Both ROMBIOS and SeaBIOS (with CONFIG_QEMU=y, as we build it) blindly
assume availability of this field (at its conventional index 0x32); OVMF
at least has code to inspect FADT. Hence we ought to have supported it
virtually forever.
As the index is beyond RTC_CMOS_SIZE, leverage the padding field in
struct hvm_hw_rtc to hold its value. Update the field only when involved
values are valid BCD century specifiers. Otherwise (for VMs migrated in
from an older hypervisor) leave handling to the DM.
This makes the Linux rtc-cmos driver report y3k compatibility.
In the new rtc_check(), besides checking the new fields also check the
pre-existing pad0 field.
While extending xen-hvmctx.c:dump_rtc() also add RTC offset there.
Fixes: 4ca1612143 ("[HVM] Move RTC emulation into the hypervisor")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger@xenproject.org>
For dates very far into the future (the MC146818 RTC's century byte can go
up to the 99th century), the present year-wise loop would become somewhat
inefficient (taking perhaps several thousand iterations). Prefix that loop
with a 400-year granular calculation (somewhat like the earlier loop does
for dates in the past).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger@xenproject.org>
Indicating it would always use BCD mode is just wrong (and then the
comment there said the opposite). All halfway recent (and really all 64-
bit capable) systems having a CMOS RTC should properly indicate the mode
in control register B.
Make use of the flag, but provide a fallback mechanism in case people run
into systems not matching the above assumption. Additionally, when binary
mode is indicated and when "cmos-rtc-probe" is in use (but "cmos-rtc-bcd"
isn't), probe whether the clock really runs in binary mode. (This probing,
sadly, can take up to 10 seconds.)
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger@xenproject.org>
Cases 0..3 are handled, and a 2-bit mask is applied to the switch()
expression. Therefore the default: case is reported unreachable by Eclair.
Insert BUILD_ERROR() to annotate this for Eclair.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
BUILD_ERROR() is even stronger a guard than assertions in general, and
ASSERT_UNREACHABLE() (or BUG()) in particular. Deviate it just like those
to allow use for marking unreachable portions of code.
In some cases code being unreachable is dependent upon configuration.
Introduce two variants, as constructs like
if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_...) )
BUILD_ERROR("...");
results in the if() still being reported as unreachable. Sadly these two
new macros introduce a new 20.12 violation each, which hence also needs
deviating.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
LPI related functions having just BUG() in them are disliked by Misra /
Eclair, as long as they don't also have a noreturn attribute.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
The stub altp2m_vcpu_idx() is recognized as "noreturn" function lacking
respective annotation (or having a return statement), which hence is deemed
unreachable code by Misra / Eclair. All call sites are guarded by
altp2m_active() checks, hence an inline function isn't needed. A
declaration will suffice, with call sites then getting DCE-d.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
In both functions cases 0..3 are handled, and a 2-bit mask is applied to
the switch() expression. Therefore the default: cases are reported
unreachable by Eclair. Subsume the "case 2" blocks each into the
corresponding default ones.
While there also drop all the pointless figure braces inside the various
case blocks, inserting blank lines instead between them.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@bugseng.com>
Of the short-data sections, only .sbss is presently mentioned in the
linker script. Place them next to, but ahead of their "normal" data
sections.
.riscv.attributes can go towards the tail of the image, next to (ahead of)
debug info.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
For whatever reason they didn't have an xsm_default_t first argument (to
cope with XSM=n mode), making it impossible to (easily) cover them in
xsm/hooks.h.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@amd.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
These are boolean, so they should always have used bool (originally
bool_t), not uint8_t. Leverage recent changes to arrange for this with
(now) fewer places which need changing (within the XSM machinery itself).
Adjust call sites as well, where the conversion wasn't done so far.
While doing this, rename flask_io{port,mem}_mapping()'s last parameters to
"map".
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Just having called the function and stored the result, there's no point in
calling it again right away with the same argument; the stored result can
be used instead. And the stored result also doesn't need overwriting again
with the same value.
No functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
While the CPU policy is obtained from hardware, the CRn values to start
with are taken from fuzzed input. Since most CR4 bits can only be set when
the respective feature is indicated as available by CPUID, the emulator
often only checks the CR4 bit. Without sanitization, assertions like the
one in emul_test_read_xcr() (checking XSAVE support) could therefore
trigger.
