionally. In practice, this
means that when restoring a 32bit PV guest, later sanity checks are skipped.
Rework the logic a little to be simpler. There are exactly two valid
combinations of fields in X86_PV_INFO, so factor this out and check them all
in one go, before making adjustments to the current domain.
Once adjustments have been completed successfully, sanity check the result
against the X86_PV_INFO settings in one go, rather than piece-wise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit aafae0e800)
The Expected and Got values are rendered in the wrong order.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit f50a4f6e24)
Commit 562a1c0f7e ("tools/xenstore: dont unlink connection object
twice") introduced a potential use after free problem in
domain_cleanup(): after calling talloc_unlink() for domain->conn
domain->conn is set to NULL. The problem is that domain is registered
as talloc child of domain->conn, so it might be freed by the
talloc_unlink() call.
With Xenstore being single threaded there are normally no concurrent
memory allocations running and freeing a virtual memory area normally
doesn't result in that area no longer being accessible. A problem
could occur only in case either a signal received results in some
memory allocation done in the signal handler (SIGHUP is a primary
candidate leading to reopening the log file), or in case the talloc
framework would do some internal memory allocation during freeing of
the memory (which would lead to clobbering of the freed domain
structure).
Fixes: 562a1c0f7e ("tools/xenstore: dont unlink connection object twice")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb2a34fd74)
The field 'sdss' was named 'dmss' before, commit 3148bebbf0 did the
renamed but didn't update the comment.
Fixes: 3148bebbf0 ("libxl: rename a field in libxl__domain_create_state")
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 035c4d7716)
pygrub in xen-4.13.0 with python 3.8.2 fails with the error
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "/usr/libexec/xen/bin/pygrub", line 21, in <module>
import xen.lowlevel.xc
SystemError: bad call flags
This patch fixes mismatches in tools/python/xen/lowlevel/xc/xc.c
between the flag bits defined in pyxc_methods and the parameters passed
to the corresponding PyObject definitions.
With this patch applied pygrub works as expected.
Signed-off-by: Michael Young <m.a.young@durham.ac.uk>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
(cherry picked from commit e19b4b3b55)
Used memory should be calculated by subtracting free memory from total
memory.
Fixes: c588c002cc ("tools: remove tmem code and commands")
Signed-off-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4b5b431edd)
The CET spec has been published and guest kernels are starting to get support.
Introduce the CPUID and MSRs, and fully block the MSRs from guest use.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
master commit: 4803a67114
master date: 2020-04-21 16:52:03 +0100
It was observed that PCI MMIO and/or IO BARs were programmed with
memory and I/O decodes (bits 0 and 1 of PCI COMMAND register) enabled,
during PCI setup phase. This resulted in incorrect memory mapping as
soon as the lower half of the 64 bit bar is programmed.
This displaced any RAM mappings under 4G. After the
upper half is programmed PCI memory mapping is restored to its
intended high mem location, but the RAM displaced is not restored.
The OS then continues to boot and function until it tries to access
the displaced RAM at which point it suffers a page fault and crashes.
This patch address the issue by deferring enablement of memory and
I/O decode in command register until all the resources, like interrupts
I/O and/or MMIO BARs for all the PCI device functions are programmed,
in the descending order of memory requested.
Signed-off-by: Harsha Shamsundara Havanur <havanur@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: a8e0c228c7
master date: 2020-04-16 10:58:46 +0200
There is a bug in commit 5e4b419966 ("xen: credit2: only reset
credit on reset condition"). In fact, the aim of that commit was to
make sure that we do not perform too many credit reset operations
(which are not super cheap, and in an hot-path). But the check used
to determine whether a reset is necessary was the wrong one.
In fact, knowing just that some vCPUs have been skipped, while
traversing the runqueue (in runq_candidate()), is not enough. We
need to check explicitly whether the first vCPU in the runqueue
has a negative amount of credit.
Since a trace record is changed, this patch updates xentrace format file
and xenalyze as well
This should be backported.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: dae7b62e97
master date: 2020-04-03 10:46:53 +0200
There have been report of stalls of guest vCPUs, when Credit2 was used.
It seemed like these vCPUs were not getting scheduled for very long
time, even under light load conditions (e.g., during dom0 boot).
Investigations led to the discovery that --although rarely-- it can
happen that a vCPU manages to run for very long timeslices. In Credit2,
this means that, when runtime accounting happens, the vCPU will lose a
large quantity of credits. This in turn may lead to the vCPU having less
credits than the idle vCPUs (-2^30). At this point, the scheduler will
pick the idle vCPU, instead of the ready to run vCPU, for a few
"epochs", which often times is enough for the guest kernel to think the
vCPU is not responding and crashing.
