No consumers are left, hence the producer and the array itself can also
go away. The static gr_mask[] is then orphaned and hence needs dropping,
too.
This is part of XSA-463 / CVE-2024-45818
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit b16c0966a1)
All read accesses are rejected by the ->accept handler, while writes
bypass the bulk of the function body. Drop the dead code, leaving an
assertion in the read handler.
A number of other static items (and a macro) are then unreferenced and
hence also need (want) dropping. The same applies to the "latch" field
of the state structure.
This is part of XSA-463 / CVE-2024-45818
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 89108547af)
Two of its consumers are dead (in compile-time constant conditionals)
and the only remaining ones are merely controlling debug logging. Hence
the field is now pointless to set, which in particular allows to get rid
of the questionable conditional from which the field's value was
established (afaict 551ceee975 ["x86, hvm: stdvga cache always on"]
had dropped too much of the earlier extra check that was there, and
quite likely further checks were missing).
This is part of XSA-463 / CVE-2024-45818
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit b740a9369e)
Since 68e1183411 ("libxc: introduce a xc_dom_arch for hvm-3.0-x86_32
guests"), HVM guests are built using XEN_DOMCTL_sethvmcontext, which
ends up disabling stdvga caching because of arch_hvm_load() being
involved in the processing of the request. With that the field is
useless, and can be dropped. Drop the helper functions manipulating /
checking as well right away, but leave the use sites of
stdvga_cache_is_enabled() with the hard-coded result the function would
have produced, to aid validation of subsequent dropping of further code.
This is part of XSA-463 / CVE-2024-45818
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 53b7246bdf)
Rework the container to be non-root, use heredocs for readability, and
use apt-get --no-install-recommends to keep the size down. Rename the
job to x86_32, to be consistent with XEN_TARGET_ARCH and the
naming scheme of all the other CI jobs:
${VERSION}-${ARCH}-${BUILD_NAME}
Remove build dependencies for building QEMU. The absence of ninja/meson means
that the container hasn't been able to build QEMU in years.
Remove build dependencies for the documentation as we don't have to
build it for every single arch.
This reduces the size of the container from 2.22GB to 1.32Gb.
Signed-off-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@cloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1ceabff115)
Rework the container to use heredocs for readability, and use
apt-get --no-install-recommends to keep the size down.
This reduces the size of the (uncompressed) container from 3.44GB to
1.97GB.
The container is left running the builds and tests as root. A
subsequent patch will make the necessary changes to the test scripts
to allow test execution as a non-root user.
Signed-off-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@cloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 44b742de09)
Right now, various blocks rewrite domU_config= as a whole, even though it is
largely the same.
* dom0pvh-hvm does nothing but change the domain type to hvm
* *-pci sets the domain type, clears vif=[], appends earlyprintk=xen to the
cmdline, and adds some PCI config.
Refactor this to be domU_type (defaults to pvh), domU_vif (defaults to
xenbr0), and domU_extra_config (defaults to empty) and use these variables to
build domU_config= once.
Of note, the default domU_config= now sets cmdline=, and extra= is intended
for inclusion via domU_extra_config as necessary.
No practical change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3be3ae0770)
* List all the test_variants and summerise what's going on
* Use case rather than an if/else chain for $test_variant
* Adjust indentation inside the case block
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6685a129c7)
We spend an awful lot of CI time building QEMU, even though most changes don't
touch the subset of tools/libs/ used by QEMU. Some numbers taken at a time
when CI was otherwise quiet:
With Without
Alpine: 13m38s 6m04s
Debian 12: 10m05s 8m10s
OpenSUSE Tumbleweed: 11m40s 7m54s
Ubuntu 24.04: 14m56s 8m06s
which is a >50% improvement in wallclock time in some cases.
The only build we have that needs QEMU is alpine-3.18-gcc-debug. This is the
build deployed and used by the QubesOS ADL-* and Zen3p-* jobs.
Xilinx-x86_64 deploys it too, but is PVH-only and doesn't use QEMU.
