See patch comment for technical details.
Concerning the timeline, this was first discovered in the aftermath of
XSA-156 which caused #DB to be intercepted unconditionally, but only in
its SingleStep + STI form which is restricted to privileged software.
After working with Intel and identifying the problematic vmentry check,
this workaround was suggested, and the patch was posted in an RFC
series. Outstanding work for that series (not breaking Introspection)
is still pending, and this fix from it (which wouldn't have been good
enough in its original form) wasn't committed.
A vmentry failure was reported to xen-devel, and debugging identified
this bug in its SingleStep + MovSS form by way of INT1, which does not
involve the use of any privileged instructions, and proving this to be a
security issue.
This is XSA-308
Reported-by: Håkon Alstadheim <hakon@alstadheim.priv.no>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Begin to document how the x86 build of Xen boots. It is by no means complete,
but is a start.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Needing to pass PYTHON=python3 into hypervisor builds is irritating and
unnecessary. Locate a suitable interpreter automatically, defaulting to Py3
if it is available.
Reported-by: Steven Haigh <netwiz@crc.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The script is 664 rather than 775, so the banner conversion doesn't actually
work if $(PYTHON) is empty:
/bin/sh: tools/fig-to-oct.py: Permission denied
make[3]: *** [include/xen/compile.h] Error 126
make[3]: Leaving directory `/builds/xen-project/people/andyhhp/xen/xen'
Fixing this is easy, but using python here is wasteful. compile.h doesn't
need XEN_BANNER rendering in octal, and text is much more simple to handle.
Replace fig-to-oct.py with a smaller sed script. This could be a shell
one-liner, but it is much more simple to comment sensibly, and doesn't need to
include the added cognative load of makefile and shell escaping.
While changing this logic, take the opportunity to optimise the banner
space (and time on the serial port) by dropping trailing whitespace, which is
84 characters for current staging.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
The script is Python 2 specific, and fails with string/binary issues with
Python 3:
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "gen-policy.py", line 14, in <module>
for char in sys.stdin.read():
File "/usr/lib/python3.5/codecs.py", line 321, in decode
(result, consumed) = self._buffer_decode(data, self.errors, final)
UnicodeDecodeError: 'utf-8' codec can't decode byte 0x8c in position 0: invalid start byte
Fixing the script to be compatible isn't hard, but using python here is
wasteful. Drop the script entirely, and write an equivelent flask-policy.S
instead. This removes the need for a $(PYTHON) and $(CC) pass.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Creative Commons is a more common license than GPL for documentation purposes.
Switch to using CC-BY-4.0 to explicitly permit re-purposing and remixing of
the content.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Lars Kurth <lars.kurth@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Introduce vmcb.ei.* to provide names to fields in exitinfo{1,2}. Implement
the task switch names for now, and clean up the TASK_SWITCH handler.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The type name is poor because the type is also used for the IDT vectoring
field, not just for the event injection field. Rename it to intinfo_t which
is how the APM refers to the data.
Rearrange the union to drop the .fields infix, and rename bytes to the more
common raw. Also take the opportunity to rename the fields in the VMCB to
increase legibility.
While adjusting all call sites, fix up style issues and make use of structure
assignments where applicable.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The local variable eventinj is set to the value of vmcb->exitintinfo which is
confusing considering that it isn't vmcb->eventinj. The variable isn't
necessary to begin with, so drop it to avoid confusion.
A local rc variable is shadowed in the CPUID, #DB and #BP handlers.
There is a mix of spelling of inst_len and insn_len, all of which are
logically the same value. Consolidate on insn_len which also matches the name
of the emulation functions for obtaining instruction lengths, and avoid
shadowing it in the CPUID and TASK_SWITCH handlers.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The vmcb is zeroed on allocate - drop all explicit writes of 0. Move
hvm_update_guest_efer() to co-locate it with the other control register
updates.
Move the BUILD_BUG_ON() into build_assertions(), and add some offset checks
for fields after the large blocks of reserved fields (as these are the most
likely to trigger from a mis-edit). Take the opportunity to fold 6 adjacent
res* fields into one.
Finally, drop all trailing whitespace in the file.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
VT-x updates RF before vmexit, so eflags written into the outgoing TSS happens
to be correct. SVM does not update RF before vmexit, and instead provides it
via a bit in exitinfo2.
In practice, needing RF set in the outgoing state occurs when a task gate is
used to handle faults.
Extend hvm_task_switch() with an extra_eflags parameter which gets fed into
the outgoing TSS, and fill it in suitably from the SVM vmexit information.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The function is init, so can use boot_cpu_data directly.