Omit most paging-only bits from sanitization, as the core emulator doesn't
itself walk page tables. LA57 wants checking for the bit being used by
CANONICALIZE_MAYBE().
Reported-by: Andrew Mbugua <andrewprecious388@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
..., for that logic to become reusable. While doing so undo the open-
coding of DIV_ROUND_UP(). Also switch to the new struct cpuinfo_x86 field
names.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger@xenproject.org>
printk_start_of_line() checks for a value of 0 right now. In order to be
able to have NOW() return at least monotonically increasing values, that
needs replacing by an explicit indicator.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger@xenproject.org>
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
For whatever reason they didn't have an xsm_default_t first argument (to
cope with XSM=n mode), making it impossible to (easily) cover them in
xsm/hooks.h.
flask_do_xsm_op() is also changed to return int, as all the function ever
returns is an int. This way no new machinery needs adding to xsm/hooks.h.
Instead one piece of compat machinery can then be dropped from
xsm/flask/flask_op.c.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
This can be easily done in hypercall-defs.c, thus avoiding the need to
dive into xsm/ when building Xen, just to add code which does what is done
for an absent hypercall handler anyway (returning -ENOSYS).
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolution.com>
Use of cf_check together with always_inline is pretty pointless, and with
XSM=n none of the dummy handlers are supposed to have their address taken.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Split out struct x86_event to an entirely separate header, and move a few
other items describing the architecture to a new x86-types.h. With a few
forward decls of structures and with a fair number of new #include-s in
.c files, the inclusion of x86_emulate.h (and hence
x86_emulate/x86_emulate.h) can be dropped from all header files except
hvm/emulate.h; it needs additionally adding to hvm/ioreq.h though.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Radix trees are in principle usable as soon as memory allocation works.
(Radix trees with only index 0 populated are usable even earlier.) If only
there wasn't height_to_maxindex[], which is filled only by a pre-SMP
initcall. The benefit of this array is rather limited - the calculations
done by __maxindex() can as well be done by radix_tree_maxindex(); the
overhead isn't all this high.
This was found by UBSAN on a multi-segment system:
(XEN) UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in common/radix-tree.c:83:27
(XEN) index 12 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [12]'
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d040323f9c>] R common/ubsan/ubsan.c#ubsan_epilogue+0xa/0xd5
(XEN) [<ffff82d040324d91>] F __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x9d/0xd4
(XEN) [<ffff82d04029265a>] F radix_tree_insert+0x24d/0x570
(XEN) [<ffff82d04037ac3e>] F drivers/passthrough/pci.c#alloc_pseg+0xc4/0x165
(XEN) [<ffff82d040a3b526>] F pci_add_segment+0xc/0x1b
(XEN) [<ffff82d040a5ad1b>] F acpi_parse_mcfg+0x29b/0x344
(XEN) [<ffff82d040a3f612>] F acpi_table_parse+0x5d/0x92
(XEN) [<ffff82d040a5bf55>] F acpi_mmcfg_init+0x3a2/0x71d
(XEN) [<ffff82d040a71ba6>] F pci_setup+0x17/0x29
(XEN) [<ffff82d040a784d0>] F __start_xen+0x394c/0x4ed8
(XEN) [<ffff82d040423057>] F __high_start+0xb7/0xb8
Fixes: 21844b0e32 ("PCI multi-seg: introduce notion of PCI segments")
Fixes: 8dc6738dbb ("Update radix-tree.[ch] from upstream Linux to gain RCU awareness")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
They're unreachable / dead otherwise. Really resource_{,un}plug_pci() is
further limited to PCI pass-through.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Hook definition (in struct xsm_ops), wrappers, dummy_ops, and flask_ops
need keeping in sync (including any involved #ifdef-ary), i.e. require
consistent adjustments in multiple places when a change is necessary.
Reduce this by introducing a multi-use helper header file. (However,
hooks not taking xsm_default_t as first argument in the wrappers aren't
covered.)
As there's some re-arrangement of field order in struct xsm_ops anyway,
also group together everything depending on SYSCTL=y. Similarly move
.mem_sharing_op() into the MEM_SHARING conditional.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
..., undoing the aliasing between two distinct enums, and more in line
with how the SDM nowadays names things.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
In order to use cpu_has_* expanding to host_cpu_policy.*, the host policy
needs setting up alongside boot_cpu_data.x86_capability[]. Arrange for
that towards the end of identify_cpu(). Then make sure .x86_capability[]
and host policy remain in sync when setup_{force,clear}_cpu_cap() are
used.