QEMU is also built by CirrusCI for FreeBSD (fully Clang/LLVM toolchain).
This should help quite a lot with Gitlab CI capacity.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit e305256e69)
The smoke tests when successful complete in about 5s. Don't waste
20min+ on failure, shorten the timeout to 120s
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit bcce5a6b62)
Check if xen.efi is bootable with an XTF dom0.
The multiboot2+EFI path is tested on hardware tests already.
Signed-off-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2d1c673bae)
TEST_TIMEOUT is set as a CI/CD project variable, as it should be, to
match the capability and speed of the testing infrastructure.
As it turns out, TEST_TIMEOUT defined in test.yaml cannot override
TEST_TIMEOUT defined as CI/CD project variable. As a consequence, today
the TEST_TIMEOUT setting in test.yaml for the Xilinx jobs is ignored.
Instead, rename TEST_TIMEOUT to TEST_TIMEOUT_OVERRIDE in test.yaml and
check for TEST_TIMEOUT_OVERRIDE first in console.exp.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
(cherry picked from commit d82e0e094e)
The test showed unreliable behavior due to unsupported console settings.
Update the baud rate used to connect to the UART.
Signed-off-by: Victor Lira <victorm.lira@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit c23571fe31)
Fixes: 95764a0817 (automation: update xilinx test scripts (tty))
This patch introduced a CI failure due to a timeout in xilinx-x86_64 test.
Change xilinx-x86_64 and xilinx-arm64 scripts to use "expect" utility
to determine test result and allow early exit from tests.
Add "expect" to xilinx container environment (dockerfile).
Rename references to "QEMU" in "qemu-key.exp" expect script to "TEST" to be
used by both QEMU and hardware tests.
Signed-off-by: Victor Lira <victorm.lira@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e99a40ea5)
Fix flaw in qemu-*.sh tests that producess a false success. The following
lines produces success despite the "expect" script producing nonzero exit
status:
set +e
...
./automation/scripts/qemu-key.exp | sed 's/\r\+$//'
(end of file)
The default exit status for a pipeline using "|" operator is that of the
rightmost command. Fix this by setting the "pipefail" option in the shell,
and removing "set +e" allowing the expect script to determine the result.
Signed-off-by: Victor Lira <victorm.lira@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 740c41ca05)
Update serial device names from ttyUSB* to test board specific names.
Update xilinx-smoke-dom0-x86_64 with new Xen command line console options,
which are now set as Gitlab CI/CD variables. Abstract the directory where
binaries are stored. Increase the timeout to match new setup.
Signed-off-by: Victor Lira <victorm.lira@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 95764a0817)
After commit c36efb7fce ("automation: use expect to run QEMU") we lost
the \r filtering introduced by b576497e3b ("automation: remove CR
characters from serial output"). This patch reintroduced it.
Fixes: c36efb7fce ("automation: use expect to run QEMU")
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit aa80a04df4)
The expectation is that QEMU_TIMEOUT should be set as a Gitlab CI/CD
variable but if not we should be able to run the pipeline anyway.
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1e2a5f991f)
Add a test script and related job for running x86_64 dom0 tests.
Signed-off-by: Victor Lira <victorm.lira@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6979e17b3f)
As detailed in commit 0fe607b2a1 ("x86/boot: Fix PVH boot during boot_info
transition period"), the use of __va(mbi->mods_addr) constitutes a
use-after-free on the PVH boot path.
This pattern has been in use since before PVH support was added. This has
most likely gone unnoticed because no-one's tried using a detached Flask
policy in a PVH VM before.
Plumb the boot_info pointer down, replacing module_map and mbi. Importantly,
bi->mods[].mod is a safe way to access the module list during PVH boot.
As this is the final non-bi use of mbi in __start_xen(), make the pointer
unusable once bi has been established, to prevent new uses creeping back in.
This is a stopgap until mbi can be fully removed.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 6cf0aaeb8d
master date: 2024-10-23 18:14:24 +0100
As detailed in commit 0fe607b2a1 ("x86/boot: Fix PVH boot during boot_info
transition period"), the use of __va(mbi->mods_addr) constitutes a
use-after-free on the PVH boot path.
