As the code comment says, this will allow use of a 2Mb super page
mapping at the end of "low" memory.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Uniformly passing "false" can't be right, but has been benign because of
the function not using this parameter.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Documentation says "<RDM_RESERVATION_STRING> is a comma separated list
of <KEY=VALUE> settings, from the following list". There's no mention
of a specific order, yet so far the parsing logic did accept only
strategy, then policy (and neither of the two omitted). Make "state"
move
- back to STATE_TYPE when finding a comma after having parsed the
<VALUE> part of a setting,
- to STATE_TERMINAL otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reserved device memory region processing as well as E820 table creation
happen earlier than the adding of (PCI) devices, yet they consume the
policy (e.g. to decide whether to add entries to the E820 table). But so
far it was only at the stage of PCI device addition that the final
policy was established (i.e. if not explicitly specified by the guest
config file).
Note that I couldn't find the domain ID to be available in
libxl__domain_device_construct_rdm(), but observing that
libxl__device_pci_setdefault() also doesn't use it, for the time being
DOMID_INVALID gets passed. An obvious alternative would be to drop the
unused parameter/argument, yet at that time the question would be
whether to also drop other unused ones.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
While in "host" strategy all regions get processed, of the per-device
ones only the first entry has been consumed so far.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
This patch fixes Coverity issue CID 1459006 (Insecure data handling
(INTEGER_OVERFLOW)).
The problem is that the error paths for libxl__mark_domid_recent() and
libxl__is_domid_recent() check the 'f' field in struct libxl__domid_history
when it may not have been initialized.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
That comment was introduce by 3943db7763 ("[XEN] Can be built
-std=gnu99 (except for .S files).") to explain why CFLAGS was removed
from the command line. The comment is already written where the
-std=gnu flags gets remove from AFLAGS, no need to repeat it.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
The top-level makefile make uses of internal implementation detail of
the xen build system. Avoid that by creating a new target
"install-tests" in xen/Makefile, and by fixing the top-level Makefile
to not call xen/Rules.mk anymore.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
It isn't necessary to include Config.mk here because this Makefile is
only used by xen/Rules.mk which already includes Config.mk.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Using scratch_cpumask in send_IPI_mask is not safe in IRQ or exception
context because it can nest, and hence send_IPI_mask could be
overwriting another user scratch cpumask data when used in such
contexts.
Fallback to not using the scratch cpumask (and hence not attemping to
optimize IPI sending by using a shorthand) when in IRQ or exception
context. Note that the scratch cpumask cannot be used when
non-maskable interrupts are being serviced (NMI or #MC) and hence
fallback to not using the shorthand in that case, like it was done
previously.
Fixes: 5500d265a2 ('x86/smp: use APIC ALLBUT destination shorthand when possible')
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Add helpers to track when executing in #MC handler context. This is
modeled after the in_irq helpers.
Note that there are no users of in_mce_handler() introduced by the
change, further users will be added by followup changes.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Add helpers to track when running in NMI handler context. This is
modeled after the in_irq helpers.
The SDM states that no NMI can be delivered while handling a NMI
until the processor has executed an iret instruction. It's possible
however that another fault is received while handling the NMI (a #MC
for example), and thus the iret from that fault would allow further
NMIs to be injected while still processing the previous one, and
hence an integer is needed in order to keep track of in service NMIs.
The added macros only track when the execution context is in the NMI
handler, but that doesn't mean NMIs are blocked for the reasons listed
above.
Note that there are no users of in_nmi_handler() introduced by the
change, further users will be added by followup changes.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This is modeled after the irq_count variable, and is used to account
for all the NMIs handled by the system.
This will allow to repurpose the nmi_count() helper so it can be used
in a similar manner as local_irq_count(): account for the NMIs
currently in service.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
It's not needed there and introduces a needless, almost global
dependency. Include the file (or in some cases just xen/err.h) where
actually needed, or - in one case - simply forward-declare a struct. In
microcode*.c take the opportunity and also re-order a few other
#include-s.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Policy objects aren't tiny, and the derivation logic isn't trivial. We are
about to increase the number of policy objects, so will have the opportunity
to drop logic and storage space based on CONFIG_{PV,HVM}.