An example of this situation is shown here. In fact, we can see d0v1
sitting in the runqueue while all the CPUs are idle, as it has
-1254238270 credits, which is smaller than -2^30 = −1073741824:
(XEN) Runqueue 0:
(XEN) ncpus = 28
(XEN) cpus = 0-27
(XEN) max_weight = 256
(XEN) pick_bias = 22
(XEN) instload = 1
(XEN) aveload = 293391 (~111%)
(XEN) idlers: 00,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,0fffffff
(XEN) tickled: 00,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000
(XEN) fully idle cores: 00,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,00000000,0fffffff
[...]
(XEN) Runqueue 0:
(XEN) CPU[00] runq=0, sibling=00,..., core=00,...
(XEN) CPU[01] runq=0, sibling=00,..., core=00,...
[...]
(XEN) CPU[26] runq=0, sibling=00,..., core=00,...
(XEN) CPU[27] runq=0, sibling=00,..., core=00,...
(XEN) RUNQ:
(XEN) 0: [0.1] flags=0 cpu=5 credit=-1254238270 [w=256] load=262144 (~100%)
We certainly don't want, under any circumstance, this to happen.
Let's, therefore, define a minimum amount of credits a vCPU can have.
During accounting, we make sure that, for however long the vCPU has
run, it will never get to have less than such minimum amount of
credits. Then, we set the credits of the idle vCPU to an even
smaller value.
NOTE: investigations have been done about _how_ it is possible for a
vCPU to execute for so much time that its credits becomes so low. While
still not completely clear, there are evidence that:
- it only happens very rarely,
- it appears to be both machine and workload specific,
- it does not look to be a Credit2 (e.g., as it happens when
running with Credit1 as well) issue, or a scheduler issue.
This patch makes Credit2 more robust to events like this, whatever
the cause is, and should hence be backported (as far as possible).
Reported-by: Glen <glenbarney@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Tomas Mozes <hydrapolic@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 36f3662f27
master date: 2020-04-03 10:45:43 +0200
The written ABI states that %es will be set up, but libxc doesn't do so. In
practice, it breaks `rep movs` inside guests before they reload %es.
The written ABI doesn't mention %ss, but libxc does set it up. Having %ds
different to %ss is obnoxous to work with, as different registers have
different implicit segments.
Modify the spec to state that %ss is set up as a flat read/write segment.
This a) matches the Multiboot 1 spec, b) matches what is set up in practice,
and c) is the more sane behaviour for guests to use.
Fixes: 68e1183411 ('libxc: introduce a xc_dom_arch for hvm-3.0-x86_32 guests')
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
x86/pvh: Adjust dom0's starting state
Fixes: b25fb1a04e "xen/pvh: Fix segment selector ABI"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: b25fb1a04e
master date: 2020-02-10 15:26:09 +0000
master commit: 6ee1031362
master date: 2020-02-11 11:04:26 +0000
Calling ./configure with python3 being there but no python,
tools/configure will fail. Fix that by defaulting to python and
falling back to python3 or python2.
While at it fix the use of non portable "type -p" by replacing it by
AC_PATH_PROG().
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
[ wei: run autogen.sh ]
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5852ca4852)
Xen used to have single, system-wide limits for the number of grant
frames and maptrack frames a guest was allowed to create. Increasing
or decreasing this single limit on the Xen command-line would change
the limit for all guests on the system.
Later, per-domain limits for these values was created. The system-wide
limits became strict limits: domains could not be created with higher
limits, but could be created with lower limits. However, that change
also introduced a range of different "default" values into various
places in the toolstack:
- The python libxc bindings hard-coded these values to 32 and 1024,
respectively
- The libxl default values are 32 and 1024 respectively.
- xl will use the libxl default for maptrack, but does its own default
calculation for grant frames: either 32 or 64, based on the max
possible mfn.
These defaults interact poorly with the hypervisor command-line limit:
- The hypervisor command-line limit cannot be used to raise the limit
for all guests anymore, as the default in the toolstack will
effectively override this.
- If you use the hypervisor command-line limit to *reduce* the limit,
then the "default" values generated by the toolstack are too high,
and all guest creations will fail.
In other words, the toolstack defaults require any change to be
effected by having the admin explicitly specify a new value in every
guest.
In order to address this, have grant_table_init treat negative values
for max_grant_frames and max_maptrack_frames as instructions to use the
system-wide default, and have all the above toolstacks default to passing
-1 unless a different value is explicitly configured.
This restores the old behavior in that changing the hypervisor command-line
option can change the behavior for all guests, while retaining the ability
to set per-guest values. It also removes the bug that reducing the
system-wide max will cause all domains without explicit limits to fail.