This pattern has been in use since before PVH support was added. Inside a PVH
VM, it will go unnoticed as long as the microcode container parser doesn't
choke on the random data it finds.
The use within early_microcode_init() happens to be safe because it's prior to
move_xen(). microcode_init_cache() is after move_xen(), and therefore unsafe.
Plumb the boot_info pointer down, replacing module_map and mbi. Importantly,
bi->mods[].mod is a safe way to access the module list during PVH boot.
Note: microcode_scan_module() is still bogusly stashing a bootstrap_map()'d
pointer in ucode_blob.data, which constitutes a different
use-after-free, and only works in general because of a second bug. This
is unrelated to PVH, and needs untangling differently.
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 8ddf63a252
master date: 2024-10-23 18:14:24 +0100
IVMD table contains restrictions about memory which must be mandatory assigned
to devices (and which permissions it should use), or memory that should be
never accessible to devices.
Some hardware however contains ranges in IVMD that reference devices outside of
the IVHD tables (in other words, devices not behind any IOMMU). Such mismatch
will cause Xen to fail in register_range_for_device(), ultimately leading to
the IOMMU being disabled, and Xen crashing as x2APIC support might be already
enabled and relying on the IOMMU functionality.
Relax IVMD parsing: allow IVMD blocks to reference devices not assigned to any
IOMMU. It's impossible for Xen to fulfill the requirement in the IVMD block if
the device is not behind any IOMMU, but it's no worse than booting without
IOMMU support, and thus not parsing ACPI IVRS in the first place.
Reported-by: Willi Junga <xenproject@ymy.be>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 2defb54490
master date: 2024-10-15 14:23:59 +0200
UBSAN complains:
(XEN) ================================================================================
(XEN) UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in common/spinlock.c:794:10
(XEN) load of address ffff82d040ae24c8 with insufficient space
(XEN) for an object of type 'struct lock_profile *'
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.20-unstable x86_64 debug=y ubsan=y Tainted: C ]----
This shows up with GCC-14, but not with GCC-12. I have not bisected further.
Either way, the types for __lock_profile_{start,end} are incorrect.
They are an array of struct lock_profile pointers. Correct the extern's
types, and adjust the loop to match.
No practical change.
Reported-by: Andreas Glashauser <ag@andreasglashauser.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
master commit: 542ac112fc
master date: 2024-10-14 16:14:26 +0100
Since the addition of the MSR_AMD64_DR{1-4}_ADDRESS_MASK MSRs to the
msrs_to_send array, the calculations for the maximum number of MSRs that
the hypercall can handle is off by 4.
Remove the addition of 4 to the maximum number of MSRs that
XEN_DOMCTL_{set,get}_vcpu_msrs supports, as those are already part of the
array.
A further adjustment could be to subtract 4 from the maximum size if the DBEXT
CPUID feature is not exposed to the guest, but guest_{rd,wr}msr() will already
perform that check when fetching or loading the MSRs. The maximum array is
used to indicate the caller of the buffer it needs to allocate in the get case,
and as an early input sanitation in the set case, using a buffer size slightly
lager than required is not an issue.
Fixes: 86d47adcd3 ('x86/msr: Handle MSR_AMD64_DR{0-3}_ADDRESS_MASK in the new MSR infrastructure')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: c95cd5f9c5
master date: 2024-10-08 14:37:53 +0200
Returning a literal number is a bad idea anyway when all other returns
use IOREQ_STATUS_* values. The function is dead on Arm, and mapping to
X86EMUL_OKAY is surely wrong on x86.
Fixes: f6bf39f84f ("x86/hvm: add support for broadcast of buffered ioreqs...")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
master commit: 2e0b545b84
master date: 2024-10-08 14:36:27 +0200
The current dpci logic relies on a softirq being executed as a side effect of
the cpu_notifier_call_chain() call in the code path that offlines the target
CPU. However the call to cpu_notifier_call_chain() won't trigger any softirq
processing, and even if it did, such processing should be done after all
interrupts have been migrated off the current CPU, otherwise new pending dpci
interrupts could still appear.