Rename the function now it's no longer static.
Fixes: 894bd76179 ("x86/Intel: use host CPU policy for ARAT checking")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
XSA-443 and XSA-497 addressed specific issues in specific file system
drivers (libfsimage) used by pygrub. Further issues were reported, and yet
more are to be expected. XSA-443 introduced a means to run pygrub de-
privileged. Only this mode of operation is security supported from now on.
This is XSA-508.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Calling vnuma_destroy() without any locking can race the handling of both
XENMEM_get_vnumainfo and XEN_DOMCTL_setvnumainfo. While the latter is,
without Flask, strictly only exposed to the control domain, the former
can also be invoked by a stubdom DM or a de-privileged DM running in the
control domain. Isolate the logic used by XEN_DOMCTL_setvnumainfo into a
new helper function, which then is also used from domain_kill(). While
doing so also move the vnuma_destroy() invocation out of the locked
region.
With d->vnuma properly cleared by domain_kill(), XENMEM_get_vnumainfo now
really only needs to check for the field being NULL. That check needs
repeating, though, after re-acquiring the lock.
This is CVE-2026-62429 / XSA-502.
Fixes: 9695014966 ("xen: vnuma topology and subop hypercalls")
Reported-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@vates.tech>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Dropping and re-acquiring the grant table lock for a particular operation
requires special care, as in the meantime the grant table version can
change.
During a v2 -> v1 change, status frames going away means that pre-
calculated status pointers go stale, referencing freed (and possibly
already re-used) memory. Record in-flight v2 operations, permitting the
version change only when there are none of them. Recalculate "status" in
the one place (map_grant_ref()'s error path) where it could be stale, but
confine this to reserved entries.
This is CVE-2026-62436.
Reported-by: Mark Esler <mark@hexproof.dev>
During a v1 -> v2 change, the number of shared table entries reduces,
meaning that previously validated grant references may now be out of
bounds. Because of the checking of pin counts in gnttab_set_version()
(with the grant table lock held for writing), for now-out-of-bounds gref-s
neither active mappings can exist, nor can there be in-progress copy
operations. Nevertheless bounds checks are added there, just to be on the
safe side.
For gnttab_transfer(), to cover the gap between the lock being dropped by
gnttab_prepare_for_transfer() and it being re-acquired, have the helper
return the version it found, and fail the operation if the version turns
out to have changed after re-acquiring the lock.
Further avoid needless use of shared_entry_header(), as it involves
pointer arithmetic which, when using an out-of-bounds ref, is UB.
This is CVE-2026-62435.
Everything together is XSA-501.
Fixes: a98dc13703 ("Introduce a grant_entry_v2 structure")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Mark Esler <mark@hexproof.dev>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
acquire_grant_for_copy() passes to its caller both an MFN and a struct
page_info *. The two really need to be in sync for the get_page()
underlying get_paged_frame() and get_page_type() (both acting on the
passed back struct page_info *) and the map_domain_page() (acting on the
passed back MFN) to achieve the intended effect.
Go further and also check other properties: GTF_transitive / GTF_sub_page
may have been flipped in the shared entry, so respective fields / values
also may not match.
The one field which we can be sure does match (as it was checked earlier
in the function) is ->domid. Add an assertion nevertheless.
This is CVE-2026-62428 / XSA-500.
Fixes: d8cbecb1ee ("grant-tables: Use get_page_from_gfn() instead of get_gfn()/put_gfn")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_sysctl(), now that it has the full op
struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
the same early point with and without Flask.
This is part of CVE-2026-62426 / XSA-499.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-By: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_sysctl(), now that it has the full op
struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
the same early point with and without Flask. Note that these were x86-
only, i.e. some dead/unreachable code gets eliminated for (in particular)
Arm.
This is part of CVE-2026-62426 / XSA-499.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-By: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_sysctl(), now that it has the full op
struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
the same early point with and without Flask.
This is part of CVE-2026-62426 / XSA-499.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-By: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
To shield the sysctl lock from abuse by unauthorized domains, follow what
5154fdda11 ("domctl: protect locking for get_domain_state") did: Check
for permission to issue the operation against DOM_XEN in flask_sysctl().
