pygrub (in identify_disk_image()) detects a DOS style partition table
via the presence of the 0xaa55 signature at the end of the first
sector of the disk.
However this signature is also present in whole-disk configurations
when there is an MBR on the disk. Many filesystems (e.g. ext[234])
include leading padding in their on disk format specifically to enable
this.
So if we think we have a DOS partition table but do not find any
actual partition table entries we may as well try looking at it as a
whole disk image. Worst case is we probe and find there isn't anything
there.
This was reported by Sjors Gielen in Debian bug #745419. The fix was
inspired by a patch by Adi Kriegisch in
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=745419#27
Tested by genext2fs'ing my /boot into a new raw image (works) and
then:
dd if=/usr/lib/grub/i386-pc/g2ldr.mbr of=img conv=notrunc bs=512 count=1
to add an MBR (with 0xaa55 signature) to it, which after this patch
also works.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: 745419-forwarded@bugs.debian.org
(cherry picked from commit fb31b1475f)
Starting in the wrong ELx mode I get the following debug output:
...
- Current EL 00000004 -
- Xen must be entered in NS EL2 mode -
- Boot failed -
The output of "Please update the bootloader" is missing here, because
string concatenation in gas, unlike in C, keeps the \0 between each
individual string.
Make sure this is output, too. With this, we get
...
- Current EL 00000004 -
- Xen must be entered in NS EL2 mode -
- Please update the bootloader -
- Boot failed -
as intended.
Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@de.bosch.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- added same change to arm32 case ]
master commit: c31d340825
master date: 2016-02-18 10:13:42 +0000
... and annotate the other deliberate one: Coverity objects otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
One of the two instances was actually a bug.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8dd6d1c099
master date: 2016-02-18 15:10:07 +0100
scratch_alloc() set scratch_start to the last byte of the current
allocation. The value of scratch_start is then reused as is (if it is
already aligned) in the next allocation. This result in a potential reuse
of the last byte of the previous allocation.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 4ab3ac074c
master date: 2016-02-10 14:46:45 +0100
When intercepting (or emulating) L1 guest INVLPG, the nested P2M
pointer may be (is?) NULL, and hence there's no point in calling
p2m_flush(). In fact doing so would cause a dereference of that NULL
pointer at least in the ASSERT() right at the beginning of the
function.
While so far nothing supports hap_invlpg() being reachable from the
INVLPG intercept paths (only INVLPG insn emulation would lead there),
and hence the code in question (added by dd6de3ab99 ["Implement
Nested-on-Nested"]) appears to be dead, this seems to be the change
which can be agreed on as an immediate fix. Ideally, however, the
problematic code would go away altogether. See thread at
lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-01/msg03762.html.
Reported-by: 刘令 <liuling-it@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 86c59615f4
master date: 2016-02-09 13:22:13 +0100
This went unnoticed until a backport of this to an older Xen got used,
causing migration of guests enabling this VM assist to fail, because
page table pinning there precedes vCPU context loading, and hence L4
tables get initialized for the wrong mode. Fix this by post-processing
L4 tables when setting the intended VM assist flags for the guest.
Note that this leaves in place a dependency on vCPU 0 getting its guest
context restored first, but afaict the logic here is not the only thing
depending on that.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: be05b5385f
master date: 2016-02-03 14:12:00 +0100
When modifying the timeslice of the credit scheduler in a cpupool the
cpupool global credit value (n_cpus * credits_per_tslice) isn't
recalculated. This will lead to wrong scheduling decisions later.
Do the recalculation when updating the timeslice.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Alan.Robinson <alan.robinson@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
master commit: ffc342fbb0
master date: 2016-02-02 14:03:40 +0100
When updating the timeslice of the credit scheduler protect the
scheduler's private data by it's lock. Today a possible race could
result only in some weird scheduling decisions during one timeslice,
but further adjustments will need the lock anyway.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
master commit: f2c96ac4de
master date: 2016-02-02 14:03:06 +0100
Most updates to the exception bitmaps set or clear an individual bits.