There is no need to write 0 to svm_feature_flags in the case of a CPUID
mismatch (not least because this is dead code on real hardware), and no need
to use locked bit operations.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
c/s d0a699a389 "x86/monitor: add support for descriptor access events"
introduced logic looking for what appeared to be exitinfo (not that this
exists in SVM - exitinfo1 or 2 do), but actually passed the exit IDT vectoring
information. There is never any IDT vectoring involved in these intercepts so
the value passed is always zero.
In fact, SVM doesn't provide any information, even in exitinfo1 and 2. Drop
the svm struct entirely, and bump the interface version.
In the SVM vmexit handler itself, optimise the switch statement by observing
that there is a linear transformation between the SVM exit_reason and
VM_EVENT_DESC_* values. (Bloat-o-meter reports 6028 => 5877 for a saving of
151 bytes).
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Adrian Pop <apop@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Unhandled IOMMU errors (i.e. not IO_PAGE_FAULT) should still be printed, and
not hidden behind iommu=debug.
While adjusting this, factor out the symbolic name handling to just one
location exposing its off-by-one nature.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The TASK_SWITCH vmexit has fault semantics, and doesn't provide any NRIPs
assistance with instruction length. As a result, any instruction-induced task
switch has the outgoing task's %eip pointing at the instruction switch caused
the switch, rather than after it.
This causes callers of task gates to livelock (repeatedly execute the call/jmp
to enter the task), and any restartable task to become a nop after its first
use (the (re)entry state points at the iret used to exit the task).
32bit Windows in particular is known to use task gates for NMI handling, and
to use NMI IPIs.
In the task switch handler, distinguish instruction-induced from
interrupt/exception-induced task switches, and decode the instruction under
%rip to calculate its length.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
ICEBP isn't handled well by SVM.
The VMexit state for a #DB-vectored TASK_SWITCH has %rip pointing to the
appropriate instruction boundary (fault or trap, as appropriate), except for
an ICEBP-induced #DB TASK_SWITCH, where %rip points at the ICEBP instruction
rather than after it. As ICEBP isn't distinguished in the vectoring event
type, the state is ambiguous.
To add to the confusion, an ICEBP which occurs due to Introspection
intercepting the instruction, or from x86_emulate() will have %rip updated as
a consequence of partial emulation required to inject an ICEBP event in the
first place.
We could in principle spot the non-injected case in the TASK_SWITCH handler,
but this still results in complexity if the ICEBP instruction also has an
Instruction Breakpoint active on it (which genuinely has fault semantics).
Unconditionally intercept ICEBP. This does have NRIPs support as it is an
instruction intercept, which allows us to move %rip forwards appropriately
before the TASK_SWITCH intercept is hit. This makes #DB-vectored switches
have consistent behaviour however the ICEBP #DB came about, and avoids special
cases in the TASK_SWITCH intercept.
This in turn allows for the removal of the conditional
hvm_set_icebp_interception() logic used by the monitor subsystem, as ICEBP's
will now always be submitted for monitoring checks.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandru Isaila <aisaila@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Petre Pircalabu <ppircalabu@bitdefender.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The VT-x task switch handler adds inst_len to %rip before calling
hvm_task_switch(), which is problematic in two ways:
1) Early faults (i.e. ones delivered in the context of the old task) get
delivered with trap semantics, and break restartibility.
2) The addition isn't truncated to 32 bits. In the corner case of a task
switch instruction crossing the 4G->0 boundary taking an early fault (with
trap semantics), a VMEntry failure will occur due to %rip being out of
range.
Instead, pass the instruction length into hvm_task_switch() and write it into
the outgoing TSS only, leaving %rip in its original location.
For now, pass 0 on the SVM side. This highlights a separate preexisting bug
which will be addressed in the following patch.
While adjusting call sites, drop the unnecessary uint16_t cast.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
It turns out that the XSA-304 / CVE-2018-12207 fix of disabling executable
superpages doesn't work well with the nested p2m code.
Nested virt is experimental and not security supported, but is useful for
development purposes. In order to not regress the status quo, disable the
XSA-304 workaround until the nested p2m code can be improved.
Introduce a per-domain exec_sp control and set it based on the current
opt_ept_exec_sp setting. Take the oppotunity to omit a PVH hardware domain
from the performance hit, because it is already permitted to DoS the system in
such ways as issuing a reboot.
When nested virt is enabled on a domain, force it to using executable
superpages and rebuild the p2m.
