This merges xenalyze.hg, changeset 150:24308507be1d,
into tools/xentrace/xenalyze.c to have the tool and
public/trace.h in one place.
Adjust code to use public/trace.h instead of private trace.h
Signed-off-by: Olaf Hering <olaf@aepfle.de>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Cc: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- wrap $(BIN) install in a check in case it is empty (which it
is on !x86, avoid BIN += since it results in BIN = ' ' on
!x86 ]
In combination with the per-active entry locks, the grant table lock
can be made a read-write lock since the majority of cases only the
read lock is required. The grant table read lock protects against
changes to the table version or size (which are done with the write
lock held).
The write lock is also required when two active entries must be
acquired.
The double lock is still required when updating IOMMU page tables.
With the lock contention being only on the maptrack lock (unless IOMMU
updates are required), performance and scalability is improved.
Based on a patch originally by Matt Wilson <msw@amazon.com>.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Split grant table lock into two separate locks. One to protect
maptrack free list (maptrack_lock) and one for everything else (lock).
Based on a patch originally by Matt Wilson <msw@amazon.com>.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Introduce a per-active entry spin lock to protect active entry state
The grant table lock must be locked before acquiring (locking) an
active entry.
This is a step in reducing contention on the grant table lock, but
will only do so once the grant table lock is turned into a read-write
lock.
Based on a patch originally by Matt Wilson <msw@amazon.com>.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Constructing dom0 may take a few seconds, particularly if the slow VESA
graphics terminal is used. Process pending softirqs a few times to avoid
tripping a watchdog with a short timeout.
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Move inclusion of xen/softirq.h (and at once clean up other includes).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
trying to shutdown the host when a cpupool exists, has
pCPUs, and has a scheduler different than the Xen's default
one, produces this:
root@Zhaman:~# xl cpupool-cpu-remove Pool-0 8
root@Zhaman:~# xl cpupool-create name=\"Pool-1\" sched=\"credit2\"
Using config file "command line"
cpupool name: Pool-1
scheduler: credit2
number of cpus: 0
root@Zhaman:~# xl cpupool-cpu-add Pool-1 8
root@Zhaman:~# shutdown -h now
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.6-unstable x86_64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
(XEN) CPU: 0
(XEN) RIP: e008:[<ffff82d080133bdf>] kill_timer+0x56/0x298
(XEN) RFLAGS: 0000000000010002 CONTEXT: hypervisor
... ... ...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d080133bdf>] kill_timer+0x56/0x298
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012233f>] csched_free_pdata+0x9b/0xcf
(XEN) [<ffff82d08012c30c>] cpu_schedule_callback+0x64/0x8b
(XEN) [<ffff82d08011bc7a>] notifier_call_chain+0x67/0x87
(XEN) [<ffff82d08010153e>] cpu_down+0xd9/0x12c
(XEN) [<ffff82d080101744>] disable_nonboot_cpus+0x93/0x138
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801aa6e7>] enter_state_helper+0xbd/0x365
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801061e5>] continue_hypercall_tasklet_handler+0x4a/0xb1
(XEN) [<ffff82d080132387>] do_tasklet_work+0x78/0xab
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801326bd>] do_tasklet+0x5e/0x8a
(XEN) [<ffff82d0801646d2>] idle_loop+0x56/0x6b
... ... ...
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) FATAL PAGE FAULT
(XEN) [error_code=0000]
(XEN) Faulting linear address: 0000000000000041
(XEN) ****************************************
The fix is, when tearing down a pCPU, call the free_pdata()
hook from the scheduler of the cpupool the pCPU belongs to,
not always the one from the default scheduler.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@eu.citrix.com>
Latch both domains alongside both vCPU-s into local variables, making
use of them where possible also beyond what the title says.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... when the domain pointer is already available or such operations
occur frequently in a function.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... when the domain pointer is already available or such operations
occur frequently in a function.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Commit 8a753b3f1c ("efi: fix allocation problems if ExitBootServices()
fails") replaced the use of a static (and hence zero-initialized)
variable by an automatic (and hence uninitialized) one.
Also drop the variable introduced by that commit in favor of re-using
another available and suitable one.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
... avoiding NULL derefs when the version to use wasn't set yet (via
GNTTABOP_setup_table or GNTTABOP_set_version).
This is CVE-2015-4163 / XSA-134.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
We're being told that while on the server side the issue we're trying
to work around is fixed starting with IvyBridge (another round of
double checking is going on before we're going to remove the one
IvyBridge ID that we're currently applying the workaround for), on the
desktop side even Skylake still requires the workaround. Hence we need
to add a whole bunch of desktop IDs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Don Dugger <donald.d.dugger@intel.com>
Also make dmar_{read,write}q() actually do what their names suggest (we
don't need to be concerned of 32-bit restrictions anymore).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
The specification explicitly provides for this, so we should have
supported this from the beginning.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
The per-domain event channel lock may suffer from contention. Add it to
the set of locks to be profiled when lock profiling is enabled.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
That flag now means cachability rather than protection, and a new flag
EFI_MEMORY_RO got added in its place.