Currently the ASSERT() in the cpu callback notifier is fairly easy to trigger
by doing CPU offline from a PVH dom0.
Solve this by instead moving out any dpci interrupts pending processing once
the CPU is dead. This might introduce more latency than attempting to drain
before the CPU is put offline, but it's less complex, and CPU online/offline is
not a common action. Any extra introduced latency should be tolerable.
Fixes: f6dd295381 ('dpci: replace tasklet with softirq')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 29555668b5
master date: 2024-10-07 11:10:21 +0200
Based on a fix from OpenSUSE, but adjusted to be Clang-compatible too. Pass
-Wno-implicit-function-declaration library-wide rather than using local GCC
pragmas.
Fix of copy_past_newline() to avoid triggering -Wstrict-prototypes.
Link: https://build.opensuse.org/request/show/1178775
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
master commit: 444cb9350f
master date: 2024-10-03 10:07:25 +0100
Ever since it's introduction in commit 013351bd7a ("Define new event-channel
and physdev hypercalls") in 2006, the public interface was named nr_ports
while the internal field was called iobmp_limit.
Rename the internal field to iobmp_nr to match the public interface, and
clarify that, when nonzero, Xen will read 2 bytes.
There isn't a perfect parallel with a real TSS, but iobmp_nr being 0 is the
paravirt "no IOPB" case, and it is important that no read occurs in this case.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 633ee8b2df
master date: 2024-10-01 14:58:18 +0100
The switch statement in guest_io_okay() is a very expensive way of
pre-initialising x with ~0, and performing a partial read into it.
However, the logic isn't correct either.
In a real TSS, the CPU always reads two bytes (like here), and any TSS limit
violation turns silently into no-access. But, in-limit accesses trigger #PF
as usual. AMD document this property explicitly, and while Intel don't (so
far as I can tell), they do behave consistently with AMD.
Switch from __copy_from_guest_offset() to __copy_from_guest_pv(), like
everything else in this file. This removes code generation setting up
copy_from_user_hvm() (in the likely path even), and safety LFENCEs from
evaluate_nospec().
Change the logic to raise #PF if __copy_from_guest_pv() fails, rather than
disallowing the IO port access. This brings the behaviour better in line with
normal x86.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8a6c495d72
master date: 2024-10-01 14:58:18 +0100
In order to fix a bug with guest_io_okay() (subsequent patch), rework
guest_io_okay() to take in an emulation context, and return X86EMUL_* rather
than a boolean.
For the failing case, take the opportunity to inject #GP explicitly, rather
than returning X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE. There is a logical difference between
"we know what this is, and it's #GP", vs "we don't know what this is".
There is no change in practice as emulation is the final step on general #GP
resolution, but returning X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE would be a latent bug if a
subsequent action were to appear.
No practical change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 7429e1cc07
master date: 2024-10-01 14:58:18 +0100
Hitting a page fault clobbers %cr2, so if a page fault is handled while
handling a previous page fault then %cr2 will hold the address of the
latter fault rather than the former. In particular, if a debug key
handler happens to trigger during #PF and before %cr2 is read, and that
handler itself encounters a #PF, then %cr2 will be corrupt for the outer #PF
handler.
This patch makes the page fault path delay re-enabling IRQs until %cr2
has been read in order to ensure it stays consistent.
A similar argument holds in additional cases, but they happen to be safe:
* %dr6 inside #DB: Safe because IST exceptions don't re-enable IRQs.
* MSR_XFD_ERR inside #NM: Safe because AMX isn't used in #NM handler.
While in the area, remove redundant q suffix to a movq in entry.S and
the space after the comma.
Fixes: a4cd20a190 ("[XEN] 'd' key dumps both host and guest state.")