NOTE: - The Ocaml bindings require the caller to always specify a value,
and the code to start a xenstored stubdomain hard-codes these to 4
and 128 respectively; this behavour will not be modified.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
(cherry picked from commit f2ae59bc4b)
Changeset ca2eee92df ("x86, hvm: Expose host core/HT topology to HVM
guests") attempted to "fake up" a topology which would induce guest
operating systems to not treat vcpus as sibling hyperthreads. This
involved actually reporting hyperthreading as available, but giving
vcpus every other ApicId; which in turn led to doubling the ApicIds
per core by bumping the ApicIdCoreSize by one. In particular, Ryzen
3xxx series processors, and reportedly EPYC "Rome" cpus -- have an
ApicIdCoreSize of 7; the "fake" topology increases this to 8.
Unfortunately, Windows running on modern AMD hardware -- including
Ryzen 3xxx series processors, and reportedly EPYC "Rome" cpus --
doesn't seem to cope with this value being higher than 7. (Linux
guests have so far continued to cope.)
A "proper" fix is complicated and it's too late to fix it either for
4.13, or to backport to supported branches. As a short-term fix,
limit this value to 7.
This does mean that a Linux guest, booted on such a system without
this change, and then migrating to a system with this change, with
more than 64 vcpus, would see an apparent topology change. This is a
low enough risk in practice that enabling this limit unilaterally, to
allow other guests to boot without manual intervention, is worth it.
Reported-by: Steven Haigh <netwiz@crc.id.au>
Reported-by: Andreas Kinzler <hfp@posteo.de>
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Adding/removing device is handled for specific devices only: VBD, VIF,
QDISK. This commit adds default case to handle adding/removing for all PV
devices by default, except QDISK device, which requires special handling.
If any other device is required a special handling it should be done by
implementing separate case (similar to QDISK device). The default
behaviour for adding device is to wait when the backend goes to
XenbusStateInitWait and the default behaviour on removing device is to
start generic device remove procedure.
Also this commit fixes removing guest function: before the guest was
removed when all VIF and VBD devices are removed. The fix removes
guest when all created devices are removed. This is done by checking the
guest device list instead of checking num_vifs and num_vbds. num_vifs and
num_vbds variables are removed as redundant in this case.
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Grytsov <oleksandr_grytsov@epam.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
There are two kind of VKBD devices: with QEMU backend and user space PV
backend. In current implementation they can't be distinguished as both use
VKBD backend type. As result, user space PV KBD backend is started and
stopped as QEMU backend. This commit adds new device kind VINPUT to be
used as backend type for user space PV KBD backend.
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Grytsov <oleksandr_grytsov@epam.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
https://docs.python.org/3.8/whatsnew/3.8.html#debug-build-uses-the-same-abi-as-release-build
> To embed Python into an application, a new --embed option must be
> passed to python3-config --libs --embed to get -lpython3.8 (link the
> application to libpython). To support both 3.8 and older, try
> python3-config --libs --embed first and fallback to python3-config
> --libs (without --embed) if the previous command fails.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
[ wei: rerun autogen.sh ]
The pvshim can only be built 64-bit because the hypervisor is only
64-bit nowadays. The hypervisor build supports XEN_COMPILE_ARCH and
XEN_TARGET_ARCH which override the information from uname. The pvshim
build runs out of the tools/ directory but calls the hypervisor build
system.
If one runs in a Linux 32-bit userland with a 64-bit kernel, one used
to be able to set XEN_COMPILE_ARCH. But nowadays this does not work.
configure sees the target cpu as 64-bit and tries to build pvshim.
The build prints
echo "*** Xen x86/32 target no longer supported!"
and doesn't build anything. Then the subsequent Makefiles try to
install the non-built pieces.
Fix this anomaly by causing configure to honour the Xen hypervisor way
of setting the target architecture.
In principle this user behaviour is not handled quite right, because
configure will still see 64-bit and so all the autoconf-based
architecture testing will see 64-bit rather than 32-bit x86. But the
tools are in fact generally quite portable: this particular location
in configure{.ac,} is the only place in tools/ where 64-bit x86 is
treated differently from 32-bit x86, so the fix is sufficient and
correct for this use case.
It remains the case that XEN_COMPILE_ARCH or XEN_TARGET_ARCH to a
non-x86 architecture, when configure thinks things are x86, or vice
versa, will not work right.
(This is a bugfix to 8845155c83
pvshim: make PV shim build selectable from configure
which inadvertantly deleted the logic to only build the shim for
XEN_TARGET_ARCH != x86_32.)
I have rerun autogen.sh, so this patch contains the fix to configure
as well as the source fix to configure.ac.
Fixes: 8845155c83
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
CC: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Jürgen Groß <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Currently, array elements are initialized with calloc. Which means
initialize all element fields with zero values. If an entry is not
present in the json (which is entirely permitted), the element will be
all-bits-zero instead of the default value (which is wrong).