Along with EFI_MEMORY_RO also add the two other new EFI_MEMORY_*
definitions, even if we don't need them right away.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
For example on Dell machines we see:
(XEN) 00000fed18000-00000fed19fff type=11 attr=8000000000000000
(XEN) Unknown cachability for MFNs 0xfed18-0xfed19
Let's allow them to be mapped as UC.
We also alter the 'efi-rs' to be 'efi=rs' or 'efi=no-rs'.
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
After the first call to ExitBootServices(), avoid calling any boot
services (except GetMemoryMap() and ExitBootServices()) by setting
setting efi_bs to NULL and halting in blexit(). Only GetMemoryMap() and
ExitBootServices() are explicitly allowed to be called after the first
call to ExitBootServices() and so are are called via
SystemTable->BootServices.
Suggested-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Destination pages need mappings to be added to the page tables in the
v1 case (where nothing else calls machine_kexec_add_page() for them).
Further, without the tools mapping the low 1Mb (expected by at least
some Linux version), we need to do so in the hypervisor in the v1 case.
Suggested-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Alan Robinson <alan.robinson@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
admin_io_okay(), guest_io_read(), and guest_io_write() all don't need
their current "regs" parameter at all, and they don't use the vCPU
passed to them for other than obtaining its domain. Drop the former and
replace the latter by a struct domain pointer.
pci_cfg_okay() returns a boolean type, and its "write" parameter is of
boolean kind too.
All of them get called for the current vCPU (and hence current domain)
only, so name the domain parameters accordingly except in the
admin_io_okay() case, which a subsequent patch will use for simplifying
setup_io_bitmap().
Latch current->domain into a local variable in emulate_privileged_op().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Being a pre-3.1 compatibility hypercall handler only, it's not needed
on ARM or any future architectures Xen may get ported to.
Also the function shouldn't really be used internally - its use should
be limited to its purpose (and hence there's also no need for a
prototype).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@cirix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Printing pointers to struct domain isn't really useful for initial
problem analysis. In get_page() also drop the page only after issuing
the log message, so that at the time of printing the state can be
considered reasonably consistent.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Currently, the BSP's stack is the BSS symbol cpu0_stack. In builds using
memguard_stack(), a page gets shot out of the mappings.
To avoid shattering the superpage which will eventually map the BSS, use the
directmap virtual address of cpu0_stack, while still using the same underlying
physical memory. (Xen has an order 21 physical relocation requirement meaning
that the order 3 alignment requirement for cpu0_stack will be honoured even
via its diretmap mapping.)
In addition, fix two issues exposed by the changes.
* do_invalid_op() should use is_active_kernel_text() rather than having its
own, different, idea of when to search through the bugframes.
* Setting of system_state to active needs to be deferred until after code has
left .init.text, for bugframes/backtraces to function in reinit_bsp_stack().
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
* Introduce symbols bounding the multiboot1 header, which helps clarify that
it is data and not code corruption when viewing the disassembly.
* Move the __high_start symbol to its implementation, and declare it
correctly as ENTRY()
* Move the l1_identmap construction to be with all the other pagetables, and
within __page_tables_{start,end}. This won't affect the EFI relocation
algorithm, as l1_identmap contains no relocations.
* Move the cpu0_stack alignment check to the linker. Chances are very good
that a binary with a misaligned stack won't get as far as the test.
* Use MB() in linker script.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Introduced by c/s 376bbba "sched_rt: print useful affinity info when dumping".
If the allocation of cpumask failed, prv was leaked.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Coverity-ID: 1304398
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
The read emulation of the register IROUTER contains lots of uncessary
code as irouter is already valid and doesn't need any processing before
setting the value in a register.
Also take the opportunity to factorize the code to find a vCPU from the
affinity in a single place. It will be easier to change the way to do it
later.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Cc: Chen Baozi <cbz@baozis.org>
Acked-by: Chen Baozi <baozich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
As suggested by Andrew Cooper, this patch attempts to remove
some redundancy and allow for an easier time when adding vm_events
for new control registers in the future, by having a single
VM_EVENT_REASON_WRITE_CTRLREG vm_event type, meant to serve CR0,
CR3, CR4 and (newly introduced) XCR0. The actual control register
will be deduced by the new .index field in vm_event_write_ctrlreg
(renamed from vm_event_mov_to_cr).
Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
As the first step of memory management cleanup, introduce the common code to
mfn_t, gfn_t and pfn_t.
The typesafe construction moves to its own header file, while the declarations
and sentinal values are moved to being common.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Checking that the subject domain is not the current one is pointless
when already having paused that domain: domain_pause() already
ASSERT()s this to be the case.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
Olaf Hering
Jan Beulich
David Vrabel
Ian Jackson
Ross Lagerwall
Dario Faggioli
Roger Pau Monné
Andrew Cooper
Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Alan Robinson
Ian Campbell
Julien Grall
Razvan Cojocaru