The GICv2 DT node is usually used by the guest to know the address/size
of the regions (GICD, GICC...) to map into their virtual memory.
While the GICv2 spec requires the size of the GICC to be 8KB, we
correctly do an 8KB stage-2 mapping but erroneously report 256 in the
device tree (based on GUEST_GICC_SIZE).
I bet we didn't see any issue so far because all the registers except
GICC_DIR lives in the first 256 bytes of the GICC region and all the
guests I have seen so far are driving the GIC with GICC_CTLR.EIOmode =
0.
Signed-off-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- fixed some typos in commit message ]
(cherry picked from commit 8ee6d574b7)
pygrub (in identify_disk_image()) detects a DOS style partition table
via the presence of the 0xaa55 signature at the end of the first
sector of the disk.
However this signature is also present in whole-disk configurations
when there is an MBR on the disk. Many filesystems (e.g. ext[234])
include leading padding in their on disk format specifically to enable
this.
So if we think we have a DOS partition table but do not find any
actual partition table entries we may as well try looking at it as a
whole disk image. Worst case is we probe and find there isn't anything
there.
This was reported by Sjors Gielen in Debian bug #745419. The fix was
inspired by a patch by Adi Kriegisch in
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=745419#27
Tested by genext2fs'ing my /boot into a new raw image (works) and
then:
dd if=/usr/lib/grub/i386-pc/g2ldr.mbr of=img conv=notrunc bs=512 count=1
to add an MBR (with 0xaa55 signature) to it, which after this patch
also works.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Cc: 745419-forwarded@bugs.debian.org
(cherry picked from commit fb31b1475f)
(cherry picked from commit 6c9b1bcce4)
... and annotate the other deliberate one: Coverity objects otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
One of the two instances was actually a bug.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 8dd6d1c099
master date: 2016-02-18 15:10:07 +0100
Starting in the wrong ELx mode I get the following debug output:
...
- Current EL 00000004 -
- Xen must be entered in NS EL2 mode -
- Boot failed -
The output of "Please update the bootloader" is missing here, because
string concatenation in gas, unlike in C, keeps the \0 between each
individual string.
Make sure this is output, too. With this, we get
...
- Current EL 00000004 -
- Xen must be entered in NS EL2 mode -
- Please update the bootloader -
- Boot failed -
as intended.
Signed-off-by: Dirk Behme <dirk.behme@de.bosch.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
[ ijc -- added same change to arm32 case ]
master commit: c31d340825
master date: 2016-02-18 10:13:42 +0000
scratch_alloc() set scratch_start to the last byte of the current
allocation. The value of scratch_start is then reused as is (if it is
already aligned) in the next allocation. This result in a potential reuse
of the last byte of the previous allocation.
Signed-off-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 4ab3ac074c
master date: 2016-02-10 14:46:45 +0100
When intercepting (or emulating) L1 guest INVLPG, the nested P2M
pointer may be (is?) NULL, and hence there's no point in calling
p2m_flush(). In fact doing so would cause a dereference of that NULL
pointer at least in the ASSERT() right at the beginning of the
function.
While so far nothing supports hap_invlpg() being reachable from the
INVLPG intercept paths (only INVLPG insn emulation would lead there),
and hence the code in question (added by dd6de3ab99 ["Implement
Nested-on-Nested"]) appears to be dead, this seems to be the change
which can be agreed on as an immediate fix. Ideally, however, the
problematic code would go away altogether. See thread at
lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-01/msg03762.html.
Reported-by: 刘令 <liuling-it@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 86c59615f4
master date: 2016-02-09 13:22:13 +0100
When modifying the timeslice of the credit scheduler in a cpupool the
cpupool global credit value (n_cpus * credits_per_tslice) isn't
recalculated. This will lead to wrong scheduling decisions later.
Do the recalculation when updating the timeslice.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Tested-by: Alan.Robinson <alan.robinson@ts.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
master commit: ffc342fbb0
master date: 2016-02-02 14:03:40 +0100
When updating the timeslice of the credit scheduler protect the
scheduler's private data by it's lock. Today a possible race could
result only in some weird scheduling decisions during one timeslice,
but further adjustments will need the lock anyway.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
master commit: f2c96ac4de
master date: 2016-02-02 14:03:06 +0100
Most updates to the exception bitmaps set or clear an individual bits.