However, entering or exiting emulated real mode unilaterally clobbers it,
leaving the exit code to recalculate what it should have been. This is error
prone, and indeed currently fails to recalculate the TRAP_no_device intercept
appropriately.
Instead of overwriting exception_bitmap when entering emulated real mode, move
the override into vmx_update_exception_bitmap() and leave exception_bitmap
unmodified.
This means that recalculation is unnecessary, and that the use of
vmx_fpu_leave() and vmx_update_debug_state() while in emulated real mode
doesn't result in TRAP_no_device and TRAP_int3 being un-intercepted.
This is only a functional change on hardware lacking unrestricted guest
support.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 78c93adf0a
master date: 2016-02-02 14:00:52 +0100
Debian bug 812166[0] reported this build failure due to
Wmisleading-indentation with gcc-6:
non-fatal.c: In function 'init_nonfatal_mce_checker':
non-fatal.c:103:2: error: statement is indented as if it were guarded by... [-Werror=misleading-indentation]
switch (c->x86_vendor) {
^~~~~~
non-fatal.c:97:5: note: ...this 'if' clause, but it is not
if ( __get_cpu_var(poll_bankmask) == NULL )
^~
I was unable to reproduce (xen builds cleanly for me with "6.0.0 20160117
(experimental) [trunk revision 232481]") but looking at the code the issue
above is clearly real.
Correctly reindent the if statement.
This file uses Linux coding style (infact the use of Xen style for
this line is the root cause of the wanring) so use tabs and while
there remove the whitespace inside the if as Linux does.
[0] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=812166
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 2e46e3f253
master date: 2016-01-22 16:19:51 +0100
Obtaining one individual range per variable range register (via
get_mtrr_range()) was bogus from the beginning, as these registers may
cover multiple disjoint ranges. Do away with that, in favor of simply
comparing masked addresses.
Also, for is_var_mtrr_overlapped()'s result to be correct when called
from mtrr_wrmsr(), generic_set_mtrr() must update saved state first.
As minor cleanup changes, constify is_var_mtrr_overlapped()'s parameter
and make mtrr_wrmsr() static.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 3272230848
master date: 2016-01-21 16:11:04 +0100
Addresses passed by PV guests should be subjected to __addr_ok(),
avoiding undue TLB flushes.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 828e114f7c
master date: 2016-01-21 16:09:22 +0100
Commit 9256f66c16 ("x86/PCI: intercept all PV Dom0 MMCFG writes")
added intercepts for writes to RO MMCFG space from PV dom0.
Similar functionality, including access to RO non-MMCFG addresses, is
needed by dom0s in HVM containers (such as PVH and, in the future,
HVMlite).
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 33c19df9a5
master date: 2015-12-21 14:05:02 +0100
This is provided explicitly in SVM and implicitly in VMX (when neither of
the three EPT_EFFECTIVE_* bits is set).
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 1a966b46a0
master date: 2015-12-21 13:38:53 +0100
... to prevent guest user mode arranging for a guest crash (due to
failed VM entry). (On the AMD system I checked, hardware is doing
exactly the canonicalization being added here.)
Note that fixing this in an architecturally correct way would be quite
a bit more involved: Making the x86 instruction emulator check all
branch targets for validity, plus dealing with invalid rIP resulting
from update_guest_eip() or incoming directly during a VM exit. The only
way to get the latter right would be by not having hardware do the
injection.
Note further that there are a two early returns from
vmx_vmexit_handler(): One (through vmx_failed_vmentry()) leads to
domain_crash() anyway, and the other covers real mode only and can
neither occur with a non-canonical rIP nor result in an altered rIP,
so we don't need to force those paths through the checking logic.
This is CVE-2016-2271 / XSA-170.
Reported-by: 刘令 <liuling-it@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ffbbfda377
master date: 2016-02-17 16:18:08 +0100
We've been told by Intel that inconsistent cachability between
multiple mappings of the same page can affect system stability only
when the affected page is an MMIO one. Since the stale data issue is
of no relevance to the hypervisor (since all guest memory accesses go
through proper accessors and validation), handling of RAM pages
remains unchanged here. Any MMIO mapped by domains however needs to be
done consistently (all cachable mappings or all uncachable ones), in
order to avoid Machine Check exceptions. Since converting existing
cachable mappings to uncachable (at the time an uncachable mapping
gets established) would in the PV case require tracking all mappings,
allow MMIO to only get mapped uncachable (UC, UC-, or WC).