Having the setting per-domain involves rearranging the internals of
parse_ept_param_runtime() but it still retains the same overall semantics -
for each applicable domain whose setting needs to change, rebuild the p2m.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The safety of livepatching depends on every stack having been unwound, but
there is one corner case where this is not true. The Sharing/Paging/Monitor
infrastructure may use waitqueues, which copy the stack frame sideways and
longjmp() to a different vcpu.
This case is rare, and can be worked around by pausing the offending
domain(s), waiting for their rings to drain, then performing a livepatch.
In the case that there is an active waitqueue, fail the livepatch attempt with
-EBUSY, which is preforable to the fireworks which occur from trying to unwind
the old stack frame at a later point.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
We cache Long Mode and No Execute early on boot, so take the opportunity to
cache HYPERVISOR early as well.
Replace opencoded early access to the feature bit.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
We have a cached cpuid_ext_features in the trampoline which is kept in sync by
various pieces of boot logic. This is complicated, and all it is actually
used for is to derive whether NX is safe to use.
Replace it with a canned value to load into EFER.
trampoline_setup() and efi_arch_cpu() now tweak trampoline_efer at the point
that they are stashing the main copy of CPUID data. Similarly,
early_init_intel() needs to tweak if it has re-enabled the use of NX.
This simplifies the AP boot and S3 resume paths by using trampoline_efer
directly, rather than locally turning FEATURE_NX into EFER_NX.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
c/s ff66ccefe5 "x86/CPUID: adjust SSEn dependencies" made SSE4A depend on
SSSE3, but these processors really do have have SSE4A without SSSE3.
This manifests as an upgrade regression, as the SSE4A feature disappears from
view.
Adjust the SSE4A feature to depend on SSE3 rather than SSSE3.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
c/s bb038f3116 "AMD/IOMMU: replace INTREMAP_ENTRIES" introduces a call to
intremap_table_entries() in dump_intremap_table() before tbl.ptr is checked
for NULL.
intremap_table_entries() internally uses virt_to_page() which falls over
ASSERT(va >= XEN_VIRT_START);
in __virt_to_page().
Reported-by: Igor Druzhinin <igor.druzhinin@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
See patch documentation and comments.
This is part of XSA-305 / CVE-2019-11135
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To protect against the TSX Async Abort speculative vulnerability, Intel have
released new microcode for affected parts which introduce the MSR_TSX_CTRL
control, which allows TSX to be turned off. This will be architectural on
future parts.
Introduce tsx= to provide a global on/off for TSX, including its enumeration
via CPUID. Provide stub virtualisation of this MSR, as it is not exposed to
guests at the moment.
VMs may have booted before microcode is loaded, or before hosts have rebooted,
and they still want to migrate freely. A VM which booted seeing TSX can
migrate safely to hosts with TSX disabled - TSX will start unconditionally
aborting, but still behave in a manner compatible with the ABI.
The guest-visible behaviour is equivalent to late loading the microcode and
setting the RTM_DISABLE bit in the course of live patching.
This is part of XSA-305 / CVE-2019-11135
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
CVE-2018-12207 covers a set of errata on various Intel processors, whereby a
machine check exception can be generated in a corner case when an executable
mapping changes size or cacheability without TLB invalidation. HVM guest
kernels can trigger this to DoS the host.
To mitigate, in affected hardware, all EPT superpages are marked NX. When an
instruction fetch violation is observed against the superpage, the superpage
is shattered to 4k and has execute permissions restored. This prevents the
guest kernel from being able to create the necessary preconditions in the iTLB
to exploit the vulnerability.
This does come with a workload-dependent performance overhead, caused by
increased TLB pressure. Performance can be restored, if guest kernels are
trusted not to mount an attack, by specifying ept=exec-sp on the command line.
This is part of XSA-304 / CVE-2018-12207
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Something causes SandyBridge IOMMUs to choke when sharing EPT pagetables, and
an EPT superpage gets shattered. The root cause is still under investigation,
but the end result is unusable in combination with CVE-2018-12207 protections.
This is part of XSA-304 / CVE-2018-12207
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
"AMD/IOMMU: don't blindly allocate interrupt remapping tables" introduces a
call at runtime from amd_iommu_add_device() to amd_iommu_set_intremap_table()
which is still marked as __init.
On one AMD Rome machine we have, this results in a crash the moment we try to
use an SR-IOV VF in a VM.
Reported-by: Jennifer Herbert <jennifer.herbert@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
c-indent-level isn't considered a safe variable, and "solaris" isn't a
recognised C style. Both cause prompts when opening the files.