However, entering or exiting emulated real mode unilaterally clobbers it,
leaving the exit code to recalculate what it should have been. This is error
prone, and indeed currently fails to recalculate the TRAP_no_device intercept
appropriately.
Instead of overwriting exception_bitmap when entering emulated real mode, move
the override into vmx_update_exception_bitmap() and leave exception_bitmap
unmodified.
This means that recalculation is unnecessary, and that the use of
vmx_fpu_leave() and vmx_update_debug_state() while in emulated real mode
doesn't result in TRAP_no_device and TRAP_int3 being un-intercepted.
This is only a functional change on hardware lacking unrestricted guest
support.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 78c93adf0a
master date: 2016-02-02 14:00:52 +0100
Debian bug 812166[0] reported this build failure due to
Wmisleading-indentation with gcc-6:
non-fatal.c: In function 'init_nonfatal_mce_checker':
non-fatal.c:103:2: error: statement is indented as if it were guarded by... [-Werror=misleading-indentation]
switch (c->x86_vendor) {
^~~~~~
non-fatal.c:97:5: note: ...this 'if' clause, but it is not
if ( __get_cpu_var(poll_bankmask) == NULL )
^~
I was unable to reproduce (xen builds cleanly for me with "6.0.0 20160117
(experimental) [trunk revision 232481]") but looking at the code the issue
above is clearly real.
Correctly reindent the if statement.
This file uses Linux coding style (infact the use of Xen style for
this line is the root cause of the wanring) so use tabs and while
there remove the whitespace inside the if as Linux does.
[0] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=812166
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 2e46e3f253
master date: 2016-01-22 16:19:51 +0100
Obtaining one individual range per variable range register (via
get_mtrr_range()) was bogus from the beginning, as these registers may
cover multiple disjoint ranges. Do away with that, in favor of simply
comparing masked addresses.
Also, for is_var_mtrr_overlapped()'s result to be correct when called
from mtrr_wrmsr(), generic_set_mtrr() must update saved state first.
As minor cleanup changes, constify is_var_mtrr_overlapped()'s parameter
and make mtrr_wrmsr() static.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 3272230848
master date: 2016-01-21 16:11:04 +0100
Addresses passed by PV guests should be subjected to __addr_ok(),
avoiding undue TLB flushes.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 828e114f7c
master date: 2016-01-21 16:09:22 +0100
... to prevent guest user mode arranging for a guest crash (due to
failed VM entry). (On the AMD system I checked, hardware is doing
exactly the canonicalization being added here.)
Note that fixing this in an architecturally correct way would be quite
a bit more involved: Making the x86 instruction emulator check all
branch targets for validity, plus dealing with invalid rIP resulting
from update_guest_eip() or incoming directly during a VM exit. The only
way to get the latter right would be by not having hardware do the
injection.
Note further that there are a two early returns from
vmx_vmexit_handler(): One (through vmx_failed_vmentry()) leads to
domain_crash() anyway, and the other covers real mode only and can
neither occur with a non-canonical rIP nor result in an altered rIP,
so we don't need to force those paths through the checking logic.
This is CVE-2016-2271 / XSA-170.
Reported-by: 刘令 <liuling-it@360.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ffbbfda377
master date: 2016-02-17 16:18:08 +0100
We've been told by Intel that inconsistent cachability between
multiple mappings of the same page can affect system stability only
when the affected page is an MMIO one. Since the stale data issue is
of no relevance to the hypervisor (since all guest memory accesses go
through proper accessors and validation), handling of RAM pages
remains unchanged here. Any MMIO mapped by domains however needs to be
done consistently (all cachable mappings or all uncachable ones), in
order to avoid Machine Check exceptions. Since converting existing
cachable mappings to uncachable (at the time an uncachable mapping
gets established) would in the PV case require tracking all mappings,
allow MMIO to only get mapped uncachable (UC, UC-, or WC).
This also implies that in the PV case we mustn't use the L1 PTE update
fast path when cachability flags get altered.
Since in the HVM case at least for now we want to continue honoring
pinned cachability attributes for pages not mapped by the hypervisor,
special case handling of r/o MMIO pages (forcing UC) gets added there.