This also implies that in the PV case we mustn't use the L1 PTE update
fast path when cachability flags get altered.
Since in the HVM case at least for now we want to continue honoring
pinned cachability attributes for pages not mapped by the hypervisor,
special case handling of r/o MMIO pages (forcing UC) gets added there.
Arguably the counterpart change to p2m-pt.c may not be necessary, since
UC- (which already gets enforced there) is probably strict enough.
Note that the shadow code changes include fixing the write protection
of r/o MMIO ranges: shadow_l1e_remove_flags() and its siblings, other
than l1e_remove_flags() and alike, return the new PTE (and hence
ignoring their return values makes them no-ops).
This is CVE-2016-2270 / XSA-154.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: c61a6f74f8
master date: 2016-02-17 16:16:53 +0100
to avoid console corruption.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xen.org>
master commit: 42940c0469
master date: 2015-10-12 16:01:56 +0200
Calculation reserved bits for MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE is model-dependent
and since we don't support PEBS anyway we shouldn't allow any writes to
it (but let's still permit guests wishing to disable PEBS).
We should also report PEBS as unsupported to HVM, just like we do on PV.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: fb424bf6b5
master date: 2016-01-07 15:27:16 +0100
Current Intel VPMU emulation needs to perform more checks when writing
PMU MSRs on guest's behalf:
* MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL is not checked at all
* MSR_CORE_PERF_FIXED_CTR_CTRL has more reserved bits in PMU version 2
* MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_OVF_CTRL's bit 61 is allowed on versions greater
* than 2.
We can also use precomputed mask in core2_vpmu_do_interrupt().
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 31af0d7675
master date: 2016-01-07 15:26:37 +0100
We need to have at least version 2 since it's the first version to
support various control and status registers (such as
MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL) that VPMU relies on always having.
We don't fully emulate version 4 but since it's back compatible with
earlier versions we can fall back to v3. At this point there is no
compatibility statement for v5 so anything above 4 is not supported.
For guests querying PMU version via CPUID leaf 0xa clip it at v3.
With explicit testing for PMU version we can now remove CPUID model
check.
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 00e248ce7f
master date: 2015-12-10 13:15:35 +0100
As soon as the cache is disabled, it will become out-of-sync with the
VGA device model and since no mechanism exists to acquire current VRAM
state from the device model, re-enabling it leads to stale data
being seen by the guest.
The problem was introduced by commit 3bbaaec0 ("x86/hvm: unify stdvga
mmio intercept with standard mmio intercept") and can be seen by
deliberately crashing a Windows guest; the BSOD output is corrupted.
This patch changes the existing 'cache' boolean in hvm_hw_stdvga into a
tri-state enum and only allows the state to move from 'uninitialized' to
'enabled'. Once the cache state becomes 'disabled' it will remain so for
the lifetime of the VM.
Signed-off-by: Paul Durrant <paul.durrant@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 22a1fbb575
master date: 2015-11-06 15:17:00 +0100
Add r1p12 to the list of supported Cadence UARTs. Xen only
uses the subset of features available in r1p8, so we don't
need to differentiate between r1p8 and r1p12 yet.
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 67f7afd26f)
Each ITARGETSR register are 4-byte wide and the offset is in byte.
The current implementation is computing the end of the range wrongly
resulting to emulate only ITARGETSR{0,1} read-only. The rest will be
treated as read-write.
As 8 registers should be read-only, the end of the range should be
ITARGETSR + (4 * 8) - 1.
For convenience introduce ITARGETSR7 and ITARGETSR8.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <stefano.stabellini@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit bc50de8838)
The GICv2 DT node is usually used by the guest to know the address/size
of the regions (GICD, GICC...) to map into their virtual memory.