The finer-grained xsm_getdomaininfo() later in the handling of the sub-op
remains unaltered.
In the in-tree policy respective permission therefore needs granting.
This is part of CVE-2026-62426 / XSA-499.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_sysctl(), now that it has the full op
struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
the same early point with and without Flask.
This is part of CVE-2026-62426 / XSA-499.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-By: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Integrate the checking with flask_platform_op(); there never really was a
need to defer these checks, as the sub-op has always been known to the
function. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at the
same early point with and without Flask.
This is CVE-2026-62427 / part of XSA-499.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-By: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Addressing certain issues, in particular related to operations which may
take excessively long and therefore would need preemption, has turned out
overly costly. Since alternatives (HVM/PVH: HAP, PV: shim) are commonly
available, the decision was to deprecate the functionality, while still
retaining it for people to use at their own (security) risk. Memory-wise
small enough guests may still be okay to run.
Some CI testing depends on SHADOW_PAGING. Explicitly enable it when needed.
This is CVE-2026-42493 / XSA-495.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
With CPU policy dependency logic now properly in place and working, and
with us never enabling ISA bits in guest policies which the underlying
hardware doesn't support, the dual checks aren't needed anymore.
In turn, a number of cpu_has_* can then also go away, when their only user
was the emulator code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
As we ignore cachability aspects of insns, they're treated like simple
MOVs.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
When adding ranges, only alter existing ones when there is an exact match.
Don't accept ranges overlapping existing ones.
When removing ranges, only remove a range if there's an exact match.
Return an error when the range isn't found.
Fixes: 192c4dabc3 ("domctl and p2m changes for PCI passthru")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Rather than granting permissions when mapping (an operation that DM-s are
allowed to carry out, while they can't invoke ioport-permission), check
whether permissions actually were granted when adding a mapping. This then
also allows relaxing the necessary locking.
While no longer granting permissions upon mapping is "only" at risk of
breaking guests, no longer revoking permissions upon unmapping strictly
requires callers to additionally invoke XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission. Or
else a security issue would arise. In-tree code already does so.
While there switch to using %pd in the two log messages.
Fixes: 192c4dabc3 ("domctl and p2m changes for PCI passthru")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger@xenproject.org>
Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
DstMem processing early in x86_emulate() raises #UD when EVEX.Z is set
with a memory destination. Open-coded checks like this one are therefore
dead / unreachable code, violating Misra rules.
Fixes: 4037a62ef9 ("x86emul: support AVX512F floating-point conversion insns")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
We know that opcode_table[0x0f] is 0, there's no need to check that. Up
until ab082ffa87 ("x86emul: generate and make use of a canonical opcode
representation") or maybe already c4e7a67e3a ("x86emul: drop
SrcInvalid") this may have been justified, but it no longer is.
This eliminates a Misra C:2012 rule 2.2 ("There shall be no dead code")
violation.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
AFL has pointed out that the op_bytes-is-not-0 assertion in common SIMD
handling can trigger for these insns. Indeed when the (relevant part of)
the controlling mask register is 0, no memory is accessed at all. Leave
op_bytes unaltered in this case, to engage the short-circuiting in common
SIMD handling when fault_suppression is true and op_bytes is 0.
While there also correct a related typo in the test harness.
Fixes: 65f82d4ce1 ("x86emul: support AVX512{F,_VBMI2} compress/expand insns")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Move the little bit that's still left in x86/x86_emulate.c into a __XEN__
conditional in x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.c. Move what are roughly the
test/fuzzing harness counterparts from there into the corresponding #else.
Interestingly more recent gcc takes issue with three static const arrays
which are unused when HVM=n (noticeable in particular in the shim build).
Apparently such are diagnosed only when present in the top-level file, but
not when living in an #include-d one.
Requested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@vates.tech>
It can be used as-is for VMX. For SVM the special treatment of %rax needs
accounting for.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
... rather than papering over guest flaws: Strings passed ought to be nul-
terminated (yet sadly libxc hasn't been doing so thus far). This way we
also avoid order-1 allocations, seeing that all present callers pass
PAGE_SIZE for max_size.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com> # Changelog
Nul-terminated strings are passed in all cases, so the strlen() can very
well be invoked by the function itself. In preparation for a hypervisor
change also include the nul terminator in the size calculation.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Reviewed-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
%4.4x and alike format specifiers can be expressed shorter as %04x or, as
e.g. dump_ioapic() has it, %.4x.