Arguably the counterpart change to p2m-pt.c may not be necessary, since
UC- (which already gets enforced there) is probably strict enough.
Note that the shadow code changes include fixing the write protection
of r/o MMIO ranges: shadow_l1e_remove_flags() and its siblings, other
than l1e_remove_flags() and alike, return the new PTE (and hence
ignoring their return values makes them no-ops).
This is CVE-2016-2270 / XSA-154.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: c61a6f74f8
master date: 2016-02-17 16:16:53 +0100
gnttab_max_frames incorrectly referred to numbers of grant tab
operations and gnttab_max_maptrack_frames was confusingly worded.
Add the default for gnttab_max_frames while here (it's currently the
same on all arches since no arch uses the available arch override) and
adjust the default for gnttab_max_maptrack_frames to match the normal
form.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: ef17887d84
master date: 2016-01-19 16:24:44 +0000
Most #DB exceptions are traps rather than faults, meaning that the instruction
pointer in the exception frame points after the instruction rather than at it.
However, VMX intercepts all have fault semantics, even when intercepting a
trap. Re-injecting an intercepted trap as a fault causes an infinite loop in
the guest, by re-executing the same trapping instruction repeatedly. This
breaks debugging inside the guest.
Introduce a helper which copies VM_EXIT_INTR_INTO to VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO, and
use it to mirror the intercepted interrupt back to the guest.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 0747bc8b4d
master date: 2016-01-05 11:28:56 +0000
While INVLPG (and on SVM INVLPGA) don't fault on non-canonical
addresses, INVVPID fails (in the "individual address" case) when passed
such an address.
Since such intercepted INVLPG are effectively no-ops anyway, don't fix
this in vmx_invlpg_intercept(), but instead have paging_invlpg() never
return true in such a case.
This is CVE-2016-1571 / XSA-168.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: bf05e88ed7
master date: 2016-01-20 13:50:10 +0100
MMUEXT_{,UN}MARK_SUPER fail to check the input MFN for validity before
dereferencing pointers into the superpage frame table.
Reported-by: Qinghao Tang <luodalongde@gmail.com>
get_superpage() has a similar issue.
This is CVE-2016-1570 / XSA-167.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 47abf29a92
master date: 2016-01-20 13:49:23 +0100
ml_interface_{read,write}() would miscalculate the quantity of
data/space in the ring if it crossed the ring boundary, and incorrectly
return a short read/write.
This causes a protocol stall, as either side of the ring ends up waiting
for what they believe to be the other side needing to take the next
action.
Correct the calculations to cope with crossing the ring boundary.
In addition, correct the error detection. It is a hard error if the
producer index gets more than a ring size ahead of the consumer, or if
the consumer ever overtakes the producer.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Samuel Thibault <samuel.thibault@ens-lyon.org>
Reviewed-by: David Scott <dave@recoil.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8a2c11f876)
(cherry picked from commit 6150df9f3f)
In Quota.merge, we merge two quota hashtables, orig_quota and mod_quota, putting
the results into dest_quota. These hashtables map domids to the number of
entries currently owned by that domain.
When mod_quota contains an entry for a domid that was not present in orig_quota
(or dest_quota), the call to get_entry caused Quota.merge to raise a Not_found
exception. This propagates back to the client as an ENOENT error, which is not
an appropriate return value from some operations, such as transaction_end.
This situation can arise when a transaction that introduces a domain (hence
calling Quota.add_entry) needs to be coalesced due to concurrent xenstore
activity.
This patch handles the merge in the case where mod_quota contains an entry not
present in orig_quota (or in dest_quota) by treating that hashtable as having
existing value 0.
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Davies <jonathan.davies@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 82ff7cbed6)
(cherry picked from commit ba391da2e7)
Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commits 04c5efb0a1
and f046e501bb)
Apropos of discussion in
"OVMF related osstest failures on multiple branches"
http://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2016-01/msg00442.html
We believe the older ovmf.git does not work when built with the gcc in
Debian jessie. We do not know where this bug lies but we are fixing
it by updating ovmf.
We have decided that we are not in a position to review the changes to
OVMF upstream, and ourselves decide what to cherry pick. Instead we
will update the revision wholesale and use the xen.git stable
branches' push gate.