While the GICv2 spec requires the size of the GICC to be 8KB, we
correctly do an 8KB stage-2 mapping but erroneously report 256 in the
device tree (based on GUEST_GICC_SIZE).
I bet we didn't see any issue so far because all the registers except
GICC_DIR lives in the first 256 bytes of the GICC region and all the
guests I have seen so far are driving the GIC with GICC_CTLR.EIOmode =
0.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- fixed some typos in commit message ]
(cherry picked from commit 8ee6d574b7)
With the current log is not possible for the user to understand
properly the error:
(XEN) Grant table range: 0x0000007fc00000-0x0000007fc72000
(XEN) DT: no ranges; cannot enumerate
(XEN) Device tree generation failed (-22).
(XEN)
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
(XEN) Could not set up DOM0 guest OS
(XEN) ****************************************
(XEN)
The other error message within the function already print the DT path.
Do the same here.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 01a8a8126d)
... allowing to suppress a confusing message combination: When
ACPI_DMAR_X2APIC_OPT_OUT is set, so far we first logged a message
that IR could not be enabled (hence not using x2APIC), followed by
one indicating successful initialization of IR (if no other problems
prevented that).
Also adjust the return type of iommu_supports_eim() and fix some
broken indentation in the function.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@intel.com>
master commit: 6851e97987
master date: 2015-10-13 17:16:22 +0200
gnttab_max_frames incorrectly referred to numbers of grant tab
operations and gnttab_max_maptrack_frames was confusingly worded.
Add the default for gnttab_max_frames while here (it's currently the
same on all arches since no arch uses the available arch override) and
adjust the default for gnttab_max_maptrack_frames to match the normal
form.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ef17887d84
master date: 2016-01-19 16:24:44 +0000
Most #DB exceptions are traps rather than faults, meaning that the instruction
pointer in the exception frame points after the instruction rather than at it.
However, VMX intercepts all have fault semantics, even when intercepting a
trap. Re-injecting an intercepted trap as a fault causes an infinite loop in
the guest, by re-executing the same trapping instruction repeatedly. This
breaks debugging inside the guest.
Introduce a helper which copies VM_EXIT_INTR_INTO to VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, and
use it to mirror the intercepted interrupt back to the guest.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 0747bc8b4d
master date: 2016-01-05 11:28:56 +0000
Undue use of dprintk() lead to many messages useful in diagnosing
issues in the field now being hidden in non-debug (i.e. production)
builds. Re-surface them.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8e4d18e113
master date: 2015-12-22 10:12:14 +0100
Undue use of dprintk() lead to many messages useful in diagnosing
issues in the field now being hidden in non-debug (i.e. production)
builds. Re-surface them, namely when init-time only and/or already
guarded by iommu_{verbose,debug} conditionals. Switch from using
iommu_verbose to iommu_debug in a couple of runtime cases.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@intel.com>
master commit: 009298d7ba
master date: 2015-12-22 10:11:44 +0100
While INVLPG (and on SVM INVLPGA) don't fault on non-canonical
addresses, INVVPID fails (in the "individual address" case) when passed
such an address.
Since such intercepted INVLPG are effectively no-ops anyway, don't fix
this in vmx_invlpg_intercept(), but instead have paging_invlpg() never
return true in such a case.
This is CVE-2016-1571 / XSA-168.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: bf05e88ed7
master date: 2016-01-20 13:50:10 +0100
MMUEXT_{,UN}MARK_SUPER fail to check the input MFN for validity before
dereferencing pointers into the superpage frame table.
Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
get_superpage() has a similar issue.
This is CVE-2016-1570 / XSA-167.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 47abf29a92
master date: 2016-01-20 13:49:23 +0100
ml_interface_{read,write}() would miscalculate the quantity of
data/space in the ring if it crossed the ring boundary, and incorrectly
return a short read/write.
This causes a protocol stall, as either side of the ring ends up waiting
for what they believe to be the other side needing to take the next
action.
Correct the calculations to cope with crossing the ring boundary.