Fix all blocks up per CODING_STYLE
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
PTF_* are declared within CONFIG_PV, and used outside:
mm.c: In function ‘_put_page_type’:
mm.c:2819:32: error: ‘PTF_preemptible’ undeclared (first use in this function)
bool preemptible = flags & PTF_preemptible;
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm.c:2819:32: note: each undeclared identifier is reported only once for each
function it appears in
mm.c:2842:24: error: ‘PTF_partial_set’ undeclared (first use in this function)
if ( !(flags & PTF_partial_set) )
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm.c: In function ‘put_page_type_preemptible’:
mm.c:3090:33: error: ‘PTF_preemptible’ undeclared (first use in this function)
return _put_page_type(page, PTF_preemptible, NULL);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm.c: In function ‘put_old_guest_table’:
mm.c:3108:25: error: ‘PTF_preemptible’ undeclared (first use in this function)
PTF_preemptible |
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm.c:3110:27: error: ‘PTF_partial_set’ undeclared (first use in this function)
PTF_partial_set : 0 ),
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm.c: In function ‘put_page_type_preemptible’:
mm.c:3091:1: error: control reaches end of non-void function
[-Werror=return-type]
}
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Re-position the definitions to be outside of the #ifdef CONFIG_PV
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Since c/s 1d429034 "hypercall: update vcpu_op to take an unsigned vcpuid",
which incorrectly swapped 'i' for 'u' in the parameter type list, guests have
been able to hit the BUG() in next_args()'s default case.
Correct these back to 'i'.
In addition, make adjustments to prevent this class of issue from occurring in
the future - crashing Xen is not an appropriate form of parameter checking.
Capitalise NEXT_ARG() to catch all uses, to highlight that it is a macro doing
non-function-like things behind the scenes, and undef it when appropriate.
Implement a bad_fmt: block which prints an error, asserts unreachable, and
crashes the guest.
On the ARM side, drop all parameter checking of p. It is asymmetric with the
x86 side, and akin to expecting memcpy() or sprintf() to check their src/fmt
parameter before use. A caller passing "" or something other than a string
literal will be obvious during code review.
This is XSA-296.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
l1tf-barrier is an inappropriate name, and came about because of restrictions
on could be discussed publicly when the patches were proposed.
In practice, it is for general Spectre v1 mitigations, and is necessary in all
cases. An adversary which can control speculation in Xen can leak data in
cross-core (BCBS, etc) or remote (NetSpectre) scenarios - the problem is not
limited to just L1TF with HT active.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Just as with CONFIG_SPECULATIVE_HARDEN_ARRAY, branch hardening should be
configurable at compile time.
The previous CONFIG_HVM was a consequence of what could be discussed publicly
at the time the patches were submitted, and wasn't actually correct. Later
patches will make further corrections.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
evaluate_nospec() is incredibly fragile, and this is one giant bodge.
To correctly protect jumps, the generated code needs to be of the form:
cmp/test <cond>
jcc 1f
lfence
...
1: lfence
...
Critically, the lfence must be at the head of both basic blocks, later in the
instruction stream than the conditional jump in need of protection.
When the compiler chooses to out-of-line the condition calculation (e.g. by
not inlining a predicate), the code layout can end up as:
pred:
lfence
<calculate cond>
ret
call pred
cmp $0, %eax
jcc 1f
...
1: ...
which breaks the speculative safety, as the lfences are earlier in the
instruction stream than the jump in need of protection.
Any use of evaluate_nospec() needs all static inline predicates which use it
to be declared always_inline to prevent the optimiser having the flexibility
to generate unsafe code.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cross reference and list all errata, now that they are published.
These errata are specific to Haswell/Broadwell. They should have model and
vendor checks, as Intel isn't the only vendor to implement VT-x.
All affected models use the same MSR indicies, so these can be hard coded
rather than looking up and storing constant values.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
At the time of fixing c/s 20f1976b44, no obvious errata had been published,
and BDF14 looked like the most obvious candidate. Subsequently, BDF93 has
been published and it is obviously this.
The erratum states that LER_TO_LIP is the only affected MSR. The provisional
fix in Xen adjusted LER_FROM_LIP, but this is not correct. The FROM MSRs are
intended to have TSX metadata, and for steppings with TSX enabled, it will
corrupt the value the guest sees, while for parts with TSX disabled, it is
redundant with FIXUP_TSX. Drop the LER_FROM_LIP adjustment.
Replace BDF14 references with BDF93, drop the redundant 'bdw_erratum_' prefix,
and use an Intel vendor check, as other vendors implement VT-x.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The include of asm/cpuid.h in spec_ctrl.c was an artefact of an older version
of c/s 3860d5534d, and is not used in its current incarnation.