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commits 6c3c6ff9ec
and 1d3cc6e62c)
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
[ Cross-ported to blktap1 from 345e44a85d
"blktap2: Fix two 'maybe uninitialized' variables" -iwj;
Remainder of commit message is from blktap2's version. ]
for which gcc 4.9.0 complains about, like this:
block-qcow.c: In function `get_cluster_offset':
block-qcow.c:431:3: error: `tmp_ptr' may be used uninitialized in this function
[-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
memcpy(tmp_ptr, l1_ptr, 4096);
^
block-qcow.c:606:7: error: `tmp_ptr2' may be used uninitialized in this
function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
if (write(s->fd, tmp_ptr2, 4096) != 4096) {
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
/home/dario/Sources/xen/xen/xen.git/tools/blktap2/drivers/../../../tools/Rules.mk:89:
recipe for target 'block-qcow.o' failed
make[5]: *** [block-qcow.o] Error 1
The proper behavior is to return upon allocation failure.
About what to return, 0 seems the best option, looking
at both the function and the call sites.
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Backport-requested-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Otherwise, especially when the compiler chooses to translate the
switch() to a jump table, unpredictable behavior (and in the jump table
case arbitrary code execution) can result.
This is XSA-166.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: b452430a4c
master date: 2015-12-17 14:22:46 +0100
FNINIT doesn't alter these registers, and hence using it is
insufficient to initialize a guest's initial state.
This is CVE-2015-8555 / XSA-165.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: 81818b3f27
master date: 2015-12-17 14:22:13 +0100
Replace is_hvm_domain() in tsc_set_info() by has_hvm_container_domain()
to keep consistent with other domain type checks in tsc_set_info().
Signed-off-by: Haozhong Zhang <haozhong.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
master commit: 3c80d6f3c6
master date: 2015-12-08 09:46:30 +0100
We've been told by Intel that server chipsets don't need the workaround
anymore starting with Ivybridge (Xeon E5/E7 v2); the second half of the
workaround was missing anyway.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: a10307b391
master date: 2015-12-03 15:33:10 +0100
When using the FIFO ABI a guest may close an event channel that is
still LINKED. If this port is reused, subsequent events may be lost
because they may become pending on the wrong queue.
This could be fixed by requiring guests to only close event channels
that are not linked. This is difficult since: a) irq cleanup in the
guest may be done in a context that cannot wait for the event to be
unlinked; b) the guest may attempt to rebind a PIRQ whose previous
close is still pending; and c) existing guests already have the
problematic behaviour.
Instead, simply check a port is not "busy" (i.e., it's not linked)
before reusing it.
Guests should still drain any queues for VCPUs that are being
offlined, or the port will become unusable until the VCPU is onlined
and starts processing events again.
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: 78e24c269b
master date: 2015-12-02 15:21:46 +0100
When using EPT, type changes are done with the following steps:
1. Set entry as invalid (misconfigured) by settings a reserved memory
type.
2. Flush all EPT and combined translations (ept_sync_domain()).
3. Fixup misconfigured entries as required (on EPT_MISCONFIG vmexits or
when explicitly setting an entry.
Since resolve_misconfig() only updates entries that were misconfigured,
there is no need to invalidate any translations since the hardware
does not cache misconfigured translations (vol 3, section 28.3.2).
Remove the unnecessary (and very expensive) ept_sync_domain() calls).
Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: cea357ba4b
master date: 2015-12-02 15:19:53 +0100
Currently check for not allowed sections is performed just after
compilation. However, if compilation succeeds and check fails then
second build will create xen.gz/xen.efi without any visible error.
This happens because %.o: %.c recipe created object file during first
run and make do not execute this recipe during second run. So, look
for not allowed sections before linking. This way check will be
executed every time.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
master commit: d380b35597
master date: 2015-11-25 17:24:36 +0100
The insert_vcpu() hook is handled with inconsistent locking.
In fact, schedule_cpu_switch() calls the hook with runqueue
lock held, while sched_move_domain() relies on the hook
implementations to take the lock themselves (and, since that
is not done in Credit1 and RTDS, such operation is not safe
in those cases).
This is fixed as follows:
- take the lock in the hook implementations, in specific
schedulers' code;
- avoid calling insert_vcpu(), for the idle vCPU, in
schedule_cpu_switch(). In fact, idle vCPUs are set to run
immediately, and the various schedulers won't insert them
in their runqueues anyway, even when explicitly asked to.