In addition, correct the error detection. It is a hard error if the
producer index gets more than a ring size ahead of the consumer, or if
the consumer ever overtakes the producer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Reviewed-by: David Scott <dave@recoil.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8a2c11f876)
In Quota.merge, we merge two quota hashtables, orig_quota and mod_quota, putting
the results into dest_quota. These hashtables map domids to the number of
entries currently owned by that domain.
When mod_quota contains an entry for a domid that was not present in orig_quota
(or dest_quota), the call to get_entry caused Quota.merge to raise a Not_found
exception. This propagates back to the client as an ENOENT error, which is not
an appropriate return value from some operations, such as transaction_end.
This situation can arise when a transaction that introduces a domain (hence
calling Quota.add_entry) needs to be coalesced due to concurrent xenstore
activity.
This patch handles the merge in the case where mod_quota contains an entry not
present in orig_quota (or in dest_quota) by treating that hashtable as having
existing value 0.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 82ff7cbed6)
The new osstest tested head contains a fix for gcc-4.4 toolchain.
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit f046e501bb)
This should have been folded into the previous commit.
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 04c5efb0a1)
Apropos of discussion in
"OVMF related osstest failures on multiple branches"
http://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-01/msg00442.html
We believe the older ovmf.git does not work when built with the gcc in
Debian jessie. We do not know where this bug lies but we are fixing
it by updating ovmf.
We have decided that we are not in a position to review the changes to
OVMF upstream, and ourselves decide what to cherry pick. Instead we
will update the revision wholesale and use the xen.git stable
branches' push gate.
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The unconditional printks in the switch statement of the
hvm_set_callback_via function results in Xen log spam in non debug
versions of Xen. The printks are for debug output only so conditionally
compile the entire switch statement on debug versions of Xen only.
This is XSA-169.
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 5c1048565b
master date: 2015-12-21 13:40:48 +0100
Otherwise, especially when the compiler chooses to translate the
switch() to a jump table, unpredictable behavior (and in the jump table
case arbitrary code execution) can result.
This is XSA-166.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: b452430a4c
master date: 2015-12-17 14:22:46 +0100
FNINIT doesn't alter these registers, and hence using it is
insufficient to initialize a guest's initial state.
This is CVE-2015-8555 / XSA-165.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 81818b3f27
master date: 2015-12-17 14:22:13 +0100
Replace is_hvm_domain() in tsc_set_info() by has_hvm_container_domain()
to keep consistent with other domain type checks in tsc_set_info().
Signed-off-by: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
master commit: 3c80d6f3c6
master date: 2015-12-08 09:46:30 +0100
We've been told by Intel that server chipsets don't need the workaround
anymore starting with Ivybridge (Xeon E5/E7 v2); the second half of the
workaround was missing anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: a10307b391
master date: 2015-12-03 15:33:10 +0100
When using the FIFO ABI a guest may close an event channel that is
still LINKED. If this port is reused, subsequent events may be lost
because they may become pending on the wrong queue.
This could be fixed by requiring guests to only close event channels
that are not linked. This is difficult since: a) irq cleanup in the
guest may be done in a context that cannot wait for the event to be
unlinked; b) the guest may attempt to rebind a PIRQ whose previous
close is still pending; and c) existing guests already have the
problematic behaviour.
Instead, simply check a port is not "busy" (i.e., it's not linked)
before reusing it.
Guests should still drain any queues for VCPUs that are being
offlined, or the port will become unusable until the VCPU is onlined
and starts processing events again.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 78e24c269b
master date: 2015-12-02 15:21:46 +0100
When using EPT, type changes are done with the following steps:
1. Set entry as invalid (misconfigured) by settings a reserved memory
type.
2. Flush all EPT and combined translations (ept_sync_domain()).
3. Fixup misconfigured entries as required (on EPT_MISCONFIG vmexits or
when explicitly setting an entry.
Since resolve_misconfig() only updates entries that were misconfigured,
there is no need to invalidate any translations since the hardware
does not cache misconfigured translations (vol 3, section 28.3.2).
Remove the unnecessary (and very expensive) ept_sync_domain() calls).
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: cea357ba4b
master date: 2015-12-02 15:19:53 +0100