Fix a typo in a comment.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
* Initialise all spinlock fields together
* No need for an atomic set_bit() to initialise domid_bitmap
* Avoid using partial-line printk()'s.
* Style fixes (too many, and too few spaces)
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
We are now down to 0 SVM maintainers who are active and wish to hold the
position. In agreement with AMD, Jan and I will take over maintainership in
the short term.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Linux has started using RDTSCP as of v5.1. This has highlighted a bug in Xen,
where virtual vmexit simply gives up.
(XEN) d1v1 Unhandled nested vmexit: reason 51
(XEN) domain_crash called from vvmx.c:2671
(XEN) Domain 1 (vcpu#1) crashed on cpu#2:
Handle RDTSCP in the virtual vmexit hander in the same was as RDTSC
intercepts.
Reported-by: Sarah Newman <srn@prgmr.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Tested-by: Chris Brannon <cmb@prgmr.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The virtual address of the base of the IOMMU's regsters is not useful for
diagnostic purposes, and is quite voluminous. The PCI coordinates is by far
the most useful piece of identifying information.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The xen-ucode utility is new with the late loading improvements in 4.13.
Update the documentation suitably.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Put together an introduction page for the Sphinx/RST docs, along with a
glossary which will accumulate over time.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Lars Kurth <lars.kurth@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Sphinx, its linters, and RST modes in common editors, expect 3 spaces of
indentation. Some bits already conform to this expectation. Update the
rest to match.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Lars Kurth <lars.kurth@citrix.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This has actually been present since c/s bd7c09c0 in 2008, and survived
through all of the recent microcode refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
c/s c0902a9a14 refactored hvm_enable() a little, but dropped the logic which
cleared hap_supported in the case that the user had asked for it off.
This results in Xen booting up, claiming:
(XEN) HVM: Hardware Assisted Paging (HAP) detected but disabled
but with HAP advertised via sysctl, and XEN_DOMCTL_CDF_hap being accepted in
domain_create().
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This is a minor UI change, but users which have elected to enable
XEN_GUEST (which still defaults to no) will definitely need one of these
options, and will typically want both.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
There are legitimate circumstance where array hardening is not wanted or
needed. Allow it to be turned off.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The names in retpoline_safe() are copied from should_use_eager_fpu(). The
names in mds_calculations() come partly from Linux's intel-family.h, and
partly from conversations with Intel.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The domain builder no longer uses local CPUID instructions for policy
decisions. This resolves a key issue for PVH dom0's. However, as PV dom0's
have never had faulting enforced, leave a command line option to restore the
old behaviour.
Advertise virtualised faulting support to control domains unless the opt-out
has been used.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
With the final users moved over to using XEN_DOMCTL_set_cpumsr_policy, drop
this domctl and associated infrastructure.
Rename the preexisting set_cpuid XSM vector to set_cpu_policy, now that it is
back to having a single user.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The purpose of this change is to stop using xc_cpuid_do_domctl(), and to stop
basing decisions on a local CPUID instruction. This is not a correct or
appropriate way to construct policy information for other domains.
The overwhelming majority of this logic is redundant with the policy logic in
Xen, but has a habit of becoming stale (e.g. c/s 97e4ebdcd7 resulting in the
CPUID.7[1].eax not being offered to guests even when Xen is happy with the
content).
There are a few subtle side effects which need to remain in place. A
successful call to xc_cpuid_apply_policy() must result in a call to
xc_set_domain_cpu_policy() because that is currently the only way the
ITSC/VMX/SVM bits become reflected in the guests CPUID view. Future cleanup
will remove this side effect.
The topology tweaks are local to libxc. Extend struct cpuid_policy with
enough named fields to express the logic, but keep it identical to before.
Fixing topology representation is another future area of work.
No (expected) change in behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The purpose of this change is to stop using xc_cpuid_do_domctl(), and to stop
basing decisions on a local CPUID instruction. This is not an appropriate way
to construct policy information for other domains.
Obtain the host and domain-max policies from Xen, and mix the results as
before. Provide rather more error logging than before.
No semantics changes to xc_cpuid_set(). There are conceptual problems with
how the function works, which will be addressed in future toolstack work.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This patch is broken out just to simplify the following two.
For xc_cpuid_set(), document how the 's' and 'k' options works because it is
quite subtle. Replace a memset() with a for loop of 4 explicit NULL
assigments. This mirrors the free()'s in the fail path.