While there, still in schedule_cpu_switch(), locking with
_irq() is enough (there's no need to do *_irqsave()).
Signed-off-by: Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Meng Xu <mengxu@cis.upenn.edu>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: ae2f41e3d7
master date: 2015-11-24 14:48:34 +0100
In the course of investigating the 4.1.6 backport issue of the XSA-156
patch I realized that #DB injection has always been broken, but with it
now getting always intercepted the problem has got worse: Documentation
clearly states that neither DR7.GD nor DebugCtl.LBR get cleared before
the intercept, so this is something we need to do before reflecting the
intercepted exception.
While adjusting this (and also with 4.1.6's strange use of
X86_EVENTTYPE_SW_EXCEPTION for #DB in mind) I further realized that
the special casing of individual vectors shouldn't be done for
software interrupts (resulting from INT $nn).
And then some code movement: Setting of CR2 for #PF can be done in the
same switch() statement (no need for a separate if()), and reading of
intr_info is better done close the the consumption of the variable
(allowing the compiler to generate better code / use fewer registers
for variables).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: 81a28f1400
master date: 2015-11-24 12:30:31 +0100
Combine the almost identical vm_launch_fail() and vm_resume_fail() into a
single vmx_vmentry_failure().
Re-save all GPRs so that domain_crash() prints the real register values,
rather than the stack frame of the vmx_vmentry_failure() call.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
master commit: bbcf0b218f
master date: 2015-11-03 18:14:02 +0100
This avoids a long running operation when destroying a domain with a
large PoD cache.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 59a5061723
master date: 2015-11-02 15:33:38 +0100
For one the uses of domu_max_order and ptdom_max_order were swapped.
And then gcc warns about an unused result of a __must_check function
in the control part of a conditional expression when both other
expressions can be determined by the compiler to produce the same value
(see https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=68039), which happens
when HAS_PASSTHROUGH is undefined (i.e. for ARM on 4.4 and older).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: ff841cead2
master date: 2015-12-09 13:53:13 +0100
The bootloader may call libxl__file_reference_map(), which mmap's the
pv_kernel and pv_ramdisk into process memory. This was only unmapped,
however, on the success path of libxl__build_pv(). If there were a
failure anywhere between libxl_bootloader.c:parse_bootloader_result()
and the end of libxl__build_pv(), the calls to
libxl__file_reference_unmap() would be skipped, leaking the mapped
virtual memory.
Ideally this would be fixed by adding the unmap calls to the
destruction path for libxl__domain_build_state. Unfortunately the
lifetime of the libxl__domain_build_state is opaque, and it doesn't
have a proper destruction path. But, the only thing in it that isn't
from the gc are these bootloader references, and they are only ever
set for one libxl__domain_build_state, the one which is
libxl__domain_create_state.build_state.
So we can clean up in the exit path from libxl__domain_create_*, which
always comes through domcreate_complete.
Remove the now-redundant unmaps in libxl__build_pv's success path.
This is XSA-160.
Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Tested-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 59543a7cc2)
assign_pages() can fail due to the domain getting killed in parallel,
which should not result in a hypervisor crash.
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Also delete a redundant put_gfn() - all relevant paths leading to the
"fail" label already do this (and there are also paths where it was
plain wrong). All of the put_gfn()-s got introduced by 51032ca058
("Modify naming of queries into the p2m"), including the otherwise
unneeded initializer for k (with even a kind of misleading comment -
the compiler warning could actually have served as a hint that the use
is wrong).
This is CVE-2015-8339 + CVE-2015-8340 / XSA-159.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: eedecb3cf0
master date: 2015-12-08 14:01:43 +0100
Introduce and enforce separate limits for ordinary DomU, DomU with
pass-through device(s), control domain, and hardware domain.
The DomU defaults were determined based on what so far was allowed by
multipage_allocation_permitted().
The x86 hwdom default was chosen based on linux-2.6.18-xen.hg c/s
1102:82782f1361a9 indicating 2Mb is not enough, plus some slack.
The ARM hwdom default was chosen to allow 2Mb (order-9) mappings, plus
a little bit of slack.
This is CVE-2015-8338 / XSA-158.
Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 4a578b316e
master date: 2015-12-08 14:00:33 +0100
Upstream qemu is now in qemu-xen.git and the trad fork is in
qemu-xen-traditional.git.
QEMU_UPSTREAM_REVISION is currently a tag and
QEMU_TRADITIONAL_REVISION is a specific revision, so no changes are
required to those.
Signed-off-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 78833c0425)
Conflicts:
Config.mk
Both being benign exceptions, and both being possible to get triggered
by exception delivery, this is required to prevent a guest from locking
up a CPU (resulting from no other VM exits occurring once getting into
such a loop).
The specific scenarios:
1) #AC may be raised during exception delivery if the handler is set to
be a ring-3 one by a 32-bit guest, and the stack is misaligned.
This is CVE-2015-5307 / XSA-156.
Reported-by: Benjamin Serebrin <serebrin@google.com>
2) #DB may be raised during exception delivery when a breakpoint got
placed on a data structure involved in delivering the exception. This
can result in an endless loop when a 64-bit guest uses a non-zero IST
for the vector 1 IDT entry, but even without use of IST the time it
takes until a contributory fault would get raised (results depending
on the handler) may be quite long.
This is CVE-2015-8104 / XSA-156.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
master commit: bd2239d9fa
master date: 2015-11-10 12:03:08 +0100
PoD guests need to balloon at least as far as required by PoD, or risk
crashing. Currently they don't necessarily know what the right value
is, because our memory accounting is (at the very least) confusing.
Apply the memory limit fudge factor to the in-hypervisor PoD memory
target, too. This will increase the size of the guest's PoD cache by
the fudge factor LIBXL_MAXMEM_CONSTANT (currently 1Mby). This ensures
that even with a slightly-off balloon driver, the guest will be
stable even under memory pressure.
There are two call sites of xc_domain_set_pod_target that need fixing:
The one in libxl_set_memory_target is straightforward.
The one in xc_hvm_build_x86.c:setup_guest is more awkward. Simply
setting the PoD target differently does not work because the various
amounts of memory during domain construction no longer match up.
Instead, we adjust the guest memory target in xenstore (but only for
PoD guests).
This introduces a 1Mby discrepancy between the balloon target of a PoD
guest at boot, and the target set by an apparently-equivalent `xl
mem-set' (or similar) later. This approach is low-risk for a security
fix but we need to fix this up properly in xen.git#staging and
probably also in stable trees.
This is XSA-153.
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@eu.citrix.com>
(cherry picked from commit 56fb5fd623)
Some of the sub-ops are acessible to all guests, and hence should be
rate-limited. In the xenoprof case, just like for XSA-146, include them
only in debug builds. Since the vPMU code is rather new, allow them to
be always present, but downgrade them to (rate limited) guest messages.
This is CVE-2015-7971 / XSA-152.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 95e7415843
master date: 2015-10-29 13:37:19 +0100
This was overlooked in fb442e2171 ("x86_64: allow more vCPU-s per
guest").
This is CVE-2015-7969 / XSA-151.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
master commit: 6e97c4b373
master date: 2015-10-29 13:36:52 +0100
Based on the contents of a guests physical address space,
p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() could degrade into a linear memcmp() from 0 to
max_gfn, which runs non-preemptibly.
As p2m_pod_emergency_sweep() runs behind the scenes in a number of contexts,
making it preemptible is not feasible.
Instead, a different approach is taken. Recently-populated pages are eagerly
checked for reclaimation, which amortises the p2m_pod_emergency_sweep()
operation across each p2m_pod_demand_populate() operation.
Note that in the case that a 2M superpage can't be reclaimed as a superpage,
it is shattered if 4K pages of zeros can be reclaimed. This is unfortunate
but matches the previous behaviour, and is required to avoid regressions
(domain crash from PoD exhaustion) with VMs configured close to the limit.
This is CVE-2015-7970 / XSA-150.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
master commit: 101ce53266
master date: 2015-10-29 13:36:25 +0100
Julien Grall
Ian Campbell
Andrew Cooper
Dirk Behme
Anthony PERARD
Jan Beulich
Juergen Gross
Jonathan Davies
Wei Liu
Dario Faggioli
Ian Jackson
Haozhong Zhang
David Vrabel
Daniel Kiper