In dump_fpu()'s XMM register dumping, also move away from showing bogus
xmm03 and alike. The proper register name is xmm3 for that particular
example.
Also strip trailing whitespace from lines touched.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
In a !PV configuration the functions aren't built. Hence we're better off
also not declaring them.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
From its introduction it has been used solely to add and remove pools.
No list traversal or alike did ever occur. Drop all of this as being dead
code.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
For a long time (if not forever) this lock has been referenced only from a
single CU. Misra C:2012 rule 8.7 (which we didn't accept yet) wants us to
have such identifiers non-external.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
In preparation for a hypervisor change also include the nul terminator in
the size calculations. (Note that xc_flask_getbool_byid() doesn't support
FLASK_GETBOOL's "ID being -1" variant of operation, and hence doesn't need
fiddling with.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@vates.tech>
Acked-by: Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@vates.tech>
It is mostly sorted, but there are anomalies. Eliminating them gives
people fewer excuses to (blindly) add to the end of the list.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
IRQ_PER_CPU and IRQ_GUEST_EOI_PENDING are entirely unused. x86 uses
IRQ_REPLAY, but only ever to clear the bit. Drop all three constants.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
There's no need to open-code these. No functional change intended, even if
the | changes to + in to_bcd().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
... outside of __get_cmos_time()'s locked region. There's no need to hold
the lock for these computations.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Setting ->orig_video_isVGA to the specific marker should be done only when
the VBE tag is present and the FRAMEBUFFER is either absent or indicates
RGB type. Since the "video" variable now starts out non-NULL, this
property was broken when in particular neither of the tags are present. To
move back to at least close to original behavior, add a 2nd check to said
conditional.
Fixes: d5a73cdc6b ("x86/boot: Use boot_vid_info variable directly from C code")
Reported-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tested-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@vates.tech>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Loaders respecting IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE would not load such sections,
yet we need to access it ourselves when switching out of "physical mode".
Leverage behavior new to GNU ld 2.46: Any contribution to .reloc which
doesn't have the discardable flag set (which cannot even be expressed in
ELF) will yield the output section also non-discardable.
Since for intermediate binaries we don't care about section attributes,
link in the new object only on the final linking pass.
Reported-by: Yann Sionneau <yann.sionneau@vates.tech>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Leaving the hook pointers in struct xsm_ops when !SYSCTL would lead to
the BUG_ON() in xsm_fixup_ops() triggering for respectively configured
hypervisors.
While moving the #ifdef for the corresponding xsm_*() wrappers, also move
those for xsm_page_offline() (where the hook pointer field already is
suitably guarded).
Fixes: c9eabaa03a ("xen/xsm: wrap around xsm_sysctl with CONFIG_SYSCTL")
Fixes: bddd9af604 ("xen/sysctl: wrap around XEN_SYSCTL_readconsole")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleskii Kurochko <oleskii.kurochko@gmail.com>
cpumask_to_xenctl_bitmap() may return errors. Clearing the error indicator
of an earlier such call by a (successful) later call is misleading the
caller. For "set", keep setting soft affinity if the hard affinity copy-
back fails; only accumulate respective errors.
While fiddling with return values, also drop a redundant clearing of
"ret". This eliminates a Misra C:2012 rule 2.2 ("There shall be no dead
code") violation.
Fixes: 6e4ecc6d58 ("sched: DOMCTL_*vcpuaffinity works with hard and soft affinity")
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Be less strict with permissions checks when removing a mapping and
only request the caller domain to have access to the region. Keep the
same permission checks for addition operations.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
This wants xsm_domctl() invoked, but the domctl lock not taken. Move the
handling to the respective switch(), thus eliminating the need for a
separate xsm_domctl() invocation.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Like for XEN_DOMCTL_getdomaininfo there's no need to hold the domctl
lock for XEN_DOMCTL_getvcpuinfo. While moving the code also switch to
using domain_vcpu().
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Tentatively-acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
About half the callers of vcpu_runstate_get() are solely after the
"running" time of a vCPU. Introduce a specialization with a smaller
read critical section and thus reduced risk of a need for retries.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
As Michal had indicated in review, status is now a variable that is set
but never read. I made the resulting change locally, but then committed a
stale version of the patch (also omitting Michal's R-b).