The fix is to initalise each array element before parsing it, using
the new libxl_C_type_do_init function.
With existing types this results in a lot of new calls like this:
for (i=0; (t=libxl__json_array_get(x,i)); i++) {
+ libxl_sched_params_init(&p->vcpus[i]);
rc = libxl__sched_params_parse_json(gc, t, &p->vcpus[i]);
(indentation adjusted). This looks right. To check what happens with
types which have nontrivial defaults but don't have init functions (of
which we currently have none in arrays), I (Ian) experimentally added:
("pnode", uint32), # physical node of this node
("vcpus", libxl_bitmap), # vcpus in this node
+ ("sporks", Array(MemKB, "num_sporks")),
])
The result was this:
for (i=0; (t=libxl__json_array_get(x,i)); i++) {
+ p->sporks[i] = LIBXL_MEMKB_DEFAULT;
rc = libxl__uint64_parse_json(gc, t, &p->sporks[i]);
where the context was added by adding "sporks" and "+" indicates a
line added by this patch, "initialise array elements in json".
Signed-off-by: Oleksandr Grytsov <oleksandr_grytsov@epam.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
v2 [iwj]: Use libxl_C_type_do_init.
Reword commit message and discuss spork testing.
This is going to be the common way to initialise things.
_libxl_C_type_init remains the thing for generating the body of the
init function, and for some special cases.
No functional change with existing types: C output is identical.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
We are going to want this in a moment.
No functional change with existing types: C output is identical.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
When both are provided, init_val is likely to be more direct.
No functional change with existing types: C output is identical.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
After sending the 'device_del' command for a PCI passthrough device,
we wait until QEMU has effectively deleted the device, this involves
executing more QMP commands. While waiting, libxl hold the connection.
It isn't necessary to hold the connection and it prevents others from
making progress, so this patch releases the QMP connection.
For background:
e.g., when a guest is created with several pci passthrough
attached, on `xl destroy` all the devices needs to be detach, and
this is usually what happens:
- 'device_del' called for the 1st pci device
- 'query-pci' checking if pci still there, it is
- wait 1s
- 'query-pci' checking again, and it's gone
-> now the same can be done for the second pci device, so
plenty of waiting on others when pci detach can be done in
parallel.
On shutdown, libxl usually keeps waiting because QEMU never
releases the device because the guest kernel never responds QEMU's
unplug queries. So detaching of the 1st device waits until a
timeout stops it, and since the same timeout is setup at the same
time for the other devices to detach, the 'device_del' command is
never sent for those.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This patch workaround the fact that it's not possible to connect
multiple time to a single QMP socket. QEMU listen on the socket with
a backlog value of 1, which mean that on Linux when concurrent thread
call connect() on the socket, they get EAGAIN.
Background:
This happens when attempting to create a guest with multiple
pci devices passthrough, libxl creates one connection per device to
attach and execute connect() on all at once before any single
connection has finished.
To work around this, we use a new lock.
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This new ev allows to arrange a non-reentrant callback to be called.
This happen immediately after the current event is processed and after
other ev_immediates that would have already been registered.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
We are going to introduce a different lock based on the same
implementation as the ev_devlock but with a different path. The
different slowlock will be differentiated by calling different _init()
functions.
So we rename libxl__ev_devlock to lib__ev_slowlock, but keep
libxl__ev_devlock_init().
Some log messages produced ev_slowlock are changed to print the
name of the lock file (userdata_userid).
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Allow to deregister the callback associated with a child death event.
The death isn't immediate will need to be collected later, so the
ev_child machinery register its own callback.
libxl__ev_child_kill_deregister() might be called by an AO operation
that is finishing/cleaning up without a chance for libxl to be
notified of the child death (via SIGCHLD). So it is possible that the
application calls libxl_ctx_free() while there are still child around.
To avoid the application getting unexpected SIGCHLD, the libxl__ao
responsible for killing a child will have to wait until it has been
properly reaped.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
libxl__dm_resume() is using a wrong timeout for the start of the
device model. Instead of 60 seconds the timeout is set to 60
milliseconds.
Reported-by: Roman Shaposhnik <roman@zededa.com>
Fixes: 6298f0eb8f ("libxl: Re-introduce libxl__domain_resume")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Both are now potentially asynchronous; pass in 'nil' to retain
synchronous behavior.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Olaf Hering
Juergen Gross
David Woodhouse
Bertrand Marquis
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Igor Druzhinin
Andrew Cooper
Jason Andryuk
Jan Beulich
Anthony PERARD
YOUNG, MICHAEL A
Sander Eikelenboom
Harsha Shamsundara Havanur
Dario Faggioli
George Dunlap
Ian Jackson
Oleksandr Grytsov