Start by causing XEN_SYSCTL_get_cpu_policy to fail with -EOPNOTSUPP when
requesting data for a compiled-out subsystem. Update xen-cpuid to cope and
continue to further system policies, seeing as the indicies are interleaved.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
There is a fencepost error on the sys.version_info check which will break on
Python 3.0. Reverse the logic to make py2 compatible with py3 (rather than
py3 compatible with py2) which will be more natural to follow as py2 usage
reduces.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
The serial port address space ID qualifies the address. Whether a value
of zero for the serial port address can sensibly mean "disabled" depends
on the address space ID. Hence check the address space ID before
checking the address.
Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <xuwei5@hisilicon.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Don't allow cpu_hotplug_begin to fail by converting the trylock into a
blocking lock acquisition. Write users of the cpu_add_remove_lock are
limited to CPU plug/unplug operations, and cannot deadlock between
themselves or other users taking the lock in read mode as
cpu_add_remove_lock is always locked with interrupts enabled. There
are also no other locks taken during the plug/unplug operations.
The exclusive lock usage in register_cpu_notifier is also converted
into a blocking lock acquisition, as it was previously not allowed to
fail anyway.
This is meaningful when running Xen in shim mode, since VCPU_{up/down}
hypercalls use cpu hotplug/unplug operations in the background, and
hence failing to take the lock results in VPCU_{up/down} failing with
-EBUSY, which most users are not prepared to handle.
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Allow a CPU already holding the lock in write mode to also lock it in
read mode. There's no harm in allowing read locking a rwlock that's
already owned by the caller (ie: CPU) in write mode. Allowing such
accesses is required at least for the CPU maps use-case.
In order to do this reserve 12bits of the lock, this allows to support
up to 4096 CPUs. Also reduce the write lock mask to 2 bits: one to
signal there are pending writers waiting on the lock and the other to
signal the lock is owned in write mode.
This reduces the maximum number of concurrent readers from 16777216 to
262144, I think this should still be enough, or else the lock field
can be expanded from 32 to 64bits if all architectures support atomic
operations on 64bit integers.
Fixes: 5872c83b42 ('smp: convert the cpu maps lock into a rw lock')
Reported-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reported-by: Jürgen Groß <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To x86 and Arm. This performs an atomic AND operation against an
atomic_t variable with the provided mask.
Requested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Currently the memory for each run-queue of the credit2 scheduler is
allocated at the scheduler's init function: for each cpu in the system
a struct csched2_runqueue_data is being allocated, even if the
current scheduler only handles one physical cpu or is configured to
work with a single run-queue. As each struct contains 4 cpumasks this
sums up to rather large memory sizes pretty fast.
Rework the memory allocation for run-queues to be done only when
needed, i.e. when adding a physical cpu to the scheduler requiring a
new run-queue.
In fact this fixes a bug in credit2 related to run-queue handling:
cpu_to_runqueue() will return the first free or matching run-queue,
which ever is found first. So in case a cpu is removed from credit2
this could result in e.g. run-queue 0 becoming free, so when another
cpu is added it will in any case be assigned to that free run-queue,
even if it would have found another run-queue matching later.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dfaggioli@suse.com>
There is now only one version of PVH implementation in Xen. Drop "v2" to
avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Commit 2b02882ebb "libxl: add infrastructure to track and query
'recent' domids" added a call to clock_gettime() into libxl. The man-
page for this states:
"Link with -lrt (only for glibc versions before 2.17)."
Unfortunately Centos 6 does have an glibc prior to that version, and the
libxl Makefile was not updated to add '-lrt' so the build will fail in
that environment.
This patch simply adds '-lrt' to LIBXL_LIBS unconditionally, as it does
no harm in newer environments.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Fixes: 2b02882ebb ("libxl: add infrastructure to track and query 'recent' domids")
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
This patch adds a '-D' command line option to save and migrate to allow
the domain id to be incorporated into the saved domain configuration and
hence be preserved.