For xc_cpuid_apply_policy(), const-ify the featureset pointer. It isn't
written to, and was never intended to be mutable.
Drop three pieces of trailing whitespace.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This hypercall allows the toolstack to present one combined CPUID and MSR
policy for a domain, which can be audited in one go by Xen, which is necessary
for correctness of the auditing.
Reuse the existing set_cpuid XSM access vector, as this is logically the same
operation.
As x86_cpu_policies_are_compatible() is still only a stub, retain the call to
recalculate_cpuid_policy() to discard unsafe toolstack settings.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Sergey Dyasli <sergey.dyasli@citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
update_domain_cpuid_info() currently serves two purposes. First to merge new
CPUID data from the toolstack, and second, to perform any necessary updating
of derived domain/vcpu settings.
The first part of this is going to be superseded by a new and substantially
more efficient hypercall.
Carve the second part out into a new domain_cpu_policy_changed() helper, and
call this from the remains of update_domain_cpuid_info().
This does drop the call_policy_changed, but with the new hypercall in place,
the common case will be a single call per domain. Dropping the optimisation
here allows for a cleaner set of following changes.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
This helper will eventually be the core "can a guest configured like this run
on the CPU?" logic. For now, it is just enough of a stub to allow us to
replace the hypercall interface while retaining the previous behaviour.
It will be expanded as various other bits of CPUID handling get cleaned up.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
The control domain exclusion for CPUID Faulting predates dom0 PVH, but the
reason for the exclusion (to allow the domain builder to see host CPUID
values) isn't applicable.
The domain builder *is* broken in PVH control domains, and restricting the use
of CPUID Faulting doesn't make it any less broken. Tweak the logic to only
exclude PV control domains.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Release-acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
In smpboot, there is no need to abstract setup_trampoline() away. Drop the
define and use bootsym_phys() directly.
In tboot, the 3 size calculations are invariant of their bootsym_phys()/__pa()
transformations, but the compiler can't tell this. Drop the tranformations,
which simplifies the compiled function.
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/1 up/down: 0/-134 (-134)
Function old new delta
tboot_shutdown 620 486 -134
Total: Before=3337042, After=3336908, chg -0.00%
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The fix for c/s 01ba8f62b6 was speculative given no local repro. It turns
out that it didn't fix the problem.
The $(AUTOINCS) variable needs to be visible before libs.mk is included, to
have any effect.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Travis reports:
make subdirs-install
make[2]: Entering directory `/home/travis/build/andyhhp/xen/tools'
make[3]: Entering directory `/home/travis/build/andyhhp/xen/tools'
make -C libs install
make[4]: Entering directory `/home/travis/build/andyhhp/xen/tools/libs'
make[5]: Entering directory `/home/travis/build/andyhhp/xen/tools/libs'
make -C toolcore install
make[6]: Entering directory `/home/travis/build/andyhhp/xen/tools/libs/toolcore'
make libs
make[7]: Entering directory`/home/travis/build/andyhhp/xen/tools/libs/toolcore'
for i in include/xentoolcore.h include/xentoolcore_internal.h; do \
gcc -x c -ansi -Wall -Werror -I<snip>/xen/tools/libs/toolcore/../../../tools/include \
-S -o /dev/null $i || exit 1; \
echo $i; \
done >headers.chk.new
include/xentoolcore_internal.h:30:31: fatal error: _xentoolcore_list.h: No such file or directory
#include "_xentoolcore_list.h"
^
compilation terminated.
make[7]: *** [headers.chk] Error 1
The problem is that xentoolcore_internal.h includes _xentoolcore_list.h which
hasn't been generated yet.
The toolcore headers.chk rule (unlike the other libraries) had an additional
dependency against $(AUTOINCS), which forced the headers to be generated
first. Replicate this in the common libs.mk
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
ERST isn't a mandatory table, and also isn't very common to find. The message
is unnecessary noise during boot. Furthermore, it is redundant with the list
of found ACPI tables printed just ahead.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Printing "$foo disabled" is unnecessary noise during boot. All other VPMU
settings emit a message, so this doesn't result in any ambiguity.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
gcc (GCC) 4.8.5 20150623 (Red Hat 4.8.5-28) complains:
xenctrl_stubs.c: In function 'stub_xc_domain_create':
xenctrl_stubs.c:216:28: error: 'val' may be used uninitialized
in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
cfg.arch.emulation_flags = ocaml_list_to_c_bitmap
^
xenctrl_stubs.c:198:12: error: 'val' may be used uninitialized
in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
cfg.flags = ocaml_list_to_c_bitmap
^
cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
GCC doesn't point at the correct piece of code, but the diagnostic text is
correct, and can occur when the list is empty. Initialise val to 0.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
c/s f089fddd94 broke the Ocaml ABI by renumering XEN_SYSCTL_PHYSCAP_directio
without adjusting the Ocaml physinfo_cap_flag enumeration. Fix this by
inserting CAP_PV between CAP_HVM and CAP_DirectIO.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Signed-off-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
The code generation for bootsym() is atrocious, and unnecessarily complicated.