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Vallejo <alejandro.vallejo@cloud.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: b06e76db7c
master date: 2024-10-01 09:45:49 +0200
Taking a fault on a non-byte-granular insn means that the "number of
bytes not handled" return value would need extra care in calculating, if
we want callers to be able to derive e.g. exception context (to be
injected to the guest) - CR2 for #PF in particular - from the value. To
simplify things rather than complicating them, reduce inline assembly to
just byte-granular string insns. On recent CPUs that's also supposed to
be more efficient anyway.
For singular element accessors, however, alignment checks are added,
hence slightly complicating the code. Misaligned (user) buffer accesses
will now be forwarded to copy_{from,to}_guest_ll().
Naturally copy_{from,to}_unsafe_ll() accessors end up being adjusted the
same way, as they're produced by mere re-processing of the same code.
Otoh copy_{from,to}_unsafe() aren't similarly adjusted, but have their
comments made match reality; down the road we may want to change their
return types, e.g. to bool.
Fixes: 76974398a6 ("Added user-memory accessing functionality for x86_64")
Fixes: 7b8c36701d ("Introduce clear_user and clear_guest")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 67a8e5721e
master date: 2024-10-01 09:44:55 +0200
The SDM states that data size must be a multiple of 4, but Xen doesn't check
this propery.
This is liable to cause a later failures, but should be checked explicitly.
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8752ad83e7
master date: 2024-09-24 18:57:38 +0100
The AMD container format has no formal spec. It is, at best, precision
guesswork based on AMD's prior contributions to open source projects. The
Equivalence Table has both an explicit length, and an expectation of having a
NULL entry at the end.
Xen was sanity checking the NULL entry, but without confirming that an entry
was present, resulting in a read off the front of the buffer. With some
manual debugging/annotations this manifests as:
(XEN) *** Buf ffff83204c00b19c, eq ffff83204c00b194
(XEN) *** eq: 0c 00 00 00 44 4d 41 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 aa aa aa aa
^-Actual buffer-------------------^
(XEN) *** installed_cpu: 000c
(XEN) microcode: Bad equivalent cpu table
(XEN) Parsing microcode blob error -22
When loaded by hypercall, the 4 bytes interpreted as installed_cpu happen to
be the containing struct ucode_buf's len field, and luckily will be nonzero.
When loaded at boot, it's possible for the access to #PF if the module happens
to have been placed on a 2M boundary by the bootloader. Under Linux, it will
commonly be the end of the CPIO header.
Drop the probe of the NULL entry; Nothing else cares. A container without one
is well formed, insofar that we can still parse it correctly. With this
dropped, the same container results in:
(XEN) microcode: couldn't find any matching ucode in the provided blob!
Fixes: 4de936a38a ("x86/ucode/amd: Rework parsing logic in cpu_request_microcode()")
Signed-off-by: Demi Marie Obenour <demi@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: a8bf14f6f3
master date: 2024-09-13 15:23:30 +0100
Current blkif implementations (both backends and frontends) have all slight
differences about how they handle the 'sector-size' xenstore node, and how
other fields are derived from this value or hardcoded to be expressed in units
of 512 bytes.
To give some context, this is an excerpt of how different implementations use
the value in 'sector-size' as the base unit for to other fields rather than
just to set the logical sector size of the block device:
│ sectors xenbus node │ requests sector_number │ requests {first,last}_sect
────────────────────────┼─────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
FreeBSD blk{front,back} │ sector-size │ sector-size │ 512
────────────────────────┼─────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
Linux blk{front,back} │ 512 │ 512 │ 512
────────────────────────┼─────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
QEMU blkback │ sector-size │ sector-size │ sector-size
────────────────────────┼─────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
Windows blkfront │ sector-size │ sector-size │ sector-size
────────────────────────┼─────────────────────┼────────────────────────┼───────────────────────────
MiniOS │ sector-size │ 512 │ 512
An attempt was made by 67e1c050e3 in order to change the base units of the
request fields and the xenstore 'sectors' node. That however only lead to more
confusion, as the specification now clearly diverged from the reference
implementation in Linux. Such change was only implemented for QEMU Qdisk
and Windows PV blkfront.