NOTE: Logically it may seem as though preservation of domid should be
dealt with by libxl, but the libxl migration stream has no record
in which to transfer domid and remote domain creation occurs before
the migration stream is parsed. Hence this patch modifies xl rather
then libxl.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This patch adds a new global 'domid_policy' configuration option to decide
how domain id values are allocated for new domains. It may be set to one of
two values:
"xen", the default value, will cause an invalid domid value to be passed
to do_domain_create() preserving the existing behaviour of having Xen
choose the domid value during domain_create().
"random" will cause the special RANDOM_DOMID value to be passed to
do_domain_create() such that libxl__domain_make() will select a random
domid value.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
This patch adds a 'domid' field to libxl_domain_create_info and then
modifies libxl__domain_make() to have Xen use that value if it is valid.
If the domid value is invalid then Xen will choose the domid, as before,
unless the value is the new special RANDOM_DOMID value added to the API.
This value instructs libxl__domain_make() to choose a random domid value
for Xen to use.
If Xen determines that a domid specified to or chosen by
libxl__domain_make() co-incides with an existing domain then the create
operation will fail. In this case, if RANDOM_DOMID was specified to
libxl__domain_make() then a new random value will be chosen and the create
operation will be re-tried, otherwise libxl__domain_make() will fail.
After Xen has successfully created a new domain, libxl__domain_make() will
check whether its domid matches any recently used domid values. If it does
then the domain will be destroyed. If the domid used in creation was
specified to libxl__domain_make() then it will fail at this point,
otherwise the create operation will be re-tried with either a new random
or Xen-selected domid value.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
A subsequent patch will modify libxl to allow selection of a random domid
value when creating domains. Valid values are limited to a width of 15 bits,
so add an appropriate mask definition to the public header.
NOTE: It is reasonable for this mask definition to be in a Xen public header
rather than in, say, a libxenctrl header since it relates to the
validity of a value passed to XEN_DOMCTL_createdomain. This new
definition is placed in xen.h rather than domctl.h only to co-locate
it with other domid-related defitions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
A domid is considered recent if the domain it represents was destroyed
less than a specified number of seconds ago. For debugging and/or testing
purposes the number can be set using the environment variable
LIBXL_DOMID_REUSE_TIMEOUT. If the variable does not exist then a default
value of 60s is used.
Whenever a domain is destroyed, a time-stamped record will be written into
a history file (/var/run/xen/domid-history). To avoid the history file
growing too large, any records with time-stamps that indicate that the
age of a domid has exceeded the re-use timeout will also be purged.
A new utility function, libxl__is_recent_domid(), has been added. This
function reads the same history file checking whether a specified domid
has a record that does not exceed the re-use timeout. Since this utility
function does not write to the file, no records are actually purged by it.
NOTE: The history file is purged on boot to it is safe to use
CLOCK_MONOTONIC as a time source.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
It turns out that these are unused, and we dup a type-dependent block of
zeros. Use xzalloc() instead.
Read/write MSRs typically default 0, and non-zero defaults would need dealing
with at suitable INIT/RESET points (e.g. arch_vcpu_regs_init).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Make a start on cleaning up the constants in msr-index.h.
No functional change - only formatting changes.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Parse the ACPI SPCR table and initialize the 16550 compatible serial port
for ARM only. Currently we only support one UART on ARM. Some fields
which we do not care yet on ARM are ignored.
Signed-off-by: Wei Xu <xuwei5@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Both callers request the host P2M's default access, which can as well be
done inside the function. While touching this anyway, make the "gfn"
parameter type-safe as well.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@ciitrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
PTE flags, for now at least, get stored in "unsigned int". Hence there's
no need to widen the values to "unsigned long" before processing them.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Throughout the function the equation
pod + nonpod == (1UL << order)
should hold. This has been violated by the final loop of the function:
* changing a range from a type other than p2m_populate_on_demand to
p2m_invalid doesn't alter the amount of non-PoD pages in the region,
* changing a range from p2m_populate_on_demand to p2m_invalid does
increase the amount of non-PoD pages in the region along with
decreasing the amount of PoD pages there.