Given the appropriate physical address, all we need is to construct a virtual
address of the appropriate type.
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/9 up/down: 0/-4256 (-4256)
Function old new delta
kexec_reserve_area.constprop 165 159 -6
reset_videomode_after_s3 231 70 -161
identify_cpu 1341 1176 -165
parse_acpi_sleep 408 240 -168
early_init_intel 632 440 -192
__cpu_up 1983 1682 -301
do_platform_op 6469 5526 -943
compat_platform_op 6433 5482 -951
__start_xen 12939 11570 -1369
Total: Before=3341298, After=3337042, chg -0.13%
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
GCC of a CentOS 6 vintage complains:
cpuid.c: In function 'parse_xen_cpuid':
cpuid.c:32: error: 'mid' may be used uninitialized in this function
This can't occur in practice because the while() loop is guarenteed to be
entered, but initialise mid to work around the issues.
Spotted by Gitlab CI.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
7a0 is an integer field, not a mask - taking the logical and of the hardware
and policy values results in nonsense. Instead, take the policy value
directly.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@cirtrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
For gen-cpuid.py, fix a comment describing self.names, and generate the
reverse mapping in self.values. Write out INIT_FEATURE_NAMES which maps a
string name to a bit position.
For parse_cpuid(), use cmdline_strcmp() and perform a binary search over
INIT_FEATURE_NAMES. A tweak to cmdline_strcmp() is needed to break at equals
signs as well.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
AMD Pre-Fam17h CPUs "optimise" {F,}X{SAVE,RSTOR} by not saving/restoring
FOP/FIP/FDP if an x87 exception isn't pending. This causes an information
leak, CVE-2006-1056, and worked around by several OSes, including Xen. AMD
Fam17h CPUs no longer have this leak, and advertise so in a CPUID bit.
Introduce the RSTR_FP_ERR_PTRS feature, as specified by AMD, and expose to all
guests by default. While adjusting libxl's cpuid table, add CLZERO which
looks to have been omitted previously.
Also introduce an X86_BUG bit to trigger the (F)XRSTOR workaround, and set it
on AMD hardware where RSTR_FP_ERR_PTRS is not advertised. Optimise the
conditions for the workaround paths.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Future changes are going to want to use cpu_bug_* in a mannor similar to
Linux. Introduce one bug word, and generalise the calculation of
NCAPINTS.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The sole remaining member of struct intel_iommu is the drhd backpointer. Move
this into struct vtd_iommu, replacing the the 'intel' pointer.
This removes one dynamic memory allocation per IOMMU on the system.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
It is unclear why this abstraction exists, but iommu_get_flush() returns
possibly NULL and every user unconditionally dereferences the result. In
practice, I can't spot a path where iommu is NULL, so I think it is mostly
dead.
Move the two function pointers into struct vtd_iommu (using a flush prefix),
and delete iommu_get_flush(). Furthermore, there is no need to pass the IOMMU
pointer to the callbacks via a void pointer, so change the parameter to be
correctly typed as struct vtd_iommu. Clean up bool_t to bool in surrounding
context.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
It is unclear why this abstraction exists, but iommu_ir_ctrl() returns
possibly NULL and every user unconditionally dereferences the result. In
practice, I can't spot a path where iommu is NULL, so I think it is mostly
dead.
Move the fields into struct vtd_iommu, and delete iommu_ir_ctrl().
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
It is unclear why this abstraction exists, but iommu_qi_ctrl() returns
possibly NULL and every user unconditionally dereferences the result. In
practice, I can't spot a path where iommu is NULL, so I think it is mostly
dead.
Move the sole member into struct vtd_iommu, and delete iommu_qi_ctrl().
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
VT-d's local struct iommu is an overly-generic name, for a structure which in
practice maps 1-to-1 with the real IOMMUs in the system.