Partially revert to the state before 67e1c050e3 while adjusting the
documentation for 'sectors' to match what it used to be previous to
2fa701e534:
* Declare 'feature-large-sector-size' deprecated. Frontends should not expose
the node, backends should not make decisions based on its presence.
* Clarify that 'sectors' xenstore node and the requests fields are always in
512-byte units, like it was previous to 2fa701e534 and 67e1c050e3.
All base units for the fields used in the protocol are 512-byte based, the
xenbus 'sector-size' field is only used to signal the logic block size. When
'sector-size' is greater than 512, blkfront implementations must make sure that
the offsets and sizes (despite being expressed in 512-byte units) are aligned
to the logical block size specified in 'sector-size', otherwise the backend
will fail to process the requests.
This will require changes to some of the frontends and backends in order to
properly support 'sector-size' nodes greater than 512.
Fixes: 2fa701e534 ('blkif.h: Provide more complete documentation of the blkif interface')
Fixes: 67e1c050e3 ('public/io/blkif.h: try to fix the semantics of sector based quantities')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
master commit: 221f2748e8
master date: 2024-09-12 14:04:56 +0200
Xen always generates an XSDT table even if the firmware only provided an
RSDT table. Copy the RSDT header from the firmware table, adjusting the
signature, for the XSDT table when not provided by the firmware.
This is necessary to run Xen on QEMU.
Fixes: 1d74282c45 ('x86: setup PVHv2 Dom0 ACPI tables')
Suggested-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
master commit: 6e7f7a0c16
master date: 2024-09-12 09:18:25 +0200
While ->count will only be different from 1 for "indirect" (data in
guest memory) accesses, it being 1 does not exclude the request being an
"indirect" one. Check both to be on the safe side, and bring the ->count
part also in line with what ioreq_send_buffered() actually refuses to
handle.
Fixes: 3bbaaec09b ("x86/hvm: unify stdvga mmio intercept with standard mmio intercept")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: eb7cd0593d
master date: 2024-09-12 09:13:04 +0200
Drop explicit {evex} pseudo-prefixes. New gas (validly) complains when
they're used on things other than instructions. Our use was potentially
ahead of macro invocations - see simd.h's "override" macro.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 3c09288298
master date: 2024-09-06 08:41:18 +0200
The complaint is:
In file included from ././include/xen/config.h:17,
from <command-line>:
arch/x86/smpboot.c: In function ‘link_thread_siblings.constprop’:
./include/asm-generic/percpu.h:16:51: error: array subscript [0, 0] is outside array bounds of ‘long unsigned int[1]’ [-Werror=array-bounds=]
16 | (*RELOC_HIDE(&per_cpu__##var, __per_cpu_offset[cpu]))
./include/xen/compiler.h:140:29: note: in definition of macro ‘RELOC_HIDE’
140 | (typeof(ptr)) (__ptr + (off)); })
| ^~~
arch/x86/smpboot.c:238:27: note: in expansion of macro ‘per_cpu’
238 | cpumask_set_cpu(cpu2, per_cpu(cpu_sibling_mask, cpu1));
| ^~~~~~~
In file included from ./arch/x86/include/generated/asm/percpu.h:1,
from ./include/xen/percpu.h:30,
from ./arch/x86/include/asm/cpuid.h:9,
from ./arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h:11,
from ./arch/x86/include/asm/system.h:6,
from ./include/xen/list.h:11,
from ./include/xen/mm.h:68,
from arch/x86/smpboot.c:12:
./include/asm-generic/percpu.h:12:22: note: while referencing ‘__per_cpu_offset’
12 | extern unsigned long __per_cpu_offset[NR_CPUS];
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Which I consider bogus in the first place ("array subscript [0, 0]" vs a
1-element array). Yet taking the experience from 99f942f3d4 ("Arm64:
adjust __irq_to_desc() to fix build with gcc14") I guessed that
switching function parameters to unsigned int (which they should have
been anyway) might help. And voilà ...
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: a2de7dc4d8
master date: 2024-09-04 16:09:28 +0200
XSM is a generic framework, which in particular is also used by SILO.