Fortunately the variable isn't used anymore after the loop. Instead of
correcting the updating of the "nonpod" variable, however, drop it
altogether, to avoid getting the above equation to not hold again by a
future change.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The initial observation was that the mfn_valid() check comes too late:
Neither mfn_add() nor mfn_to_page() (let alone de-referencing the
result of the latter) are valid for MFNs failing this check. Move it up
and - noticing that there's no caller doing so - also add an assertion
that this should never produce "false" here.
In turn this would have meant that the "else" to that if() could now go
away, which didn't seem right at all. And indeed, considering callers
like memory_exchange() or various grant table functions, the PoD
accounting should have been outside of that if() from the very
beginning.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Xen has never acted upon the value of HVM_PARAM_PAE_ENABLED, contrary perhaps
to expectations based on how other boolean fields work.
It was only ever used as a non-standard calling convention for
xc_cpuid_apply_policy() but that has been fixed now.
Purge its use, and any possible confusion over its behaviour, by having Xen
reject any attempts to use it. Forgo setting it up in libxl's
hvm_set_conf_params(). The only backwards compatibility necessary is to have
the HVM restore stream discard it if found.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The local xc_hvm_param_deprecated_check() in libxc tries to guess Xen's
behaviour for the MEMORY_EVENT params, but is wrong for the get side, where
Xen would return 0 (which is also a bug). Delete the helper.
In Xen, perform the checks in hvm_allow_set_param(), rather than
hvm_set_param(), and actually implement checks on the get side so the
hypercall doesn't return successfully with 0 as an answer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
A splitlock is an atomic operation which crosses a cache line boundary. It
serialises operations in the cache coherency fabric and comes with a
multi-thousand cycle stall.
Intel Tremont CPUs introduce MSR_CORE_CAPS to enumerate various core-specific
features, and MSR_TEST_CTRL to adjust the behaviour in the case of a
splitlock.
Virtualising this for guests is distinctly tricky owing to the fact that
MSR_TEST_CTRL has core rather than thread scope. In the meantime however,
prevent the MSR values leaking into guests.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
The owner domain of shared pages is dom_cow, use that for get_page
otherwise the function fails to return the correct page under some
situations. The check if dom_cow should be used was only performed in
a subset of use-cases. Fixing the error and simplifying the existing check
since we can't have any shared entries with dom_cow being NULL.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <tamas.lengyel@intel.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
ARM currently has no restrictions on toolstack and guest access to the entire
HVM_PARAM block. As the monitor feature isn't under security support, this
doesn't need an XSA.
The CALLBACK_IRQ and {STORE,CONSOLE}_{PFN,EVTCHN} details are only exposed
read-only to the guest, while MONITOR_RING_PFN is restricted to only toolstack
access. No other parameters are used.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
With having to take over Lars' role as community manager, I don't have
the necessary time to review the mm/ subsystem. Step back to being only
a designated reviewer, reverting mantainership to the x86 maintianers.
While here, fix my e-mail address in other places.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Some code-paths use values other than INVALID_DOMID to indicate an invalid
domain id. Specifically, xl will pass a value of 0 when creating/restoring
a domain. Therefore modify libxl__logv() to use libxl_domid_valid_guest()
as a validity test.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <pdurrant@amazon.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
The async_exception_{state,mask} infrastructure is implemented in common code,
but is limited to x86 because of the VCPU_TRAP_LAST ifdef-ary.
The internals are very x86 specific (and even then, in need of correction),
and won't be of interest to other architectures. Move it all into x86
specific code.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The hardware domain doesn't necessarily have the domid 0. Render v instead,
adjusting the strings to avoid printing trailing whitespace.
Rename i to cpu, and use separate booleans for pending/masked. Drop the
unnecessary domain local variable.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This is an Intel-only, read-only MSR related to microcode loading. Expose it
in similar circumstances as the PATCHLEVEL MSR.
This should have been alongside c/s 013896cb8b "x86/msr: Fix handling of
MSR_AMD_PATCHLEVEL/MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV"
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Jan Beulich
Paul Durrant
Olaf Hering
Anthony PERARD
Roger Pau Monné
Andrew Cooper
Wei Xu
Juergen Gross
Wei Liu
Tamas K Lengyel
George Dunlap