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Sander reported a build failure which manifests as `make; make install`
failing with:
<snip>/cross-install -m0644 -p xen-dir/xen-shim //usr/local/lib/xen/boot/xen-shim
install: cannot stat 'xen-dir/xen-shim': No such file or directory
make[4]: *** [Makefile:52: install] Error 1
make[4]: Leaving directory '/usr/src/new/xen-unstable/tools/firmware'
It has subsequently been seen intermittently by OSSTest. This was caused by
c/s 32b1d628 triggering a preexisting linkfarm bug for partial rebuilds.
Between the first `make` and the subsequent `make install`, the linkfarm logic
observes new final build products and regenerates the linkfarm. This includes
a distclean, which throws away everything from the first `make`.
As the xen-shim rule use a symlink, the link itself remains still up-to-date
but is broken due to the distclean, which causes install to fail.
Update the linkfarm logic to not regenerate itself when build artefacts
appear. This isn't a comprehensive fix but is the best which can be done
easily. Any further effort would be better spent making out-of-tree builds
work for Xen.
Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
In the case the while loop gets interrupted, the target musn't appear as
up-to-date. The mov $X.tmp $X must be the last action of the rule.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>
Perform parsing in a custom_param, rather than stashing the content in a
string and parsing in an initcall. Adjust the parsing to conform to current
standards.
No practical change.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
sleep_states[] is a write-only array, and despite the loop logic, the printed
message is consistently "ACPI sleep modes: S3". Drop it all.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
lmsw is an obsolete relic of the 286 processor - so much so that it even lacks
intercept assistance on AMD processors.
Use a plain mov to %cr0 which is easier to follow, certainly faster to
virtualise on AMD hardware, and almost certainly a faster microcode path in
real hardware.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
gdt_boot_descr and gdt_48 disagree on how long trampoline_gdt is.
Introduce an end label for each GDT and have the linker calculate their size,
rather than hard coding it.
Also, just as with c/s af292b41e9, there is no point forcing the CPU to set
Access bits. Fix all affected GDTs.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
load_TR() is used exclusively in the resume path, but jumps through a lot of
unnecessary hoops. As suspend/resume is strictly on CPU0 in idle context, the
correct GDT to use is boot_gdt, which means it doesn't need saving on suspend.
Although doing more than strictly necessary, reuse load_system_tables(), which
is already used by APs on the S3 resume path.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
It is never written to.
This was an oversight when it was moved from asm into C.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
The logic depends on being run on CPU0, and in IDLE context. Having this
explicitly identified allows for simplification of the whole S3 path.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This functionality is obsolete. It was introduced by c/s 41296317a3 into
Xend, but was never exposed in libxl.
Nothing limits this to PV guests, but it makes no sense for HVM guests.
Looking through the XenServer templates, this was used to work around bugs in
the 32bit RHEL/CentOS 4.7 and 4.8 kernels (fixed in 4.9) and RHEL/CentOS/OEL
5.2 and 5.3 kernels (fixed in 5.4). RHEL 4 as a major version went out of
support in 2017, whereas the 5.2/5.3 kernels went out of support when 5.4 was
released in 2009.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Christian Lindig <christian.lindig@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
This functionality is obsolete. It was introduced by c/s 39407bed9c into
Xend, but never exposed in libxl.
While not explicitly limited to PV guests, this is PV-only by virtue of its
position in the pagefault handler.
Looking though the XenServer templates, this was used to work around bugs in
the 32bit RHEL/CentOS 4.{5..7} kernels (fixed in 4.8). RHEL 4 as a major
version when out if support in 2017.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Marek Marczykowski-Górecki <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
c/s 650c31d3af "x86/IRQ: fix locking around vector management" adjusted the
locking in adjust_irq_affinity().
The S3 path ends up here via iommu_resume() before interrupts are enabled, at
which point spin_lock_irq() fails ASSERT(local_irq_is_enabled()); but with no
working console.
Use spin_lock_irqsave() instead to cope with interrupts already being
disabled.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Building with GCC 8.3 on Buster identifies:
src/xenstat_linux.c: In function 'xenstat_collect_networks':
src/xenstat_linux.c:307:32: warning: 'snprintf' output may be truncated before
the last format character [-Wformat-truncation=]
snprintf(devNoBridge, 16, "p%s", devBridge);
^
src/xenstat_linux.c:307:2: note: 'snprintf' output between 2 and 17 bytes into
a destination of size 16
snprintf(devNoBridge, 16, "p%s", devBridge);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
devNoBridge[] needs one charater more than devBridge[], so allocate one byte
more. Replace a raw 16 in the snprintf() call with a sizeof() expression
instead.
Finally, libxenstat, unlike most of the rest of the Xen, doesn't use -Werror
which is why this issue went unnoticed in CI. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Andrew Cooper