With this it can't really be experimental: Arm mandates SILO for having
a security supported configuration.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
master commit: d7c18b8720
master date: 2024-09-04 16:05:03 +0200
When built with ASAN, "xl dmesg" crashes in the "printf("%s", line)"
call in main_dmesg(). ASAN reports a heap buffer overflow: an
off-by-one access to cr->buffer.
The readconsole sysctl copies up to count characters into the buffer,
but it does not add a null character at the end. Despite the
documentation of libxl_xen_console_read_line(), line_r is not
nul-terminated if 16384 characters were copied to the buffer.
Fix this by asking xc_readconsolering() to fill the buffer up to size
- 1. As the number of characters in the buffer is only needed in
libxl_xen_console_read_line(), make it a local variable there instead
of part of the libxl__xen_console_reader struct.
Fixes: 4024bae739 ("xl: Add subcommand 'xl dmesg'")
Reported-by: Edwin Török <edwin.torok@cloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Javi Merino <javi.merino@cloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
master commit: bb03169bcb
master date: 2024-09-03 10:53:44 +0100
With the original code I observe
In function ‘__irq_to_desc’,
inlined from ‘route_irq_to_guest’ at arch/arm/irq.c:465:12:
arch/arm/irq.c:54:16: error: array subscript -2 is below array bounds of ‘irq_desc_t[32]’ {aka ‘struct irq_desc[32]’} [-Werror=array-bounds=]
54 | return &this_cpu(local_irq_desc)[irq];
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
which looks pretty bogus: How in the world does the compiler arrive at
-2 when compiling route_irq_to_guest()? Yet independent of that the
function's parameter wants to be of unsigned type anyway, as shown by
a vast majority of callers (others use plain int when they really mean
non-negative quantities). With that adjustment the code compiles fine
again.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
master commit: 99f942f3d4
master date: 2024-08-29 10:03:53 +0200
For partial writes the non-written parts of registers are folded into
the full 64-bit value from what they're presently set to. That's wrong
to do though when the behavior is write-1-to-clear: Writes not
including to low 3 bits would unconditionally clear all ISR bits which
are presently set. Re-calculate the value to use.
Fixes: be07023be1 ("x86/vhpet: add support for level triggered interrupts")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 41d358d2f9
master date: 2024-08-29 10:02:20 +0200
Move the logic that disables SMAP so it's only performed when building a PV
dom0, PVH dom0 builder doesn't require disabling SMAP.
The fixes tag is to account for the wrong usage of cpu_has_smap in
create_dom0(), it should instead have used
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_XEN_SMAP). Fix while moving the logic to apply to PV
only.
While there also make cr4_pv32_mask __ro_after_init.
Fixes: 493ab190e5 ('xen/sm{e, a}p: allow disabling sm{e, a}p for Xen itself')
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: fb1658221a
master date: 2024-08-28 19:59:07 +0100
Downing CPUs for S3 is somewhat special: Since we can expect the system
to come back up in exactly the same hardware configuration, per-CPU data
for the secondary CPUs isn't de-allocated (and then cleared upon re-
allocation when the CPUs are being brought back up). Therefore the
cluster_cpus per-CPU pointer will retain its value for all CPUs other
than the final one in a cluster (i.e. in particular for all CPUs in the
same cluster as CPU0). That, however, is in conflict with the assertion
early in init_apic_ldr_x2apic_cluster().
Note that the issue is avoided on Intel hardware, where we park CPUs
instead of bringing them down.
Extend the bypassing of the freeing to the suspend case, thus making
suspend/resume also a tiny bit faster.
Fixes: 2e6c8f182c ("x86: distinguish CPU offlining from CPU removal")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ad3ff7b427
master date: 2024-08-26 10:30:40 +0200
Jan Beulich
Javi Merino
Andrew Cooper
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Stefano Stabellini
Victor Lira
Stefano Stabellini
Daniel P. Smith
Roger Pau Monné
Alejandro Vallejo
Demi Marie Obenour