Amends: eff88c4d35 ("gnttab: simplify (really: drop) gnttab_set_frame_gfn()")
Reported-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@amd.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
Unprivileged callers better wouldn't be in the position of figuring out
domain existence from error codes. Adjust the respective path sitting
ahead of XSM checks to produce -EPERM in such cases, just like the
subsequent XSM check would yield.
Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
HAS_PIRQ is selected by x86 only, and that's expected to remain that way.
Avoid the #ifdef needed by moving the logic to arch_do_domctl(). Leverage
"currd" being available as a local variable there while doing so.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-Acked-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@gmail.com>
The only locking required here is that between checking d->target and
setting it. To avoid the need for an explicit lock, use cmpxchgptr() to
update d->target.
Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). As a positive side effect,
permissions are then checked at the same early point with and without
Flask. As the DT device path needs fetching earlier (but must not be
double fetched), cache it in a private field of the public interface
struct.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
iommu_get_device_group() uses its own locking. Thus, with caller side
locking irrelevant, it can as well be called with the domctl lock not
held.
Move the handling not only ahead of acquiring the lock, but also ahead
of the XSM check, leveraging that the sub-op has its own hook.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
the same early point with and without Flask.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(), now that it has the full op
struct passed. As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at
the same early point with and without Flask.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Subsequently some sub-ops will want to inspect their sub-sub-ops. Plus
this way we don't need to pass SSIDref separately anymore for
domain_create.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Integrate the checking with xsm_domctl(). Care needs to be taken with the
GET_VERSION sub-op, which may be invoked with DOMID_INVALID, and which has
been (and continues to be) bypassing XSM checking.
Since the latter two parameters were unused, monitor_domctl() invoking the
hook was actually redundant with the earlier xsm_domctl() (as can be seen
nicely from the hunks changing xsm/flask/hooks.c).
As a positive side effect, permissions are then checked at the same early
point with and without Flask.
While folding XEN_DOMCTL_monitor_op and XEN_DOMCTL_vm_event_op in
flask_domctl(), also fold in XEN_DOMCTL_set_access_required.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
As the GSI handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is being
moved there; the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move the
re-purposed (XSM_HOOK -> XSM_PRIV, as xsm_domctl() is now bypassed)
dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
As the I/O port handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), no code is
being moved, but the 2nd invocation of arch_do_domctl() is re-used. Move
the re-purposed dedicated XSM checks as early as possible.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
(It also already isn't used when pt_irq_{create,destroy}_bind() are
invoked for PVH Dom0.) As the handling is in arch-specific code, no code
is being moved, but the 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops like the ones
here) invocation of arch_do_domctl() is being re-used.
This is part of XSA-492.
Fixes: fda49f9b3f ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
As the handling is in arch-specific code (x86 only), almost no code is
being moved, but a 2nd (extensible to other sub-ops) invocation of
arch_do_domctl() is being added. Move just the re-purposed dedicated XSM
check as early as possible.
In flask_domctl() don't put #ifdef around the moved case label.
This is part of XSA-492.
Fixes: fda49f9b3f ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
With dedicated locking added, the domctl lock isn't required here anymore.
Move the re-purposed dedicated XSM check as early as possible.
Minimal "modernization": Switch "add" to bool and use %pd in log messages.
This is part of XSA-492.
Fixes: fda49f9b3f ("Add build option to allow more hypercalls from stubdoms")
Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
It's used twice in entirely different situations. The use in do_domctl()
wants to become an ordinary XSM_DM_PRIV invocation, while the one in vPCI
code need to remain XSM_HOOK (it may plausibly become XSM_TARGET). For
Flask, the same backing function will continue to be used for the time
being.
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_{,un}bind_pt_irq
handling out of the domctl-locked region, a separate (per-domain) lock is
needed to synchronize in particular with XEN_DOMCTL_{irq,gsi}_permission.
Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
limited to non-__init code).
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
In order to be able to pull at least the XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_mapping
handling out of the domctl-locked region, the new separate (per-domain)
lock is used to synchronize in particular with
XEN_DOMCTL_ioport_permission.
Locking is added only as far as domctl-s are affected. Uses presently
outside of the domctl lock may want dealing with subsequently (perhaps
limited to non-__init code).
This is part of XSA-492.
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Jan Beulich